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ABSTRACT 
 
Assessing Taiwan’s Semi-presidentialism:  A Within-case Comparison through the Lens of 
State Capacity 
 
by 
 
Chih-Yung Ho 
 
The Republic of China (ROC) government was transformed into a semi-presidential (SP) 
system after the 1997 ROC Constitutional Amendments. This constitutional framework has 
been subject to criticisms for creating a powerful but unaccountable presidency in president-
parliamentary congruence (SP majority regime), a political stalemate between the executive 
and legislative branches in president-parliamentary incongruence (SP minority regime), and 
an incapable government regardless which political party is in power. My research examines 
the validity of these criticisms by empirically studying the Presidential (executive)-
legislative relationship of variations in ROC’s semi-presidentialism (independent variable), 
namely, SP majority and minority regimes, and its impact on the nation’s governance, 
specifically through the lens of state capacity (dependent variable), from mid-1997 to early 
2018. My research methods include hypothesis testing and a power-law analysis. I also build 
linear regression models to explore if there is a correspondence between trends in approval 
ratings of the President, the Premier, and his Cabinet in Taiwan and variations in state 
capacity in the ROC SP regimes over the past twenty-odd years, respectively. Four salient, 
alternative dimensions of state capacity are examined in this study: extractive/fiscal capacity, 
  ix 
(domestic) coercive/(external) military capacity, administrative/bureaucratic capacity (with 
a focus on policy coherence/continuity), and legal capacity (with a focus on legislative 
productivity). 
This study uses Taiwan’s over two decades of SP experience to test (i.e., confirm or 
falsify) the conventional wisdom that governance in president-parliamentary congruence is 
considered more effective than that in president-parliamentary incongruence. The research 
findings show that the SP majority/minority government division may not be associated with 
overall state capacity (detected by chi-squared tests). Whereas it makes some differences in 
serveral dimensions of state capacity, the KMT/DPP rule division would not necessarily 
affect state capacity, or have effects limited to only legal capacity and performance of 
coercive capacity. More specifically, the SP majority regime outperforms its minority 
counterpart, as hypothetically expected and unexpected, respectively, in fiscal capacity 
(when measured with changes made by the Legislature to annual general budgets, either in 
revenue or expenditure) and military capacity (when measured with the natural log of 
defense budgets in expenditure per capita), amidst long-standing Communist Chinese 
threats to Taiwan. By contrast, both institutional and party divisions affect legal capacity, 
but not in the direction expected. Similarly, high frequencies, or power-law distributions of 
Cabinet official changes (reflective of administrative/bureaucratic capacity) are found in 
both SP majority and minority regimes (even after the party factor was accounted for), 
although the latter more evidently followed a self-organized criticality behavior. The 
institutional factor affects coercive capacity only when it is measured by its performance 
(violent crime rates per 100,000 population), rather than its capacity per se. The findings 
also reveal that variations in state capacity in the ROC SP regimes were barely reflected, if 
  x 
at all, in job approval ratings of the President and the Premier and not reflected for the 
Cabinet in Taiwan.  
These statistical results are synthetically interpreted with two different perspectives, 
namely of leadership and political culture, based on inputs from my semi-structured 
interviews with a few leading politicians and senior political journalists in Taiwan. Between 
my statistical analysis and the interviews, this study tries to build up a complicated but 
convincing picture of twenty years of governance under the new constitutional arrangements. 
It seems, for the time being, Taiwan’s experience has cast doubt on, if not falsified, the 
conventional wisdom that governance in president-parliamentary congruence is better than 
that in president-parliamentary incongruence. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, a.k.a. KMT) under then-President Ma Ying-
jeou’s (馬英九) leadership suffered a stunning defeat in Taiwan’s 2016 combined 
Presidential and Legislative elections on January 16, garnering only 31% of the Presidential 
popular vote and securing barely 35 seats in the 113-seat Legislature, clearly reflective of the 
public’s disapproval of outgoing Ma’s eight-year Presidency. The sound defeat to the pro-
Taiwan independent Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) led by Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) was 
a sharp reversal of the sweeping 2008 election victories of Ma and his party. Under eight 
years of KMT rule (2008-2016), the party retained a substantial legislative majority, unlike 
its DPP predecessor Chen Shui-bian’s (陳水扁) Presidency, which never enjoyed a 
legislative majority. Conventionally, and perhaps theoretically, the KMT/Ma administration 
which was given a mandate to govern and enact laws would have had been deemed capable 
of doing more work with less effort than its DPP/Chen counterpart.  
Although Tsai’s victory gave the DPP control of the Legislature for the first time in 
history, her honeymoon with the Taiwanese public ended much sooner than she had hoped. 
Voters in Taiwan delivered a shark rebuke to the ruling DPP in the November 2018 midterm 
(local) elections, repeating the pattern of the KMT’s disaster in the 2014 midterm elections 
and thus signaling that the DPP will be hard-pressed to retain the Presidency in the 2020 
election. In 2018, the KMT won 15 out of 22 jurisdictions and the DPP only six. The results 
were almost an exact reversal of the numbers from the 2014 midterm elections, in which the 
DPP won 13 jurisdictions and the KMT won only 6. One might wonder how it was possible 
for the two debacles of Taiwan’s ruling parties in “total governance” (完全執政), with a 
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single party controlling the Presidency and Legislature, in the 2016 general and 2018 local 
elections to happen. Nevertheless, this study will focus on the national level.  
Within the “third wave,” the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan began its democratic 
transition in the late 1980s, and the ROC government was transformed into a semi-
presidential (a.k.a. dual executive) system—a popularly elected presidency with considerable 
power alongside a premier and cabinet responsible to the parliament, in accordance with the 
Duvergerian definition (see Chapter 2)—after the 1997 ROC Constitutional Amendments 
from the spirit of parliamentarism enshrined in a five-branch constitutional framework,1 as 
shown in Figure 1.2 Semi-presidentialism (hereafter referred to as SP, so is semi-
presidential) is a common choice in many third-wave nascent democracies. According to a 
variety of sources, SP is applied in dozens of countries worldwide, ranging from 20 or so up 
to approximately one-third of all countries, due to a controversy over its definition (Elgie, 
2016).3  
                                                     
1 The amended ROC Constitution of 1997 still retains the organizational structure of the Presidential Palace and 
five branches (called “Yuan” meaning house), namely, the Executive Yuan (Cabinet), the Legislative Yuan 
(Parliament), the Judicial Yuan (an organ that oversees the nation’s court system, with its Council of Grand 
Justices serving as the sole judicial review authority), the Examination Yuan (empowered to administer the 
nation’s civil service), 
and the Control Yuan (the nation’s top watchdog body or ombudsman), based on the national founding father 
Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s constitutional theory. 
2 The 1997 Amendments empower the ROC President to appoint the president of the Executive Yuan (the 
Premier) without Legislative confirmation. With its power to confirm the President’s nomination of the Premier 
being removed, the Legislative Yuan received the power to vote no-confidence in the Premier by a simple 
majority in return. And if this scenario happens, the Premier then either resign or request that the President 
dissolve the Legislative Yuan. 
3 The definitional controversy of what constitutes SP in literature leads to a difference in the number of 
countries that have adopted an SP constitution worldwide. For example, in advancing his post-Duvergerian 
definition of SP (explained in the next chapter), Robert Elgie (2008 coauthored with McMenamin; 2011) 
identifies up to 57 SP countries. By contrast, Wu Yu-shan (2006), a co-editor of Semi-Presidentialism and 
Democracy (2011) with Elgie (whose essay in this edited volume has been cited immediately above), singles 
out 33 SP regimes through a sequence of tests on Duverger’s tripartite definition of SP: democracy 
(democracies or non-democratic regimes), formal (republics or monarchies; prime minister or president as head 
of government), and substance (I. direct election of the president cum the prime minister responsible to the 
parliament or indirect election of the president/the prime minister responsible to the president, not the 
parliament; II. the president with substantive or limited power). Wu further designates 25 of them as “narrowly-
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However, SP is a neglected area of study. Compared with lots of work look at 
presidentialism vs. parliamentarism, there is relatively a paucity of literature on SP, 
specifically in a comparative perspective, except to suggest that it is likely to end in a 
democratic breakdown or become authoritarian.4 Moreover, given that SP has a rich variety 
of possibilities with respect to the president-parliamentary relations, hence various subtypes 
(to be further discussed in Chapter 2), its study can thus uncover valuable insights from 
structural impact on governance. As a working democracy, Taiwan has shown some 
significant variations, albeit not as many, in its SP constitutional practice over twenty-odd 
years, since 1997 (whereas not all SP countries have experienced variations, say, Russia).5 
Unfortunately, Taiwan is largely ignored in existing Europe-centered SP literature and 
literature on structural impact on governance in a comparative perspective. This dissertation 
intends to pose an analytic framework that allows for variations in ROC SP and will thus 
hopefully be beneficial to empirical SP studies. 
 
                                                     
defined SP regimes” because of their substantive presidential power while eight with limited presidential power 
as “broadly-defined SP regimes.” Despite their co-authorship, there remains a noticeable difference between 
Eligie and Wu with respect to identifying and, thus, counting SP regimes worldwide. Likewise, such a 
difference can also be detected in reference sources (e.g., survey, yearbook). For example, Freedom House’s 
annual surveys of 2004 and 2008 reveal that there are 55 and 46 (free and partly free) SP countries in the given 
years, respectively (as cited in Elgie [2005] and Tsai [2009], respectively, given that Freedom House’s annual 
reports published on its website for public viewing do not contain a list of government types). The Central 
Intelligence Agency’s World Factbook (2016-2017), however, identifies only 21 SP republics in the world (the 
latest edition is available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2128.html). But 
Taiwan is identified as an SP country for sure regardless of which said source is used. 
4 However, a debate on the (negative) impact of SP constitutions on democratic performance was recently 
raised by more optimistic scholars (e.g., Cheibub & Chernykh, 2009) or those whose contribution is valued by 
further distinguishing between subtypes of SP democracies in relation to democratic survival (e.g., Elgie & 
Schleiter, 2011). Similar topics in this regard have also emerged in the Taiwanese context, such as (a possible 
SP effect on) democratic consolidation (Paolino, 2008) and polarization (Chang & Chu, 2008). 
5 Neither a coalition government was formed, nor did a French-style cohabitation happen in Taiwan. 
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Figure 1.1. Semi-presidentialism in Taiwan, the Republic of China 
 
Indeed, the ROC on Taiwan is a prominent case in the third wave of democratization, 
given its position as being the first and only democracy installed in Chinese society, the 
world’s 22th largest and 19th wealthiest economy,6 the 13th most competitive global 
economy,7 one of the world’s “most free” countries in the world,8 and ranked 24th 
worldwide in military strength worldwide,9 not to mention its three democratic and peaceful 
turnovers of ruling parties following five Presidential elections hitherto in the 21st century, 
which has clearly passed Samuel P. Huntington’s (1991) “two-turnover test” of democratic 
consolidation. Right after Taiwan’s 2008 Presidential election, which marked the country’s 
second turnover of ruling parties, the-US President George W. Bush issued a statement 
congratulating Taiwan as “a beacon of democracy for Asia and the world.”10  
                                                     
6 See the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook Database (October 2018), list of countries 
by gross domestic product (GDP) based on purchasing power parity (PPP) valuation of country GDP and per 
capita, respectively, in 2017: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2018/02/weodata/index.aspx.  
7 The World Economic Forum’s annual Global Competitiveness Report assesses the competitiveness landscape 
of most economies worldwide based on 12 main drivers of productivity, or “pillars,” grouped into four 
categories: enabling environment, human capital, markets, and the innovation ecosystem. See the Global 
Competitiveness Report 2018: https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-competitveness-report-2018. 
8 In Freedom House’s latest annual report on global freedom released in early 2018, Taiwan scores the highest 
freedom rating of 1.0 out of 7.0 in both political rights and civil liberties. Overall, Taiwan receives an 
aggregated score of 93 out of 100, ahead of France (90), Italy (89), the US (86), and South Korea (84). See 
Freedom in the World 2018: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2018. 
9 See military website Global Firepower’s latest, annual survey for 2018: 
https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp. 
10 See the American Institute in Taiwan website, U.S. Statements on Taiwan Presidential Election: 
https://www.ait.org.tw/en/officialtext-ot0802.html. 
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Viewed from a domestic perspective, however, the island began to suffer from political 
turbulence since the DPP Presidential candidate Chen won a plurality in a three-way race and 
thereby clinched his party’s historic first Presidential victory in 2000, ending the KMT’s 
half-century rule in Taiwan. Without enjoying a legislative majority or adopting a French-
style cohabitation, the DPP administration by Chen was mired in political gridlock, albeit re-
elected on a razor-thin margin of 0.2% in 2004 after the 3/19 Shooting Incident (三一九槍擊
案), the mystery-shrouded “assassination” attempt on Chen.11 This difficult situation was 
further compounded by a series of corruption scandals surrounding the then-First Family that 
did not begin to surface until Chen’s second term. In 2008, the KMT returned to power on 
the back of its presidential nominee Ma’s landslide victory with over 58% of the vote, a 
record, together with its sweeping victory in the earlier Legislative race, an absolute majority 
of 81 seats out of 113. Chen was arrested in late the same year, making history as the first 
former ROC President to be jailed. 
Although the KMT enjoyed what then-President Ma called “total governance” in his 
eight-year, two-term Presidency (2008-2016), and so had the party prior to 2000, such 
political advantage did not necessarily ensure satisfactory results in governance. Cross-Strait 
relations between Taiwan and Mainland China during the Ma administration became the 
most stable they had ever been since 1949. However, the public’s dissatisfaction with Ma’s 
performance grew, primarily due to the government’s handling of the deteriorating economy 
and his pursuit of closer Mainland ties. The Sunflower Movement (太陽花學運) erupted in 
the spring of 2014 over a dispute about a trade liberalization pact with Beijing, which saw 
                                                     
11 On March 19, the eve of the 2004 Presidential election, then-President Chen was shot and slightly injured. 
Chen was accused of staging the shooting to win sympathy votes that made himself squeeze past his KMT rival, 
Lien Chan (連戰). Lien contested the outcome but lost his case after two court trials (Hung, 2007).   
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thousands of student-led demonstrators storm and occupy the parliament building, a first in 
the nation’s history. The unprecedented occupation movement shut down the parliament and 
lasted 24 days, ending up successfully blocking the ratification of the trade pack (Loa, 2014). 
Throughout most of his second term of Presidency, Ma’s job approval ratings hovered below 
20% and once plummeted to a single digit percentage,12 heralding the KMT’s disastrous 
defeats in the 2014 local and 2016 general elections.13  
The DPP swept back into power in 2016 and enjoyed its first “total governance”: Tsai 
became the island’s first female President in a landslide victory, winning 56% of the vote to 
her KMT opponent’s 31%; the DPP won a legislative majority for the first time in Taiwan’s 
democratic history, with 68 seats compared with the KMT’s 35. Like her predecessor Ma, 
Tsai’s popularity plummeted early in her Presidency, mainly due to economic stagnation and 
her controversial pension reform efforts. A poll released by local broadcaster TVBS in mid-
February 2017 revealed that Tsai’s approval rating sank to 29% since she was inaugurated 
about nine months ago, compared with Ma’s 28% after his first nine months in office in 
TVBS’s earlier poll in late February 2009.14  
It is further recalled that in the summer of 1997, then-ROC President cum KMT 
Chairman Lee Teng-hui (李登輝), who is the first-ever popularly elected President in 
Chinese history and orchestrated the 1997 Constitutional Amendments, asserted that the new 
ROC SP regime would guarantee the country’s future stability and peaceful development for 
                                                     
12 In the wake of the “September Strife” (馬王「九月政爭」) of 2013, a power struggle in which Ma, who 
doubled as KMT chairman, failed to revoke then-Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng’s (王金平) KMT party 
membership for lobbying in a court case, a move that could strip him of the post, Ma’s approval plunged to a 
record-low 9.2% (Wang, 2013). 
13 The Presidential and Legislative elections were held concurrently in 2012 for the first time and again in 
2016. 
14 See the opinion polls at http://other.tvbs.com.tw/export/sites/tvbs/file/other/poll-center/0602091.pdf and 
http://other.tvbs.com.tw/export/sites/tvbs/file/other/poll-center/even-20090226185206.pdf. 
 7 
 
next thirty years. Ironically, these words are still ringing in the ears of most people in Taiwan. 
Now that it has been over twenty years since Taiwan adopted SP, during which the island has 
experienced “total governance” and minority government following three turnovers of ruling 
parties, it is a good time to systematically examine how the constitutional engineering affects 
governance, specifically through the lens of state capacity, across different administrations in 
Taiwan. 
Overall, we see president-parliamentary congruence, or “total governance,” in the last 
three years of Lee’s rule, most of Ma’s Presidency, and the current Tsai administration. It 
peaked during Ma’s first term and Tsai’s current, with their parties enjoying a dominant 
majority, or nearly a three-quarters and two-thirds supermajority, respectively, in the 
Legislative Yuan. By contrast, Chen’s two terms as President and Ma’s caretaker period of 
about four months15 exemplify president-parliamentary incongruence, given their minority 
status in the Legislature. Again, the history of governments in democratic Taiwan after 1997 
seems not to leave majority governance looking more successful than others, thus having the 
makings of an interesting puzzle of why “total governance” does not lead to greater voter 
satisfaction with the ruling SP regime in Taiwan, or, in a more articulated and measurable 
way: Does the majority/minority status division make difference to govern? And if it does, 
don’t people perceive the difference? To clarify this puzzle is important to understand and 
explain why the KMT in “total governance” lost so badly in the 2016 Presidential and 
Legislative elections as its DPP/minority counterpart in 2008?16 
                                                     
15 The latest 2016 presidential and legislative elections were held concurrently on January 16. The new 
Legislative Yuan convened on February 1 and the new President was inaugurated on May 20. 
16 Taiwan’s SP constitutional framework has long been subject to criticisms for creating a powerful but 
unaccountable Presidency. The issue of whether to amend the Constitution to adopt a parliamentary system was 
therefore raised by the 2016 Presidential election, albeit with great difficulty and, more importantly, a lack of 
consensus in the island. 
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1.2 Research questions and objectives  
This dissertation conducts an empirical analysis of the presidential (executive)-
legislative relationship of variation in ROC SP (independent variable) and its impact on 
the country’s state capacity (dependent variable) from 1997 to early 2018. Given the dual-
legitimacy feature of SP—both the president and the legislative majority (theoretically, of the 
premier) can claim separate mandates to govern, the government cannot function well 
without sufficient legislative support. As a tentative explanation, it is assumed that the more 
SP systems reach president-parliamentary congruence, the more productive they become. 
Second, there is a wide array of definitions of governance, some of which appear very 
inclusive (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010), whereas considerable disagreement 
remains over how to define governance (Rotberg, 2014). This dissertation seeks to unpack 
the notion of and examine governance by means of multiple alternative dimensions of state 
capacity. State capacity in literature can be conceptualized as six distinct, yet interrelated, 
dimensions, each being considered as illustrative of the most crucial and defining elements of 
governance: extractive/Schumpeterian fiscal capacity; coercive/military capacity; classic 
Weberian administrative/bureaucratic capacity; legal capacity; infrastructural capacity; and 
transformative (and distributive) capacity. In Chapter 2, a literature review examines the six 
dimensions of state capacity in a two-fold form: conceptualization and operationalization 
(either analyzable or measurable) and recommends with a parsimonious principle that 
extractive/fiscal, coercive/military, administrative/bureaucratic, and legal capacities be 
selected for analysis because of their more distinguishable features.  
This dissertation aims to address three research questions about the constitutional 
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structural impact on governance: 
1. What is the relationship between president-parliamentary mode of interaction, i.e., 
congruence or incongruence, and state capacity to govern? Does it stick with the 
conventional wisdom that governance in president-parliamentary congruence is 
considered more effective than that in president-parliamentary incongruence?17 
This is the main question of this dissertation and can be rephrased, given that 
conventional wisdom tentatively applied in the Taiwanese context, in more detail as 
follows: Is Taiwan’s state capacity in “total governance,” namely, of the KMT/Lee 
administration in 1997-2000, the KMT/Ma administration in 2008-early 2016, and the 
current DPP/Tsai administration, higher than that in minority governance, namely, of the 
DPP/Chen administration in 2000-2008 and the KMT/Ma administration in February-
May 2016? However, a continuous lack of voter satisfaction with the ruling regime, 
followed by successive defeats in general elections, seems to imply two possibilities: 
One, that the majority/minority government division makes no difference. And two, that 
it does, but that people do not perceive the difference (say, as shown in opinion polls), 
which may be a sign of a crisis in governance. Testing the latter leads to my third 
question listed below. Additionally, one may wonder if there is a difference in state 
capacity between SP majority and minority regimes under the same-party rule in Taiwan? 
So far (as of early 2018), there has been 16 ROC SP duarchies, including nine majority 
and seven minority regimes (Table 1.1; see also changes in parliamentary composition of 
Taiwan since 1996 in Table 1.2). Again, the dual legitimacy accentuates the importance of 
president-parliamentary congruence. 
                                                     
17 This idea is inspired by, and therefore complement, the debates on parliamentarism and the separation of 
powers and, in the US context, the performance of united vs. divided government.  
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2. Regardless of how varying state capacity is at an aggregate level, do all dimensions of 
state capacity respond similarly to the majority/minority government division? If they do 
not, which dimension is more or most reactive to the majority/minority government 
division? 
3. Can the people in Taiwan perceive and appreciate differences, if any, in state capacity? 
From the perspective of responsible party government, “total governance” theoretically 
makes it easier for voters to attribute blame for incompetent governance, thereby 
throwing out an incompetent party government, which may be signs of a healthy 
democracy. The answer to this question might thus help us understand if such a healthy 
democracy is accessible.  
In a word, all of these can become subsumed in a more fundamental research question: Is SP 
good for Taiwan
  
 
11 
 
Table 1.1. The ROC Semi-presidential Duarchies 
Duarchy Premier: party affiliation Period Legislative (working) 
majority 
Regime subtype: further sub-
classificationa 
KMT/Lee-Lien Lien Chan (連戰): KMT Feb. 1993-Sept. 1997 KMT M: super-presidentialism 
KMT/Lee-Siew Vincent C. Siew (蕭萬長): KMT Sept. 1997-May 2000 KMT M: super-presidentialism 
DPP/Chen-Tang Tang Fei (唐飛): KMT May 2000-Oct. 2000 KMT-led pan-Blue 
Campb 
m: minority/divided gov’t 
(collision/a Finnish compromise) 
or cohabitation in disputec 
DPP/Chen-Chang Chang Chun-hsiung (張俊雄): DPPd Oct. 2000-Feb. 2002 KMT-led pan-Blue 
Camp 
m: minority/divided gov’t 
(collision) 
DPP/Chen-Yu Yu Shyi-kun (游錫堃): DPP Feb. 2002-Feb. 2005 KMT-led pan-Blue 
Camp 
m: minority/divided gov’t 
(collision) 
DPP/Chen-Hsieh Frank Hsieh Chang-ting (謝長廷): DPP Feb. 2005-Jan. 2006 KMT-led pan-Blue 
Camp 
m: minority/divided gov’t 
(collision) 
DPP/Chen-Su Su Tseng-chang (蘇貞昌): DPP Jan. 2006-May 2007 KMT-led pan-Blue 
Camp 
m: minority/divided gov’t 
(collision) 
DPP/Chen-Chan Chang Chun-hsiung (張俊雄): DPP May 2007-May 2008 KMT-led pan-Blue 
Camp 
m: minority/divided gov’t 
(collision) 
KMT/Ma-Liu Liu Chao-shiuan (劉兆玄): KMT May 2008-Sept. 2009 KMT M: super-presidentialism 
KMT/Ma-Wu Wu Den-yih (吳敦義): KMT Sept. 2009-Feb. 2012 KMT M: super-presidentialism 
KMT/Ma-Chen Sean Chen Chun (陳冲): KMT Feb. 2012-Feb. 2013 KMT M: super-presidentialism 
KMT/Ma-Jiang Jiang Yi-huah (江宜樺): KMT Feb. 2013-Dec. 2014 KMT M: super-presidentialism 
KMT/Ma-Mao Mao Chi-kuo (毛治國): KMT Dec. 2014-Jan. 2016 KMT M: super-presidentialism 
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Table 1.1. (cont.) 
Duarchy Premier: party affiliation Period Legislative (working) 
majority 
Regime subtype: further sub-
classificationa 
KMT/Ma-Chang  Simon Chang San-cheng (張善政): Independent Jan. 2016-May 2016 
 
DPP m: minority/divided gov’t 
(caretaker Cabinet)e 
DPP/Tsai-Lin Lin Chuan (林全): Independent (albeit long, 
informally affiliated with the DPP)f 
May 2016-Sept. 2017 DPP M: super-presidentialism 
DPP Tsai-Lai William Lai Ching-de (賴清德): DPP Sept. 2017-Jan. 2019 DPP M: super-presidentialism 
Note: Data for the period of duarchy from the website of the ROC Executive Yuan: http://www.ey.gov.tw 
a. M = SP majority regime; m = SP minority regime (see also discussions of SP regime subtypes and their further sub-classifications in Chapter 2.) 
b. In recent years (specifically, after 2000), two major but loose political coalitions were formed in Taiwan due to increased political polarization: the pro-
unification pan-Blue Camp led by the KMT and included the New Party (NP) and the People First Party (PFP), both splinter parties of the KMT, and the pro-
independence pan-Green Camp led by the DPP and included the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) and the New Power Party (NPP) which emerged from the 
Sunflower Movement in 2014. Since the NP and the PFP had grown out of the KMT, their coalition was named after the color of the KMT emblem, and so 
did the DPP-led pan-Green Camp. Since the 2012 general elections, however, the PFP leaders have become less enthusiastic about their alliance with KMT, 
sometimes swinging toward the DPP. 
c. The Chen-Tang duarchy, or Chen’s first Cabinet, but led by a KMT-affiliated Premier, is more commonly considered as a compromise (closer to the Finnish 
“division of labor” system, but with less presidential concessions) rather than a French-style cohabitation because the KMT was not granted the power to 
form a new Cabinet nor was its then-Chairman Lien Chan officially consulted prior to Tang’s appointment (Wu, 2000, 2007). Tang stepped down after only 
137 days because of a disagreement with Chen over the country’s controversial fourth nuclear power plant. By contrast, Robert Elgie (2005) views the short-
lived Tang Cabinet as an example of cohabitation. Tang Fei is a retired ROC four-star Air Force general. Before being appointed to form a new Cabinet, he 
was outgoing President Lee Teng-hui’s Defense Minister. 
d. Chang was the nation’s first DPP-affiliated Premier. He was declared “persona non grata” by the Legislature, a first in the ROC Constitutional history, soon 
after he was sworn in in 2000 because of his decision to halt construction of the fourth nuclear power plant. Chang was unprecedentedly appointed to the 
  
 
13 
Premiership for a second time more than five years after he resigned from the post. 
e. Although the DPP won both the Presidency and a majority in the Legislature in 2016, then-President-elect and DPP Chairwoman Tsai rejected then-President 
Ma’s request on constitutional grounds to form a Legislative majority-led Cabinet, i.e., cohabitation, during a nearly four-month gap between the seating of 
the new Legislature on February 1 and Tsai’s inauguration on May 20. 
f. Although Lin has never joined the DPP, he started his political career being a political appointee of former Mayor Chen Shui-bian of Taipei and later served 
as a Cabinet member during much of Chen’s Presidency. Before his premiership, Lin led the DPP-affiliated think tank, the New Frontier Foundation, for two 
years (Tai & Chen, 2016). 
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Table 1.2. Parliamentary Composition during the ROC Semi-presidentialisma 
 
Note: Adapted from the website of the Parliamentary Library of the ROC Legislative Yuan: https://npl.ly.gov.tw/do/www/homePage 
a. In accordance with the ROC Constitution and its 1991 Amendments, the size of the Legislative Yuan is proportional to population. The 1997 Amendments 
Term of the Legislative Yuan (period) Total number of seats Number (%) of seats by party/coalition (elections results)b 
KMT NP PFP DPP TSU NPP Others 
3rd (Feb. 1996-Jan. 1999) 164 85 
(51.8) 
21 
(12.8) 
-- 54 
(32.9) 
-- -- 4 
(2.4) 
4th (Feb. 1999-Jan. 2002) 225 123 
(54.7) 
11 
(4.9) 
-- 70 
(31.1) 
-- -- 21 
(9.3) 
5th (Feb. 2002-Jan. 2005) 225 68 
(30.2) 
1 
(0.4) 
46 
(20.4) 
87 
(38.7) 
13 
(5.8) 
-- 10 
(4.4) 
Pan-Blue = 115 (51.1) Pan-Green = 100 (44.4) 
6th (Feb. 2005-Jan. 2008) 225 79 
(35.1) 
1 
(0.4) 
34 
(15.1) 
89 
(39. 6) 
12 
(5.3) 
-- 10 
(4.4) 
Pan-Blue = 114 (50.7) Pan-Green = 101 (44.9) 
7th (Feb. 2008-Jan. 2012) 113 81 
(71.7) 
0 
(0) 
1 
(0.9) 
27 
(23.9) 
0 
(0) 
-- 4 
(3.5) 
Pan-Blue = 84 (72.6) Pan-Green = 27 (23.9) 
8th (Feb. 2012-Jan. 2016) 113 64 
(56.6) 
0 
(0) 
3 
(2.7) 
40 
(35.4) 
3 
(2.7) 
-- 3 
(2.7) 
Pan-Blue = 64 (56.6) Pan-Green = 43 (38.1) 
9th (Feb. 2016-Jan. 2020) 113 35 
(31.0) 
0 
(0) 
3 
(2.7) 
68 
(60.2) 
0 
(0) 
5 
(4.4) 
2 
(1.8) 
Pan-Blue = 35 (31.0) Pan-Green = 73 (64.6) 
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increased the total seats of the Legislative Yuan to 225. The latest amendments in 2005 created a two-ballot electoral system incorporating single-member 
districts and party-list seats, halved the number of Legislative seats to 113, and extended legislators’ terms of office from three years to four, effective as of 
the 7th Legislative Yuan. 
b. See a description of Taiwan’s major political parties and coalitions in footnote b of Table 1.1. (The percentage was rounded to one decimal place.) 
 
 
 16 
 
On balance, as this dissertation attempts to draw inferences about the effect of SP 
engineering on governance unpacked into components of state capacity, several other 
variables that have to be taken into account in interpreting results, as follows:   
1. Political parties: Two possibilities are held out: One, that given the same SP 
majority/minority status, ROC government ruled by different political parties may vary in 
their governance capabilities. Conventionally, one may expect different ruling parties in 
the same majority/minority status to behave similarly. And two, that given the same 
ruling party, majority governance may not outperform its minority counterpart as 
conventionally expected. If things go either way, the party factor seems to have 
explanatory power to decipher causal mechanisms of the central puzzle of this study. In 
other words, it is possible for political parties to have an effect on state capacity alongside 
SP structural variations. 
2. Leadership: the “quality” of the package of traits of the President, Premier, and major 
party and legislative leaders, often reflective of how they interact with one another. For 
example, the “September Strife” between then-President Ma and Legislative Speaker 
Wang, briefly described above in footnote 12, is widely seen as an outgrowth of their 
being not in synchronization with important legislation, albeit both KMT-affiliated. 
3. Taiwan’s political culture, rooted in traditional Chinese culture and influenced by the 
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KMT’s past authoritarian rule, that has dominated the country since its democratization at 
the turn of the 1990s. Taiwan’s polarized ideological politics is also a concern of interest. 
 
This dissertation pursues three core objectives that fill gaps in research on the 
constitutional structural impact assessment of governance in nascent non-European SP 
democracies. The first is to investigate and evaluate the selected alternative dimensions of 
state capacity in different SP regimes in Taiwan. While there exists a handful of literature that 
studies and compares the consequences of different systems of government (parliamentary, 
presidential, and SP) on governance either theoretically (Sartori, 1994) or empirically 
(Weaver & Rockman, 1993, via patterned policies), very few studies have been conducted on 
the same topic but with SP variations involved (e.g., a case study of Mongolia by Sophia 
Moestrup and Gombuserengiin Ganzorig [2007]), let alone through the lens of state capacity. 
Nor is Taiwan included in a transnational structure-governance study (e.g., Lijphart, 2012). 
My dissertation thus provides a different perspective from Taiwan, a working democracy, to 
understand how SP variations affect governance unpacked in a multi-dimensional assessment 
of state capacity. 
The second objective is to test the conventional wisdom that governance in president-
parliamentary congruence is considered more effective than that in president-parliamentary 
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incongruence by using over two decades of SP practice in Taiwan. Again, since many nascent 
democracies have embraced SP, once this conventional wisdom becomes falsifiable in the 
Taiwanese context, one cannot help but wonder if SP would remain a viable choice for those 
countries like Taiwan. Regardless of the results, I do believe that Taiwan’s experience will be 
instructive for nascent democracies, particularly non-European SP ones. My dissertation will 
thus fill a niche in the structure-governance literature. 
The third and the ultimate objective of this dissertation is to assess the 1997 
Constitutional reform that created the SP in Taiwan. I will subsequently utilize the findings to 
suggest potential future initiatives that the people of Taiwan could consider. 
 
1.3 Structure of chapters 
This dissertation is organized into five chapters. Chapter 2 provides a literature review 
divided into five parts, aiming to derive a working SP typology, select salient dimensions of 
state capacity (along with implications on the selectivity for measurements for statistical 
analysis), introduce the power law (rarely applied in political science, but serves to help 
understand Cabinet longevity, a concept centering on policy coherence and continuity), and 
develop hypotheses for this dissertation through an overview of previous literature on the 
impact of president-parliamentary congruence/incongruence on governance. Chapter 3 
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details my within-case research design, research methodologies, quantitative (statistical and 
regression analyses) and qualitative (semi-structured interviews) as required in a 
triangulation, and data collection and instrumentations. Chapter 4 presents the findings from 
the quantitative methods, followed by interpretations suggested by interviewees and mine. 
Chapter 5 is conclusions of my dissertation, where I summarize the results with implications 
and indicate its contributions and limitations, as well as the directions of future research.  
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
Introduction 
The central puzzle underlying this study is whether the semi-presidential 
majority/minority government division makes difference in governance, especially in the 
Taiwanese context. This chapter then presents a review of literature focused on three major 
themes I tackle surrounding this puzzle: (1) defining and conceptualizing the two main 
variables of interest: (the variation within) semi-presidentialism (IV) and (multiple 
alternative dimensions of) state capacity (DV); (2) power law and its applications in 
empirical studies (albeit rarely applied in political science); and (3) the impact of president-
parliamentary congruence vs. incongruence on governance. It is followed by a section that 
outlines the formation of hypotheses in this dissertation. 
It is worth emphasizing that the first theme addressed the fundamental issues of 
operationalizing semi-presidentialism and state capacity for this study. Simply put, a simple, 
dichotomous typology of semi-presidentialism (majority vs. minority regimes) was therefore 
derived.1 And the purpose of understanding the multi-dimensional notion of state capacity, 
drawn from the comparative politics (CP) literature and supplemented by the American 
politics (AP) literature, is to not only provide the rationale for singling out the four salient 
dimensions of state capacity for this study, namely, extractive/fiscal, coercive/military, 
administrative/bureaucratic, and legal, but to help develop appropriate indicators for the 
respective dimensions.  
 
                                                     
1 For the sake of simplicity, “semi-presidentialism” and “semi-presidential” are both hereafter denoted as SP in 
this chapter. 
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2.1 Semi-presidentialism and typologies 
My first task is to define the independent variable, SP regime type. Theorists of SP 
systems have conceptualized these regimes as varying in the distribution of power among 
political parties. In his seminal work, Maurice Duverger (1980) advanced the concept of a SP 
regime, giving an original, classic tripartite definition: (1) the directly-elected president; (2) 
government responsible to the parliament; and (3) significant presidential powers.2 To put in 
a nutshell, SP is a constitutional system based on dual legitimacy,3 i.e., the presidency vs. the 
legislative majority (upon which the premier and ministers can survive), allowing the system 
to alternate or oscillate (on the continuum) between presidentialism (under unified or divided 
government) and parliamentarism (under cohabitation, when the president and the premier 
are of opposing political parties) (Duverger, 1980; Lijphart, 2012). Accordingly, the president 
of the French Fifth Republic, the model case of SP, has ultimate power only when his party 
enjoys a parliamentary majority currently; if not, the (French) president is stipulated by the 
constitution to hold power over defense and foreign policy (Chou, 2000).4 Given its nature 
of dual legitimacy, SP is more commonly called the “dual executive system” (雙首長制) in 
                                                     
2 Nearly twenty years later, Robert Elgie (1999, 2004) proposed a post-Duvergerian definition of SP, in which 
he ruled out “significant presidential powers” to avoid judgement on how powerful a president is, or can be 
(referred to relational properties) and thus focus on the core (or dispositional properties) of SP. 
3 Juan J. Linz (1990, 1994) poses a nettlesome problem of dual legitimacy in presidential systems, in which the 
president and assembly have competing claims to legitimacy, given that both are popularly elected and thereby 
the survival of each is independent from the other. This problem, as Linz puts it, confuses voters: who can 
represent the will of the people, the president or the assembly? Likewise, semi-presidentialism generates a 
similar problem that has to do with dual-legitimacy when president’s party is not a legislative majority, thus 
resulting in intra-executive conflict or power struggle between the president who is popularly elected and the 
premier who relies on the confidence of a parliament (i.e., dual executive responsibility). Some scholars 
attribute the power struggle between the president and the premier to political instability in SP (e.g., Linz, 1994; 
Sui, 2002). Although cohabitation is considered as a pragmatic solution to this problem, such an achievement is 
rarely reached in nascent semi-presidential democracies. Wu Yu-shan (2006) further identifies the institutional 
core of SP based on the issue of dual legitimacy as “dual chains of legitimacy, command, and responsibility” 
(dual CLCRs). 
4 There have been three periods of cohabitation in France’s Fifth Republic since its creation in 1958: 1986-
1988, 1993-1995, and 1997-2002. 
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Taiwan. 
Since SP is considered as a constitutional engineering that emphasizes (dynamic) 
variations in the relationship between the president and parliament, it provides a richer 
variety of subtypes than its presidential and parliamentary counterparts. Matthew S. Shugart 
and John M. Carey (1992) classify SP into two separate subtypes: “premier-presidential” and 
“president-parliamentary” regimes. They refer to the former as the Duvergerian definition of 
SP and specify the latter as a SP regime with the primacy of the president (who 
appoints/dismisses cabinet ministers and has power to dissolve parliament), plus the 
dependence of the president’s cabinet on parliament (i.e., cabinet ministers are subject to 
parliamentary confidence). Both subtypes must have a popularly elected president. Following 
suit with the above typology, David J. Samuel and Matthew S. Shugart (2010) label Taiwan 
(1992-1997) as a dual-executive, SP system or specifically a “premier-presidential” regime 
even before the amendments made in 1997, while identifying the country in the post-
amendment period (1997-2007) as a “president-parliamentary” regime. 
Like Shugart and his co-authors, Shuy Jeno-rong and Le Bing-kuan (2002) develop an 
operational dichotomous SP typology, although more intuitive and straightforward: the 
majority vs. minority regime systems. The majority regime system occurs when a political 
party concurrently enjoys the presidency and a parliamentary majority, hence executive 
superiority. It is placed into three further subtypes by the strength of presidential 
predominance over policy making, from most to least: (1) super-presidentialism (or quasi-
presidential semi-presidentialism; see also Shen, 2014); (2) intra-party or intra-coalition 
cohabitation; and (3) premier-led semi-presidentialism. The minority regime system, by 
contrast, occurs when the president’s party does not win a parliamentary majority, hence 
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legislative inferiority. It also contains three further subtypes: (1) cohabitation; (2) the 
minority/divided government; and (3) the coalition government. The minority/divided 
government, as Wu Yu-shan (2000, 2006) suggests, can be separated into the “collision” and 
“presidential supremacy” modes. In the former mode, the president fights the parliamentary 
majority by appointing his own favorite as premier, and the parliament may react by casting a 
no-confidence vote against the government, and then the president may retaliate by 
dissolving the parliament. In the latter mode, the president persists, and the parliament yields. 
Robert Elgie (2005) categorizes SP regimes into three groups when accounting for 
differences in the degree of presidential power (which he calls relational properties when 
taking an initiative in refining the Duvergerian definition of SP [see footnote 2]): (1) highly 
presidentialized semi-presidential regimes (of authoritarian tendencies, such as in Russia); 
(2) (parliamentary-like) semi-presidential regimes with ceremonial presidents and strong 
premiers (in Ireland and Slovenia, for example); and (3) semi-presidential regimes with a 
balance of presidential and prime-ministerial powers (exemplified by the French typical 
model). According to him, many countries of balanced SP have experienced periods of 
cohabitation which may serve to solve intra-executive conflict. Even though cohabitation 
occurred in nascent democracies with fragile systems, namely, in Mongolia, Poland, and 
briefly in Taiwan (referred to the Chen-Tang duarchy), fostering power struggles (albeit 
surmountable) between the president and the premier, democracy in these three countries has 
survived. 
The SP typology elaborated by Shuy and Le and Wu satisfies the need of my study to 
focus on president-parliamentary congruence and incongruence as an explanatory variable. 
Thus, I applied it in my study, with the two SP regime subtypes being renamed the majority 
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regime and minority regime for simplicity. Table 2.1 presents the adopted SP typology. 
 
Table 2.1. Configurations within Dual Legitimacy under Semi-presidentialism 
Presidency Parliamentary 
majority 
Regime subtype and further sub-classification 
  
Majority regime (president-parliamentary congruence):a 
1. Super-presidentialism (or quasi-presidential SP) 
2. Intra-party or intra-coalition cohabitation 
3. Premier-led SP 
  
Minority regime (president-parliamentary incongruence, 
with more veto players): 
1. Cohabitation 
2. Minority/divided government: 
2.1 Collision  
2.2 Presidential supremacy 
3. Coalition government 
Note: Summarized primarily from Shuy & Le (2002); Wu (2000, 2006). 
a. The SP majority regime in Taiwan is commonly described as enjoying “total governance” or winning 
“complete power.” 
 
2.2 Alternative dimensions of state capacity 
The second task is to define, conceptualize, and operationalize the dependent variable, 
state capacity. As already stated in the introduction chapter, one of the aims of this 
dissertation is to define a workable notion of governance and thus investigate any differences 
in governance between different ROC SP regimes. Since state capacity has emerged as a core 
concept in political science, particularly important within the literature on cross-national 
comparisons of governance quality, it can alternatively serve to unpack the notion of 
governance. Generally, state capacity is conceptualized in the CP literature through six major 
dimensions which emphasize different functions that the state performs, connoting the 
complexity of conceptualizing and measuring governance. It includes 
extractive/Schumpeterian fiscal capacity, coercive/military capacity, classic Weberian 
administrative/bureaucratic capacity, legal capacity, infrastructural capacity, and 
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transformative (and distributive) capacity.5 The CP typology is commonly utilized in the 
literature on American Political Development (APD) (e.g., Hacker [2002]; Weaver & 
Rockman [1993]).6 
On the other hand, one should be aware that some literature in AP (including APD) has 
traditionally emphasized the “exceptionalism” of American state formation, producing 
analyses that view state capacity through a different lens. On balance, in these strands of AP 
literature, the juxtaposition of a weak state (or even a state of being “stateless”) and strong 
outcomes exemplifies American exceptionalism (King & Liberman, 2009; Skowronek, 1982. 
See also Huntington [1968] and Nettl [1968] for the notion of the early American state as 
“stateless”). The conceptualization of American state capacity (-cum-American 
“exceptionalism”) mainly derives from separation of powers (Binder, 2014; Mayhew 2005; 
Weaver & Rockman, 1993), federalism (Johnson, 2007), and a vibrant, independent private-
sector economy, together with the idea of limited government (Hacker, 2002; King & 
Liberman, 2009). However, American “exceptionalism” should not be overstated, and the 
literature review on state capacity needs to stay within circumscribed borders, hence 
manageable. This section is thus organized by the CP typology of state capacity, with 
                                                     
5 Luciana Cingolani (2013) coins the term “political capacity” and conceptualizes it by emphasizing how 
veto/institutional players (political party, Congress, etc.) exert leverage over policymaking (and its 
performance). The literature referable to the notion of “political capacity” include George Tsebelis (1995) who 
applies a veto player framework to explain the variance in policy stability in different political systems (regime 
or party system), and the edited volume by Paul D. Pierson and R. Kent Weaver (1993) that investigates 
whether forms of government influence government capabilities in the US (separation of powers) and other 
advanced democracies, especially those with parliamentary systems (concentration of power). Likewise, the 
notion of “political capacity” can also be exemplified by Scott Gates, Håvard Hegre, Mark P. Jones, and Håvard 
Strand (2006), Arend Lijphart (2012), and Giovanni Sartori (1994). Nevertheless, I opted not to incorporate 
“political capacity” as an alternative dimension of state capacity for analysis in my dissertation for two reasons. 
First, “political capacity” is not a popular category, not to mention its complicated dynamics caused by different 
institutional settings (constitutional properties). Second, I take state capacity as dependent variable for the 
dissertation, whereas “political capacity” is treated in literature as independent variable. 
6 APD is a growing subfield of American Politics dedicated to studying and explaining changes in American 
political system, with important links to other fields of political science as well as other disciplines, such as 
History and Sociology. 
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conceptual counterparts in the AP literature being incorporated in the review of a compatible 
dimension, so as to provide a systematic and integrative analysis of state capacity.  
Before we enter upon detailed discussions of individual dimensions, here is a sketch of 
the general idea of operationalization of state capacity for the quantitative purpose, 
particularly in CP: Scholars have adopted a wide array of indicators (as proxies) to measure 
different dimensions of state capacity and connect them with outcomes (Cingolani, 2013; 
Hanson & Sigman, 2013; Savoia & Sen, 2015). And in many single studies, state capacity is 
evaluated by using multiple indicators, each of which may represent or involve a different 
dimension of the CP typology of state capacity (e.g., Fortin, 2010).7 Additionally, many 
organizations, whether international or domestic, are also substantial providers of 
quantitative cross-national indicators of state capacity (e.g., the WGI indicators8 and the 
IRIS data set9). In this section, I examine each alternative dimension of state capacity in a 
two-fold form: namely, conceptualization and operationalization (either measurable or 
                                                     
7 Jessica Fortin (2010) proposes a five-item index to operationalize and measure state capacity in 26 post-
communist countries, namely, tax revenue (extractive/fiscal capacity), corruption (administrative/bureaucratic 
capacity), infrastructure reform (infrastructural capacity), property rights protection, and contract intensive 
money (both latter legal capacity). 
8 In much of literature, state capacity is closely related to good governance (e.g., Fukuyama, 2004, 2013), albeit 
not identical (which I will explain in the next paragraph of the text: capacity vs. performance). The Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI) project by the World Bank provides a generic set of aggregate, survey-based 
(sub-concept) indicators that measure six key dimensions of governance: 1. “Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism”; 2. “Government Effectiveness”; 3. “Regulatory Quality”; 4. “Rule of Law”; 5. “Control of 
Corruption”; and 6. “Voice and Accountability.” The WGI capture the notion of coercive/military (1), 
administrative/bureaucratic (2 and 5), and legal (4, 6, and perhaps 3) capacities (see further definitions for each 
WGI indicator on the WGI website at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home). 
9 The IRIS data set was first constructed in 1993 by Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer based on expert survey 
data obtained from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) by the Syracuse, New York-based Political 
Risk Services (PRS) Group. The data set contains six ICRG variables of political risks scored for state capacity: 
1. “corruption in government”; 2. “rule of law”; 3. “bureaucratic quality”; 4. “ethnic tensions”; 5. “repudiation 
of contracts by government;” and 6. “risk of expropriation.” It provides useful indexes to measure 
administrative/bureaucratic (1 and 3) and legal (2, 5, and 6) capacities (see the latest, current version of IRIS 
data set, or IRIS-3, and ICRG data on the website of the PRS Group at http://www.prsgroup.com). 
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analyzable, say, through offering a historical account, the former including direct and/or 
indirect [proxy] measurements).10 
Capacity is not equivalent to (its) performance, albeit not necessarily completely 
dissociated. Capacity is the potential, i.e., a necessary but not sufficient condition, for (good) 
performance, rather than performance per se. Nevertheless, state capacity is often measured 
via an indirect proxy(ies) for performance on patterned policy “outputs” or “outcomes,” 
instead of indicators or a direct proxy(ies) of the concept of state capacity per se. Policy 
“outputs” usually refer to legislation/enactment or the process of policy implementation, 
whereas policy “outcomes” are the effect, via changed behavior of, say, economic or social 
actors, i.e., results of policy implementation (or, in a more general sense, performance on 
governance).11, 12 Given the necessity of offering a thorough conceptual clarification, I 
distinguish between capacity and performance when discussing operationalization. This 
section enumerates the dimensions of state capacity, discussing their conceptualization and 
operationalization. 
 
                                                     
10 Operationalizing state capacity in the literature would not always lead to quantitative measures or, more 
specifically, direct, measurable indicators of a dimension of state capacity, say, the use of government revenue 
as a percentage of GDP for fiscal capacity. Instead, it sometimes would serve as an analyzable key element of 
the concept of, or an indirect proxy for assessing, a targeted dimension of state capacity. For example, Dietrich 
Rueschemeyer and Peter B. Evans (1985) operationalize the state’s transformative capacity as “effectiveness of 
state intervention in the economy,” but they do not connect this proxy, albeit still analyzable, with any 
measurable indicators in an empirical setting. 
11 David Vogel’s (1986) empirical, comparative study of the impact of structural choices on pollution reduction 
between the United States and Britain can illustrate these differences. In this study, policy outputs are: (a) the 
environmental regulations adopted by the two countries, and (b) the issue of how bureaucrats implement 
pollution control policies (i.e., the difference in the process of policy implementation between the two 
countries): little discretion left for the Environmental Protection Agency in the US separation of powers vs. 
more discretion left for the Department of the Environment bureaucrats in the British parliamentary system. The 
performance on pollution reduction, and in relation to costs to the government and private firms, in the two 
countries are policy outcomes. 
12 Just a note that legislation/enactment does not necessarily have to be deemed to measure performance. It 
could serve instead as a direct measurement of legal capacity in itself, which will be explained in further detail 
in the subsection on that capacity. 
 
 
28 
 
2.2.1 Extractive/Schumpeterian fiscal capacity 
Conceptualization 
This dimension of state capacity emphasizes the state’s ability to extract resources from 
the society, particularly in the form of tax revenues. It is closely associated with Joseph A. 
Schumpeter’s fiscal sociology which he elaborated in his 1918 work Crisis of the Tax State. 
According to Schumpeter (1918/1991; see also Musgrave, 1992), the income tax is 
appropriate for a minimal modern state, i.e., the tax state, to survive rising costs of 
administration and war. However, in order not to dampen people’s enthusiasm for production 
that is taxable, the tax state must respect the autonomy of the private economy and its power 
of taxation needs to be limited. Otherwise the tax state will collapse. Similarly, Charles 
Tilly’s (1975) study of state formation in Western European shares insights with 
Schumpeter’s notion of state capacity: “Stateness” is defined by building a repressive state 
apparatus that enables a more effective extraction of resources. 
The rationale behind either Schumpeter’s tax state or Tilly’s “stateness” can also be 
extended to explain why the state’s extractive/fiscal capacity (or more specifically, tax 
revenue-raising ability) is considered positively related to the emergence of 
administrative/bureaucratic capacity (Savoia & Sen, 2015). Some scholars further distinguish 
between “income taxes” and “taxes on trade” for revenue with an emphasis on the former’s 
nature of a more administrative complexity, thus referring the two different sources of tax 
revenue to administrative and extractive capacities, respectively (Hanson & Sigman, 2013; 
Lieberman, 2002). 
Some other strands of CP literature on extractive/fiscal capacity associate the concept 
more generally with the provision of public goods, which, I afraid, is problematic since 
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collecting revenue and spending on public goods are not necessarily the same thing. Margaret 
Levi (1988), for example, defines state capacity as the state’s ability to provide collective 
goods by raising revenue while tax policy choices are subject to internal political constraints, 
including rulers’ bargaining power, the transaction costs of measuring taxes, and ruler’s 
mandate duration. Timothy Besley and Torsten Persson (2007, 2008, 2009, 2011) see state 
capacity as capital investment and argue that incumbents can use some revenues to invest in 
taxing that allows higher future tax collection, being conducive to the provision of more 
quality public goods. Some strands of AP literature with a focus on the relationship between 
budget and public policy (e.g., Jones & Baumgartner, 2005), or between revenue and 
spending (e.g., Schick, 1993, through the lens of deficit reduction) share a similar 
conceptualization of extractive/fiscal capacity being assessed as above (in CP) in this 
paragraph. The conceptualization of extractive/fiscal capacity provided in these strands of 
literature is flawed by two unjustified assumptions. First, the literature ignores the difference 
between the state’s revenue and expenditure, the latter of which hinges on how to “use” the 
former. In other words, the government, either theoretically or practically, has discretion in 
determining how to draw up a budget (for “use”) no matter how much tax revenue would 
enter the treasury, hence turning out to be a surplus, balanced, or deficit budget. In this sense, 
only when the government operates under a balanced budget rule, can one opt against 
distinguishing expenditure from revenue. The second assumption is rested on a faulty 
premise that the government must use revenue to provide public goods, say, infrastructural 
development or national defense. In economics, a public good is non-exclusive and non-rival 
in consumption. In fact, much of government spending is not for public goods, but benefits 
exclusive, small-sized groups of people (e.g., farm subsidies, or even corruption in 
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developing countries). Consequently, the provision of public goods seems a blunt proxy for 
conceptualizing extractive/fiscal capacity. 
 
Operationalization 
Generally, extractive/fiscal capacity is operationalized in its fundamental considerations 
of taxation, for example, the share of tax collection in GDP (Besley & Persson, 2008), the 
share of income tax in total tax revenue (Besley & Persson, 2008; Rogers & Weller, 201413), 
and the ratio of actual tax revenue to predicted tax revenue (A/P ratio), a.k.a. “relative 
political capacity” (Arbetman-Rabinowitz, Kugler, Abdollahian, Johnson, & Kang, 2011; 
Feng, 2006). But one should be aware that for countries that rely on petroleum revenues or 
have historically had lower levels of tax collection (e.g., Mexico for both scenarios), perhaps 
neither the income tax share of receipts nor the tax revenue share of GDP would be a good 
measure of fiscal/extractive capacity.14 Otherwise, they all serve as useful direct 
measurements of extractive/fiscal capacity. 
 
2.2.2 Coercive/military capacity 
Conceptualization 
This dimension of state capacity is the most basic attribute of “stateness.” It refers to the 
state’s capacity to monopolize the administration of security forces and/or military to a. 
                                                     
13 Melissa Rogers and Nicholas Weller (2014) also see income taxation as a good measure of the state’s 
effectiveness in policy implementation, along the same lines with the conceptualization of extractive/fiscal 
capacity as an account of how administrative/bureaucratic capacity emerges (given above in the text of this 
subsection). 
14 As illustrated in an Forbes.com article by Christopher Wilson and Pedro Valenzuela (2014, October 22), 
Mexico has historically had low levels of tax collection, and in 2013 the Mexican government’s revenues 
equaled 23.6% of GDP, with less than half of that, or 10.2% of GDP, derived from tax revenue and another 
7.8% from Pemex petroleum and derivatives sales. 
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maintain internal order and b. prevent foreign invasion (Cingolani, 2013; Hanson & Sigman, 
2013; Hendrix, 2010; Savoia & Sen, 2015). The conceptualization of the control of domestic 
opposition (i.e., a), is consistent with Max Weber’s widely quoted definition of the state as “a 
human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical 
force within a given territory” (Weber, 1919/2009, p. 78). The influence of the Weberian 
concept of the state as possessing the monopoly of legitimate force has been far-reaching. 
When applied to an international context, the concept is stretched to cover the state’s ability 
to repel foreign invasion (as well as invade its neighbors) (i.e., b). In the state formation 
literature, for example, Samuel E. Finer (1975) illustrates a positive relationship between 
major military inventions (hence, changes in the format of armed forces) and the formation 
of the modern state in Europe: Military inventions in Europe push rulers to continue building 
up their power by armed forces (while the inventions also increase the state’s extractive 
capacity). 
It remains important to be aware and cautious of the fact that the two purposes of 
coercive/military capacity, i.e., maintaining internal order and repelling foreign invasion, are 
normatively (and typically empirically) served by different organizations, such as the police 
and the military, respectively. And these organizations call on the government to articulate 
different rationales for mobilizing the public in support of their respective purposes, say, 
needs to prevent domestic violent extremism for the former (purpose) and to counter 
international terrorism (motivated by nationalism) for the latter. Although much of the state 
capacity literature treats these two strands of thought as components of the same concept, it 
would be conceptually useful to separate them for the sake of evaluation and analysis. 
Aside from its role as a catalyst for state formation in Europe, coercive/military capacity 
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is likewise a significant variable to explain American state building, either through the lens of 
domestic control or military engagements against foreign countries. In his 1982 book 
Building a New American State, Stephen Skowronek focuses on three institutional 
innovations at the national level forged at the turn of the 20th century as a response to 
industrialism, namely, (1) the reform of civil administration; (2) reorganization of the army 
(e.g., reforms in the national army in the aftermath of the Spanish-American war and the state 
militia system for its failure in containing violent domestic railroad strikes in the 1870s); and 
(3) the establishment of national railroad regulation. These three institutional innovations 
turn the American state away from being “stateless” toward a central bureaucratic apparatus, 
i.e., the sense of the state.  
 
Operationalization 
The same reasoning as above can be applied to the operationalization of coercive/military 
capacity by two separate purposes. The Fragile States Index (FSI) by the Fund for Peace15 
and the State Fragility Index and Matrix by the Center for Systemic Peace16 are widely-used 
                                                     
15 The FSI is based on a dozen separate social, economic, and political/military indicators of state vulnerability, 
among of which “Security Apparatus” examines the state’s monopoly on the use of legitimate force (coercive 
capacity) while “External Intervention” for foreign intervention (military capacity) (they are both 
political/military indicators). The “Security Apparatus” indicator considers internal conflict, riots and protests, 
military coups, rebel activity, and the emergence of state-sponsored or supported “private militias” that terrorize 
political opponents, suspected “enemies,” or civilians sympathetic to the opposition. The “External 
Intervention” indicator considers foreign assistance, presence of peacekeepers or UN missions, foreign military 
intervention, sanctions, and credit ratings. Taiwan is unfortunately not included in the FSI rankings. See the 
website of the Fund for Peace for further details, at http://fundforpeace.org/global. 
16 The State Fragility Index and Matrix combines scores on eight component indicators along four performance 
(outcomes) dimensions: security, political, economic, and social. “Security Effectiveness Score” and “Security 
Legitimacy Score” are the security indicators, with the former indicating a state’s general security and 
vulnerability to the residual effects of most recent wars (military capacity) while the latter, state repression 
against domestic opponents (coercive capacity), partly based on Political Terror Scale (PTS). See the website of 
the Center for Systemic Peace for further details, at http://www.systemicpeace.org. (The PTS is a measure of 
state-inflicted political terror on a population. Its indicators are coded based on information contained in the 
annual human rights reports published by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch [not including Taiwan], 
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instruments for assessing state capacity for either purpose. With a focus on repelling foreign 
invaders, military capacity is typically operationalized as the military size or/and military 
spending. For example, in the Correlates of War (COW) Project initiated by David J. Singer 
in 1963 (still ongoing), military capacity is operationalized as “the number of military 
personnel per thousand (in the population)” and “the total military budget for a given state 
for a given year.”17  
Much of the literature on military capacity adopts the COW measurements (e.g., Hanson 
& Sigman, 2013). In Singer’s co-authored work with Henderson (Henderson & Singer, 2000, 
p. 285), they propose “the log of the ratio of a state’s military expenditures (in constant, 1990 
US$) to its total population” to measure military capacity, the logic behind which, I surmise, 
is similar to the one behind the COW military personnel. However, it has been debatable 
whether the relationship between the state’s military force (either its size or spending) and 
military capacity is necessarily positive. States with a large military force or greater military 
spending might become more conflict-prone, particularly when suffering from 
unprofessionalism, corruption, and/or patronage (Hanson & Sigman, 2013; Henderson & 
Singer, 2000; Kocher, 2010).  
Military capacity can also be assessed through analysis of (effectiveness of) military 
security policy. Davis B. Bobrow (1993) operationalizes military capacity as the state’s 
abilities to (1) manage international commitments and (2) target limited resources effectively 
to secure the most effective forces or optimize the cost-effectiveness of weapon system 
procurement, albeit both unmeasurable. 
For domestic control, on the other hand, “(domestic) political violence” is often 
                                                     
and the US State Department. See the PTS website for further details, at http://www.politicalterrorscale.org.) 
17 For more information about the COW Project, see its website at http://www.correlatesofwar.org. 
 
 
34 
 
considered as an expedient (indirect) proxy for assessing the state’s ability to maintain 
internal order. For example, Arend Lijphart, Ronald Rogowski, and R. Kent Weaver (1993) 
use (the numbers of) “riots” and “deaths” from political violence (both adjusted for 
population size) to measure and compare the ability of the US and other advanced 
democracies to manage cleavage (i.e., reflective of performance [outcomes]). The approach 
taken by Besley and Persson (2015) in explaining how state capacity and political institutions 
interact with political violence may help us understand why political violence would serve a 
common proxy (conceptualized either as performance or “precursors” of coercive capacity) 
for assessing domestic control. They suggest that institutions that serve the public interest 
tend to have less violence and a stronger incentive to invest in state capacity, and that less 
violence increases political stability which can increase a stronger incentive to invest in state 
capacities. 
Intriguingly, as some scholars suggest, coercive/military and administrative/bureaucratic 
capacities are intertwined, in which GDP per capita can accordingly serve as a general proxy 
for either dimension (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Perhaps the empirical study by William G. 
Howell, Saul P. Jackman, and Jon C. Rogowski (2013) on the US President’s bid to increase 
his success in promoting national or foreign policy by resorting to warfare could illustrate the 
complexity of such an intertwined relationship. 
 
2.2.3 Weberian administrative/bureaucratic capacity 
Conceptualization 
As implied by the name, this aspect of state capacity is rooted in the Weberian tradition of 
a modern state bureaucracy that is professional and insulated from political control, thus 
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being able to perform growing and increasingly complex administrative tasks of government, 
including, for example, various public policies. The modern state, according to Weber 
(1919/2009), is defined by not only its monopoly of legitimate force (as mentioned when 
discussing coercive/military capacity earlier) but also its administrative structure developed 
through rational-legal authority. The Weberian bureaucracy contains at least two elements: 
(1) meritocratic recruitment through competitive examinations and (2) the provision of career 
stability and rewarding internal promotion, both important for improving bureaucratic 
performance (Rauch & Evens, 2000); it thereby contributes to “stateness” (Skowronek, 
1982). 
Generally, the conceptualization of administrative/bureaucratic capacity is associated 
with implementation of public policies (following Weber’s idea of bureaucracy), making this 
dimension of state capacity central to all areas of research on state and development (Savoia 
& Sen, 2014). For the sake of clarity in the discussions to follow, it is advisable to emphasize 
that administrative/bureaucratic capacity has to do with implementation, not with legislation 
or enactment. Legislation/enactment and implementation involve different (often quite 
separate) “politics,” including actors, processes, and interest-based coalitions (McDonnell & 
Weatherford, 2016).18 
Given its close conceptual association with policy implementation, the 
administrative/bureaucratic dimension of state capacity is inherent in being far more 
inclusive compared with any other alternative. This idea is well illustrated by Theda Skocpol 
                                                     
18 According to the authors, the processes (of legislation/enactment vs. implementation) include (1) time frame: 
episodic vs. continuous process; (2) decision venues: one or two less visible/accessible venues, with clearly 
defined decision rules vs. multiple, localized venues, with many small decisions made by implementers, and 
widespread information access, while for interest-based coalitions (of the same comparison), it is national 
interest groups vs. state and local affiliates/grassroots groups (all in respective order). In practice, however, 
legislation/enactment and implementation would be closely interrelated with each other if the executive branch 
is constitutionally empowered to propose bills for legislative action (e.g., Taiwan). 
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(1985), who argues that the state’s ability to implement policies toward achieving desired 
goals is underpinned by sovereign integrity, a stable military control over territory (coercive 
/military capacity), loyal and skilled officials (administrative/bureaucratic capacity per se), 
and plentiful financial resources (extractive/fiscal capacity). Her argument also helps reaffirm 
a multi-dimensional notion of state capacity in which different alternative dimensions are 
closely intertwined (or even conflated) and interdependent. 
 
Operationalization 
Some scholars measure administrative/bureaucratic capacity in direct and intuitive ways. 
For example, Daron Acemoglu and colleagues take the “number of public employees” as the 
indicator of a (positive) effect of state capacity on public goods provision, as reflected in the 
“population above the poverty line” and “secondary enrollment rate,” in Colombian 
municipalities (as cited in Acemoglu, García-Jimeno, & Robinson, 2015). Through expert 
surveys in 35 less developed countries, James Rauch and Peter B. Evens (2000) explain 
cross-national variations in bureaucratic performance by analyzing survey-based, coded 
scores on corruption, autonomy and expertise, efficiency, and red-tape. In addition, as 
previously illustrated in footnotes 8 and 9 (p. 26), two WGI indicators, “Government 
Effectiveness” and “Control of Corruption,” and two ICRG variables of political risks, 
“bureaucratic quality” and “corruption in government,” can be taken to measure 
administrative/bureaucratic capacity. 
By contrast, some scholars use performance (policy “outputs” or “outcomes”) as an 
(indirect) proxy to measure administrative/bureaucratic capacity. In this sense, they must be 
under the assumption that the state’s ability to implement policies always translates directly 
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into performance measures. So, if performance is high, then it is inferred that the state’s 
ability to implement policies is high, and vice versa. This proposition is exemplified in most 
essays of the edited volume by R. Kent Weaver and Bert A. Rockman (1993) which evaluates 
constitutional structural impacts on performance of policy implementation in various policy 
areas (albeit inextricably interwoven with operationalization of other dimensions of state 
capacity).19 For example, the essays by Bobrow (1993) and Lijphart et al. (1993) in this 
volume (both already discussed in the subsection on coercive/military capacity above), reveal 
that coercive/military and administrative/bureaucratic capacities would become conflated 
(conceptually and operationally), respectively, when comparing and analyzing the differences 
in the effectiveness of the implementation of military security policies between the US and 
Japan, and how to avoid political violence in the context of four different cleavage 
management strategies across 22 country cases (consociational, delegatory, arbitral, and 
limited-government). The essay by Ellis S. Krauss and Jon Pierre (1993) conflates 
transformative and administrative/bureaucratic capacities by focusing on industrial policies 
in the US, Sweden, and Japan and assessing their relative abilities to produce efficient 
targeting of resources for industrial changes. 
In short, the studies herein reviewed make it reasonable to infer that 
administrative/bureaucratic capacity is the most inclusive, if not all-inclusive, among the six 
selected alternative dimensions of state capacity due to its, not only conceptualization of the 
implementation of a variety of public policies, but also moderate reliance on performance-
                                                     
19 Each essay of this volume compares the US presidential system and its parliamentary counterparts with 
respect to at least one of ten specific government tasks: setting and maintaining priorities, targeting resources (to 
most effectively attain goals), innovating (when old policies fail), coordinating conflicting objectives, imposing 
losses (on powerful groups), represent diffuse, unorganized interests, ensuring effective implementation, 
ensuing policy stability, making and maintaining international commitments, and managing political cleavages. 
The editors use the term “government capabilities” to describe the state’s ability to implement policies. 
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based measurements associated with other dimensions of state capacity. In other words, if 
Giovanni Sartori’s (1970, 1991; see also Collier and Mahon, 1993) label, a “ladder of 
generality (abstraction),” is applied here, one would find that the notion of 
administrative/bureaucratic capacity is located higher on the “ladder,” given its fewer 
defining attributes (i.e., being more general or inclusive) compared with that of other 
dimensions of state capacity. 
 
2.2.4 Legal capacity 
Conceptualization 
Legal capacity has its roots in the principle of limited government, i.e., the limits of state 
intervention, according to which the government acts as a neutral third party, severely 
restricted by law, to enforce credible commitments (contracts) to protect property rights 
(Besley & Persson, 2007, 2009; North, 1981, 1990; North & Weingast 1989).20 Thus, it has 
to do with the idea of the “rule of law.”21 In other words, only under the “rule of law” can 
private property rights (and hence markets) be upheld. This proposition is championed by 
Barry R. Weingast (1995, 1997), who contends, with his game theoretic models, that the 
design of political institutions should credibly commit the state to preserving markets, and 
that only democracy in a form of limited government in which political officials and citizens 
respect the “rule of law” would achieve this goal. He further suggests that economic 
                                                     
20 Some scholars in this tradition has recently turned to acknowledging the necessity of a strong state to foster a 
market economy, specifically in terms of the state’s transformative capacity (e.g., Besley and Persson, 2009). 
21 The “rule of law” is a legal principle in which law, which is supreme, governs all individuals and institutions, 
including the state itself. It embraces such properties as stability/predictability of laws, explicit/transparent 
procedures for making and interpreting laws, and representational arrangements that make legislators and 
(usually indirectly) judges democratically accountable. The “rule of men” (in the absence of the “rule of law”), 
by contrast, means a society that is governed by arbitrary decisions of a ruler or group of people. My discussion 
of legal capacity in this dissertation is apparently, and theoretically, confined to democracy and not applicable to 
monarchy or feudalism. 
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performance and democratic stability depend on such type of self-enforcing equilibrium: 
limits on the state and respect for the rule of law, in no violation of political/economic rights 
of citizens, and that the US model of market-preserving federalism is an exemplar.  
As legal capacity centers on the principle of the “rule of law,” legislation/enactment can 
properly be expected to serve as a conceptual embodiment of that principle and hence a 
(direct) operational proxy for legal capacity. The logic of being a conceptual embodiment is 
intuitive: The existence of laws is an essential prerequisite for the “rule of law” to come 
about in a democracy. In line with the same logic, it is ideally suited to operationalizing legal 
capacity by taking into consideration the quantity and/or quality of legislation/enactment 
(which I will further elaborate below).     
 
Operationalization 
As mentioned in the early page of this section, the WGI indicators and the IRIS data set 
provide quantitative measures of several, including legal, dimensions of state capacity.22 
Likewise, the Vancouver-based Fraser Institute’s annual report, Economic Freedom of the 
World, assesses and tracks changes in countries’ degree of economic freedom by five 
quantitative indexes (criteria), among which “the legal structure and security of property 
rights” is also a valid proxy for measuring legal capacity, particularly of its components 
(Gwartney, Hall, & Lawson, 2015).23 
                                                     
22 The WGI indicator, “Rule of Law,” and three IRIS-3/ICRG political risk variables, “risk of expropriation,” 
“government repudiation of contracts,” and “rule of law,” can be used to measure legal capacity. The “rule of 
law” proxy of either source directly measures legal capacity, given the quantification of its core idea. By 
contrast, when legal capacity is measured concentrating on protection of property rights, “risk of expropriation” 
and “government repudiation of contracts” appear to appropriate proxies: For example, James D. Fearon (2005) 
employs both and Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson (2000) select “risk of 
expropriation.” 
23 The said index contains six components: judicial independence, impartial courts, protection of property 
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“Contract intensive money” (CIM) is an innovative measure of the enforceability of 
contracts and the security of property rights, introduced by Christopher Clague, Philip 
Keefer, Stephen Knack, and Mancur Olson (1999). CIM is defined as the ratio of non-
currency money to the total money supply, or 
(𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 − 𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚 ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠)
𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 . The logic behind is quite straightforward: 
When the state lacks sufficient third-party enforcement of property rights, citizens are less 
likely to allow other parties to hold their financial assets in exchange for some compensation. 
The higher the CIM ratio, the higher legal capacity.  
As briefly sketched above, legal capacity can also be operationalized by the quantity and 
quality of legislation/enactment (“outputs”), both of which, however, turn out to serve as its 
direct proxies given the “rule of law” logic.24 As far as quantity is concerned, calculating 
legislative productivity (of the parliament) is a commonly accepted measure of legal 
capacity. For example, in her empirical investigation of legislative productivity of Taiwan’s 
4th Legislature (1999 to 2002) straddling the nation’s first turnover of ruling parties and 
transition to divided government, Yang Wan-ying (2003, p. 77) introduces and formulates the 
useful notion of “relative number of laws supplied and demanded” that is equal to 𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛
𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛
: 
Where 
𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚 = 𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚 + 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚−1 − 𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚−1  
D is the number of passed bills.  
P is the number of newly introduced/proposed bills. 
S is the (accumulated) number of introduced/proposed bills. 
                                                     
rights, military interference in rule of law and the political process, integrity of the legal system, and legal 
enforcement of contracts. 
24 Admittedly, since legislation/enactment can hardly be independent of structural impact (think of the dynamic 
of veto players under different constitutional designs), using it as a proxy for operationalizing legal capacity 
might be called into question. However, any such suspicion will be dispelled when this proxy is used for a 
single case (e.g., a within-case comparative analysis) or a comparative study of multiple cases with a focus on 
the relationship between the structure and legal capacity. 
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n is the session of a given Legislative term.25 
 
 
As for quality, a further subtle analysis of how political and social actors interact and 
decide to enact good (or poor) legislation is required, making this approach less 
straightforward and more complicated operationally than its quantity counterpart. For 
example, Alan M. Jacobs (2011), in his analysis of intertemporal choices in pension policy 
made by ten (cases of) governments in North America, Britain, and Germany, suggests three 
necessary conditions for enacting good legislation: The government wishing to invest in the 
long term, rather than in short-sighted gains, must (1) have sufficient “institutional capacity” 
to enact its preferred policy into law (in facing potential resistance from organized groups), 
together with taking account of (2) “expected social returns” (i.e., if long-term benefits 
exceed short-term costs?) and (3) “politicians’ (short-term) electoral safety.” As another 
example, Vogel’s (1993) study of environmental politics and policies during the postwar 
period in the US, Britain, and Japan shows that whether a government can enact effective 
environmental regulations is contingent on its ability to represent diffuse, unorganized 
interests.  
 
2.2.5 Infrastructural capacity 
Conceptualization 
It refers to the state’s capacity to exercise control (e.g., enforcing policies) throughout its 
                                                     
25 Unfinished bills can be carried over to later sessions within the same Legislative Yuan, as bills die if they do 
not pass during that Legislature (屆期不連續原則), except the budget bill (預算案), (the bill of) the final 
account of the general budget as certified by the Comptroller General (決算案), and the citizen petition bill (人
民請願案) (The Legislative Yuan [TLY], 2005). 
 
 
 
42 
 
territory/jurisdiction (Mann, 1986). Infrastructural capacity centers on a traditional, 
hierarchical view of the state.26 According to Hillel D. Soifer (2008), there are three 
approaches to understanding the state’s infrastructural power: (1) national capabilities of the 
central state, which is most commonly applied, featuring the extent of resources at the 
disposal of the (central) state for exercising such power on society via its institutions of 
control;27 (2) the weight of the state, which captures how the state is limited and constructed 
by radiating institutions (i.e., non-state actors) and their impact on society; and (3) sub-
national (territorial/spatial) variation, which determines the state’s ability to exercise control 
via radiating institutions, serving as a middle ground between the first two approaches. Given 
the information above, it seems difficult to conceptually distinguish infrastructural capacity, 
the focus of which is on the exercise of control by the central state over territory and social 
actors, from administrative/bureaucratic capacity (and perhaps coercive/military capacity as 
well). 
If infrastructure is confined to what is considered conventional (for example, roads, 
telephone systems, technology, education, to name but a few), infrastructure capacity should 
not be a separate category because that is also what a Weberian bureaucracy looks for. 
However, the “federalism” angle in the literature on state capacity might be a promising way 
to unpack the underlying complexities of conceptualizing infrastructure capacity, making it 
worth considering infrastructural capacity distinguishable from administrative/bureaucratic 
                                                     
26 By contrast, some scholars take a horizontal view of interactions between the state and society. For example, 
Joel S. Midgal (1988) seeks to capture the extent to which the state permeates through society and to explore 
how state-society interactions build state capacity. This strand of literature is known as “relational capacity,” 
with infrastructural capacity as its subtype (Cingolani, 2013). But given political sociology as its research 
interest, it is beyond the scope of this review to discuss. 
27 For example, how do teachers in a new education program influence local communities via schools? 
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capacity of the Weberian tradition.28 For example, in an effort to unravel the US federal-state 
partnership in the half century preceding the New Deal, Kimberley S. Johnson (2007) 
analyzes 131 Congressional enactments ranging in various policy areas, which she calls 
“inter-governmental policy instruments (IPIs).” Her findings suggest that the American 
federalism, rather than being a barrier to the development of state capacity as people 
conventionally think of it, expands the reach and cohesion of the American state, hence 
strengthening its state capacity. Policy authority in the US is not only shared between the 
federal and state governments but also shaped by locally-oriented members of Congress. 
Intriguingly, however, based on the results from his formal modeling of existing arguments 
about the consequences of decentralization (good, neutral, or bad) vis-à-vis centralization for 
governance of multiple subjects in a comparative perspective, like policy stability and fiscal 
coordination, Daniel Treisman (2007) concludes that none of these arguments is tenable, 
thereby tainting the credibility of evidence from the “federalism” angle. 
It might also be noted that in the European context involving federalism, Daniel Ziblatt 
(2006) explains how infrastructural power of sub-national units shapes federal bargains and 
then determines state building outcomes of either a federal or unitary system in Italy and 
Germany in the late 19th century. In this study, infrastructural power is conceptualized via 
three proxies: (1) state rationalization; (2) state institutionalization; and (3) embeddedness of 
the state in society, high levels of which contribute to federalism, while low levels lead to a 
unitary state. It challenges the common presumption that federalism is the consequence of an 
incomplete state-building process, by showing that both Italy and Germany eventually 
                                                     
28 The logic underlying the “federalism” angle is that under the unitary system, only the central government, 
not sub-national governments, can control infrastructure and that under federalism, by contrast, states/provinces 
(or other forms of sub-national government) are empowered to control infrastructure. 
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adopted federalism, regardless of the difference in their coercive power of the center while 
pursuing national unification. 
 
Operationalization 
The infrastructural and administrative/bureaucratic capacities are conceptually conflated 
to a large extent, the latter of which can also be intrinsically intertwined with all the other 
dimensions of state capacity when conceptualized via policy implementation. A wide variety 
of measurements of infrastructural capacity is therefore referred to in the literature, largely 
overlapping with that on extractive/fiscal, coercive/military, administrative/bureaucratic, and 
perhaps transformative dimensions of state capacity. For example, measures of the territorial 
reach of the state generally depend on its fiscal resources and extractive capacity (e.g., Gallo, 
1991 [tax collection]; Goodwin, 1999 [government revenue as a share of GDP]; Fearon & 
Laitin, 2003 [GDP per capita]), military power (e.g., Goodwin, 1999 [size of armed forces 
and military expenditures]), and density of transportation network (e.g., Centeno, 2002 
[railroads]; Goodwin, 1999 [railroads and highways]).  
The first two sets of examples (concerning fiscal/extractive and military components) and 
third (railroads/highways) provide specific measurements to operationalize Soifer’s (2008) 
national capabilities and sub-national variation approaches, respectively, to infrastructural 
power. The evaluation of outcomes of state policy can be a measure of the other of Soifer’s 
approaches, the weight of the state (e.g., Eugen Weber’s classic 1976 study of national 
identity formation in late 19th-century rural France). By the same token, Soifer (2012) 
proposes a reach-adjusted approach over population and territory to measuring three core 
dimensions of state capacity in Latin America via nine proxies: extraction (direct/indirect 
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taxes, direct taxes per capita, and the share of population working in economic circles); 
security (violent crime, lynching rates, and the use of private security per capita), and the 
administration of basic services (census administration coverage, national identity card and 
voter registration rates, and vaccination rates). It exemplifies the use of a combination of 
proxies referable to other dimensions of state capacity to operationalize infrastructural 
capacity, given a tendency toward a conceptual conflation of infrastructural and 
administrative/bureaucratic capacities. 
 
2.2.6 Transformative (and distributive) capacity 
Conceptualization 
The last strand of the literature on state capacity, like coercive/military capacity, is 
composed of two sub-domains: transformative and attendant distributive capacities. As 
illustrated in the “development state” literature, transformative capacity is the ability to 
intervene in a productive system and shape the economy (Cingolani, 2013).29 For example, 
Rueschemeyer and Evans (1985) identify the conditions for effective state intervention in 
economic and industrial development, while assuming the necessity of state intervention in 
capitalist economics for continual capital accumulation and higher levels of productivity. In 
the American context of the late 19th century, for example, the federal government began to 
intervene in the national economy through its role in regulating national railroad, while in the 
process of forming the American “stateness” (Skowronek, 1982). 
                                                     
29 The relationship between state capacity and markets/economic growth is a fundamental question in political 
economy: which one is the precursor to the other in development? A recent study of Mainland China in this 
regard by Ang (2015) suggests an endogenous relationship between both variables (albeit targeted to focus on 
the country’s adaptive approach to governance, or directed improvisation, in the post-Mao era), posing a 
challenge to the conventional Western notion of the unidirectional causality between state capacity (good  
institutions [governance]/rule of law, perhaps resulting from colonial legacies) and growth. 
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Transformative capacity also essentially responds to the Acemoglu-Robinson analysis of 
state failure by the view of government-economy relations. Daron Acemoglu and James A. 
Robinson (2012) contend that rich countries are rich because they establish “inclusive” 
(economic and political) institutions where a large majority of the population has access to 
property rights (contract) enforcement and democratic government that foster growth. By 
contrast, where countries have “extractive” institutions that are created and perpetuated for 
the benefit of a tiny oligarchical elite without property rights (enforcement) and the rule of 
law, thus impoverishing the poor, they end up being poor and fragile. In short, legal capacity, 
markets, and the issue of redistribution are integrated as components of transformative 
capacity in the Acemoglu-Robinson analysis.   
When economic development is taking place, the issue of whether or how the state can 
prevent wide disparities in the distribution of wealth then becomes another topic of interest 
for state capacity. Acemoglu and Robinson also touch on this topic in their said analysis 
above of state failure. The evidence collected by Kay L. Schlozman, Sidney Verba, and 
Henry E. Brady (2012) demonstrates widespread economic inequality in the US which 
further undermines the equality of citizens in terms of voting strength, and simply political 
influence. In fact, the larger the wealth gap becomes, the more likely it is for an inefficient 
state to emerge and persist (Acemoglu, Ticchi, & Vindigni, 2011). 
Linda Weiss (1998) proposes a model of “governed interdependence” between the state 
and business, shedding light on the role of the state in managing economic growth with 
equity. She argues that states with both transformative and distributive capacities (e.g., 
Germany and Japan) outperform those with either alone (e.g., other East Asian countries than 
Japan with transformative capacity and Sweden with distributive capacity) in economic 
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growth and equity. 
 
Operationalization 
The notion of market economy (or the strength of the private sector) not only is a core 
conceptual component of transformative capacity, but also serves as its measurable proxy, 
although reflective of “outcomes.” For example, transformative capacity can be measured by 
the ratio of private credit to GDP in a cross-national perspective (Besley & Persson, 2009). In 
the American context, Jacob S. Hacker (2002) uses the (active) participation of the private 
sector/actors in public social welfare spending as a proxy to reflect a vibrant, independent 
private-sector economy of the US.30 In the previously noted study by Rueschemeyer and 
Evans (1985), by contrast, “effectiveness of state intervention in the economy” is taken as a 
non-measurable but analyzable proxy for transformative capacity.31  
Weiss (1998), as likewise mentioned above, evaluates and compare (“outcomes” of) both 
individual state’s transformative and distributive capacities through various quantitative 
indicators. She uses exports, savings, and investments, respectively, as a share of GDP to 
name but a few, to measure the former sub-domain (with markets/the private sector being 
considered) while the latter is captured by income distribution and social security transfers, 
respectively, as a share of GDP. It is evident that either sub-domain of the literature echoes 
the important role of the state in policy implementation, as reiterated throughout, the 
fundamental building block of administrative/bureaucratic capacity. Following the same 
                                                     
30 According to Hacker, the US is a hybrid public-private welfare state that distributes risk within its system, 
thus becoming an exceptional model that poses a challenge to its European, dominant welfare state 
counterparts.     
31 The first and foremost condition of successful state intervention, as the authors argue, is the presence of a 
Weberian bureaucratic apparatus with corporate coherence. The autonomy of a bureaucracy from the dominant 
interests in a capitalist society to achieve “collective goods” is the other condition.  
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reasoning, indicators of either transformative or redistributive capacity vary widely 
depending on what policy issues need to be addressed. The essay by Krauss and Pierre 
(1993), briefly introduced in the subsection on administrative/bureaucratic capacity while 
discussing the conceptual conflation, can illustrate this point. They measure transformative 
capacity of the US by counting the number of enactments dealing with industrial policy 
(“outputs,” or serving as a potential direct proxy for legal capacity), while no measurable 
proxy is used in their analysis of Sweden and Japan. 
Followed by a recent sharp rise in income and wealth inequality worldwide between the 
rich and poor, socio-economic groups, and generations, the issue of how government fairly 
and effectively redistributes wealth inside pension plans has received prominent attention. In 
the 1993 study by Paul D. Pierson and R. Kent Weaver of the state’s capability to impose 
redistributive losses in North America and Britain in terms of cuts in old-age pensions 
(“outputs”), dating as far back as the 1970s and 1980s, two measurements (of distributive 
capacity) are singled out: (1) the magnitude of changes made in pensions cutback, and (2) the 
ratio of final policy changes to initial cutback proposals. 
 
Section conclusions  
In this section, I bring together different strands of literature on state capacity in CP and 
AP to show its multi-dimensional complexity of conceptualization and operationalization. 
Five specific conclusions are drawn for the selection of the four salient dimensions of state 
capacity, along with some implications on the selectivity of measurements for the statistical 
analysis to come:  
1. Administrative/bureaucratic capacity appears most prominent, inclusive, given its 
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conceptual association with policy implementation. It overlaps with respect to 
conceptualization and operationalization of other major dimensions of state capacity. 
2. Extractive/fiscal, coercive/military, and legal capacities are relatively more independent 
and distinguishable. They are usually measured by widely-used proxies. But one must be 
aware of the potential pitfalls involved: 
(1) Fiscal capacity and the provision of public goods are not necessarily the same. 
(2) When analyzing coercive/military capacity, one should distinguish between its two 
purposes: maintaining internal order and repelling foreign invasion. 
(3) Given the “rule of law” logic, I propose to operationalize legal capacity as the 
quantity of legislation/enactment, albeit involving structural impact that might 
invalidate, say, cross-national comparisons. However, such a proxy is supposed to be 
methodologically appropriate for a within-case comparative analysis (like this 
dissertation).     
3. Infrastructural and transformative (and distributive) capacities are considered 
supplementary to the other four major dimensions of state capacity and (largely) 
conceptually, and as a result, operationally conflated (particularly the former) with 
administrative/bureaucratic capacity. Following the principle of parsimony, they can thus 
merge (or fuse) with the major ones.32  
4. In much of literature, government performance (“outputs” or “outcomes”) is seen as a 
“practical” proxy for assessing state capacity out of necessity or expediency, even though 
                                                     
32 The state’s ability to fairly redistribute wealth has become a hot-button issue. When compared to global 
average, Taiwan has high average wealth and only moderate wealth inequality (Hou, 2016). Doing comparison 
of distributive capacity in the Taiwanese context seems less worthwhile. 
 
 
 
50 
 
it is important to distinguish evaluating performance from identifying capacity.33 
5. The analysis presented here permits us to reconsider the central puzzle of this study. That 
is, the majority/minority division should most strongly affect administrative/bureaucratic 
capacity. By contrast, the structural effect on extractive/fiscal, coercive/military, and legal 
capacities depends on the context in a given country, say, with more likelihood for 
legislation and budget enactments in the midst of rising partisan polarization and with 
less likelihood for military and coercive capacities in the face of an external threat and 
domestic unrest or potential instability, respectively. 
 
2.3 Power law and its applications  
A power law is instrumental in investigating policy coherence/continuity, essential to 
understanding administrative/bureaucratic capacity as it conceptually associates well with 
policy implementation. The purpose of this section is to introduce the power law employed, 
in this study, in an attempt to compare and analyze administrative/bureaucratic capacity 
throughout the ROC SP regimes, and to reveal where such a pattern of distribution occurs. 
The power law is a special probability distribution describing a variable that has many 
small values, some mid-range values, and just a few extremely large values—the “many, 
some, few” pattern. In other words, a variable which follows a power law shows a highly 
skewed distribution of values wherein “many have little and few have lots.” It “reflects a 
world (or part of it) that is ‘out of balance’, where by ‘balance’ or equilibrium we mean a 
normally-distributed world where average behavior tends to prevail, with truly rare and 
                                                     
33 For example, all the measurable proxies presented in the subsection on transformative (and distributive) 
capacity are referred to as either “outputs” or “outcomes,” not capacity per se. No one will truly know to what 
extent the state can boost the economy or alleviate the wealth gap until expected progress or improvement has 
been demonstrated. 
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clearly symmetric departure from a well-established central tendency” (Cioffi-Revilla, in 
press-b, MS. p. 3). The general mathematical form for a power law distribution is as follows: 
[1] p(x) = Cx-α 
   Where p(x) = the probability density function which x has a value equal to 
   α = the exponent of the power law 
   C = a constant 
 
 
[2]  α = 1 + n �∑ ln 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
𝑥𝑥min
𝑚𝑚
𝑜𝑜=1 �
−1
 
Where 
xi = observed values. 
xmin = minimum observed value. 
If α > 1, the data set is in a power-law distribution. 
If α = 2.5, the data set is in a pure power-law distribution. 
(adapted from Newman, 2005) 
 
 
A power law in a hyperbolic form (a) and linearized form (or log-log space) (b) is illustrated 
in Figure 2.1, directly adapted from Cioffi-Revilla (in press-a, MS. p. 22). 
 
 
Figure 2.1. A power law in hyperbolic (a) and linearized or log-linear (b) forms. Reprinted from Cioffi-Revilla 
(in press-a, MS. p. 22). 
 
When data is in a power-law pattern, it features a self-organized criticality behavior and a 
critical state. The self-organized criticality behavior describes a specific scenario in a system 
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that plays out repeatedly. A critical state produces many possible sizes of “avalanches” (or 
crashes) distributed with a power law in the system (Bak, Tang, & Wiesenfeld, 1987; 
Newman, 2005). The Bak-Tang-Wiesenfeld sandpile model, introduced in 1987, has received 
much interest for its simplicity, providing a typical example of how these features work. 
Suppose we steadily drop grains of sand on a sandpile and observe how many grains fall off 
the edge. The growing pile will collapse whenever it reaches a point (i.e., critical state) where 
the system becomes barley stable with respect to small perturbations. The observed 
“avalanches” from time to time are of all different scales—most are small, and large 
“avalanches” are rare, followed by a number of small “avalanches” before yet another large 
“avalanche” occurs. The kind of sand slides keep recurring as the simulation moves on (Bak, 
Tang, & Wiesenfeld, 1987). Such skewed distributions occur naturally in many 
circumstances, in addition to sandpile avalanche sizes. For example, there are many small 
towns, some larger cities, and few megalopolises in the world; the distribution of personal 
income, financial market crashes, firm sizes, land holding, scaling of warfare, forest fire 
sizes, and earthquake magnitudes, to name but a few, all share the same pattern (see Cioffi-
Revilla’s forthcoming edited volume [in press-c] for a collection of different examples 
illustrating the power law in social complexity). 
The power-law distribution or the like is also applied to the governance literature. For 
example, Bryan D. Jones and Frank R. Baumgartner (2005) (as referred to in Section 2.2.1 in 
respect of extractive/fiscal capacity) suggest a “leptokurtic” distribution (steeper, more 
peaked, and narrowed than a normal distribution with longer tails) of changes in budget share 
allocated cross various government programs in the US from 1948 to 2003. In other words, 
there are very small budget changes (due to either growth or cutbacks) in most programs and 
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punctuated budget changes (or significant fluctuations) in a very, very few programs, 
revealing incrementalism. Chih-Yung Ho (2007) presents a first attempt at using the power 
law to compare and analyze the Cabinet longevity, a crucial factor to ensure policy 
continuity, in Taiwan from 1997 to 2007.34 The study exemplifies earlier SP operation in 
Taiwan, with a focus on comparing the nation’s first non-KMT-led government since 
democratization, the DPP/Chen administration, with its KMT predecessor, the Lee 
administration. The Chen administration is found to fall behind Lee’s because the former 
causes a more frequent change of Cabinet officials and evidently follows a self-organized 
criticality behavior. Both studies give a rich insight into policy coherence/continuity, one of 
the foci of the literature on consequences of divided vs. unified government in the US, which 
will be discussed further in the following section.  
 
2.4 The impact of president (executive)-parliamentary congruence vs. incongruence on 
governance 
We now return to the central puzzle of this study—Whether the majority/minority 
government division makes difference. Speculation as to how this puzzle might be resolved 
have benefited from an extensive literature that attempts to explore whether and how 
different constitutional structures impact on governance. Alfred Stepan and Juan J. Linz 
(2011) theorize a negative relationship between the number of veto players and governance 
that is consistent with Linz’s own classics (1990, 1994) and the conventional wisdom that my 
                                                     
34 According to Lijphart (1984), although long-lived cabinets are neither necessarily effective policy makers 
nor critical to democratic stability, short-lived ones can hardly develop sound and coherence policies, not to 
mention their being powerless to carry them out largely. Along a similar vein, Kaare Strøm (1990) evaluates 
minority government performance via cabinet duration, arguing that the longer the duration of a cabinet, the 
better might be its performance. Unfortunately, the minority cabinet is less likely to be durable than its majority 
counterpart (Dodd, 1976; Taylor & Herman, 1971; Warwick, 1979). 
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dissertation addresses: Governance in president-parliamentary congruence is considered 
more effective than that in president-parliamentary incongruence. Their theory, however, 
conflicts with the findings of some earlier studies, such as David R. Mayhew’s (1991, 2005) 
argument in favor of divided government in the US (more on this topic in a subsequent 
paragraph).  
Another strand of related literature compares performance between the (British 
parliamentary version of) majoritarian/Westminster model (featured by e.g., executive 
dominance, the plurality rule, and two-party systems; theoretically more likely to achieve 
executive-parliamentary congruence) and the consensus model (featured by, say, a balanced 
executive-legislative relationship, proportional representation [PR] and multiparty systems). 
It remains open to empirical contestation. Lijphart’s (2012) path-breaking comparison of 36 
majoritarian and consensus democracies finds that the latter outperform the former both in 
representing and governing. By contrast, however, Matt Golder and Jacek Stramski (2010) do 
not support an advantage to PR; neither do André Blais and Marc André Bodet (2006). 
Perhaps the findings of G. Bingham Powell (2009) can contribute to a reconciliation of those 
inconsistencies in the literature: It is (due to differences in) the time frame. He argues that 
over time, the PR advantage declines as political parties in majoritarian systems, specifically 
single member district (SMD), converge toward the median voter. 
The literature on consequences of divided government (vis-à-vis unified government) in 
the US also accommodates rich exploration of the relationship between president-
parliamentary congruence/incongruence and governance. A substantial body of the literature 
is devoted to assessing legislative productivity. Divided government is often thought to lead 
to gridlock (e.g., Coleman, 1999; Sundquist, 1988) while, as said Mayhew (1991, 2005) 
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observes, it has nil effect on legislative output of important enactments.35 A second major 
focus of this literature concerns policy coherence. The coherence and continuity of public 
policy are conventionally expected to be more likely to suffer under divided than unified 
government (Milkis, 1999; Pfiffner, 1991). This conventional view may be limited after 
taking into account how political ideology shapes policy coherence. The evidence show that 
substantial liberal programs and policies were enacted even during times of divided 
government with Republican Presidents (Wu, 2008). Its third focus is on the fiscal deficit. 
Like the first two foci of the literature reviewed, studies reveal disagreement over the fiscal 
consequences of divided government, for example, better ability to lower deficits in the late 
19th-century US (Stewart, 1991) vs. weak deficit control (at the state level) from the late 
1960s to 1980s (Alt & Lowry, 1994). However, it is intriguing to notice that the electorate in 
the US and other Western democracies often votes according to “blind” retrospection or a 
myopic evaluation of the performance of an incumbent (Achen & Bartels, 2016). An 
investigation carried out in this dissertation to understand if the people in Taiwan could 
perceive changes, if any, in state capacity, as being reflective of the public image of its dual 
executives and Cabinet, will complement the above point. 
When focusing on how SP engineering affects governance, a number of works in 
literature approach the issue through the lens of political stability (e.g., Chou, 1996; Ho, 
2007; Poulard, 1990), though uncertain as to what the golden mean should be between being 
lowly (many changes) and highly stable (no changes), and of government efficiency (e.g., 
                                                     
35 Besides Coleman, several authors challenge Mayhew’s results, on the study methodology (Howell, Adler, 
Cameron, & Riemann, 2000; Kelly, 1993) while others confirm the results by analyzing the effect of, e.g., 
highly ideological issues (Quirk & Nesmith, 1995), super-majoritarian procedures of American politics, say, the 
Senatorial filibuster or the Congressional override of a Presidential veto (Krehbiel, 1996), omnibus legislating 
(Krutz, 2000), and party polarization (Jones, 2001).        
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Schleiter & Morhan-Johns, 2005). They are both known as the most notable achievements of 
the French Fifth Republic (Stevens, 1996). 
Much of the pertinent literature with the Taiwanese context brings attention to legislative 
productivity and budgetary deliberations. Wu Chung-li and Lin Chang-chih (2002) find that 
divided government is subject to significant annual budget cuts early on in first Chen 
administration, but this does not turn out to be true for legislation. In her study of the 4th 
Legislature (1999-2002), Yang (2003) challenges the traditional dichotomy of divided and 
unified government that, respectively, leads to legislative gridlock and effective governance 
by contending that it oversimplifies executive-legislative interactions. She indicates, 
alternatively, an increasing trend in bipartisan introduction of bills and a decline in party-line 
voting during divided government, albeit often with delays in legislation passing. The 
implication of the findings is that minority governments can be legislatively productive if 
they wisely manage not to provoke the Legislative majority or instigate hostile reactions. The 
study by Hawang Shiow-duan (2003) shows little difference in the executive branch’s 
exposure to annual budget cuts regardless of the form of government, but finds lower passage 
rates and longer periods of deliberation for legislation proposed by the Cabinet under divided 
government.36 A recent study by Kao Tsui-min (2016) reveals that the production of 
important laws governing cross-Strait relations under unified government statistically stands 
out, despite no significant difference in legislative productivity between unified and divided 
government in the time frame of 1996-2010. Moreover, as Chiu Fang-yi (2010) argued based 
on game-theoretic models, legislative stalemate can boil down to inactiveness of the 
legislative majority, for which the antagonistic executive-legislative relationship under 
                                                     
36 See also similar results for legislation of the 4th Legislative Yuan in Sheng (2003). 
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divided government entails an incentive. But given their limited scopes of work, 
longitudinally or conceptually, those findings might not be generalized to longer time frames 
or more extensive study of the topic. This dissertation therefore seeks to redress this 
insufficiency by using a longer longitudinal design and unpacking the notion of governance 
with its various most important elements.  
 
2.5 Hypotheses 
The synthesis of existing literature summarized in the preceding section, Section 2.4, 
reveals a debate among scholars that has left unanswered many questions concerning how to 
account for the effect of constitutional engineering on governance either at an aggregate level 
or through the lens of a refined conceptualization of governance, say, a multi-dimensional 
notion and measure of state capacity, especially in the context of nascent SP democracies. To 
play it safe, with the aim of addressing the only one main question of this dissertation: What 
is the relationship between president-parliamentary mode of interaction and state capacity to 
govern, I set up a primary research hypothesis (H1) and its alternative, null counterpart (H0), 
at aggregate levels, as follows:  
H1: ROC SP majority regimes (denoted “M”) had greater aggregate state capacity than 
   their minority counterparts (“m”). 
H0: M had no greater aggregate state capacity than m. 
The primary hypothesis is derived from and consistent with the conventional wisdom to be 
tested that governance in president-parliamentary congruence is considered more effective 
than that in president-parliamentary incongruence.  
In addition to the aggregate level and given the multi-dimensional assessment of state 
capacity in this study, we should also allow for the possibility that a set of auxiliary 
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hypotheses, list below, each capturing a selected salient dimension of state capacity, may not 
necessarily all go in one direction. That is, it seems unlikely that we expect all dimensions of 
state capacity to respond similarly to the majority/minority division. And indeed, this is 
largely the point of measuring dimensions of state capacity separately that could help provide 
a causal mechanism to explain the central puzzle of this study. 
Once again, as stated earlier (Section 2.2), I expect administrative/bureaucratic capacity 
to be most reactive to the majority/minority division, given its conceptual association with 
policy implementation. Likewise, I also expect the structural factor to matter for 
extractive/fiscal and legal capacities given rising partisan polarization in Taiwan’s 
government; however, given aforementioned Yang’s (2003) findings, legal capacity might 
respond better to minority governance in Taiwan instead, due to a working compromise. By 
contrast, considering the long-standing Communist Chinese threat to Taiwan that motivates 
the ROC government to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, a non-rejected null 
hypothesis for military capacity is desired, without violating the conventional wisdom. In 
other words, I expect majority/minority government status to have less impact on self-
defense due to the external pressures on governments of all types. So is it for coercive 
capacity, given the extraordinary vibrancy of Taiwan’s civil society participation in protests 
(see Chang [2012], Ho [2005], and Philion [2010] for social movements and democratization 
in Taiwan). 
H1a: M had greater extractive/fiscal capacity than m. (expected) 
H0a: M had no greater extractive/fiscal capacity than m. 
H1b: M had greater coercive capacity than m. 
H0b: M had no greater coercive capacity than m. (expected) 
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H1c: M had greater military capacity than m. 
H0c: M had no greater military capacity than m. (expected) 
H1d: M had greater administrative/bureaucratic capacity than m. (expected) 
H0d: M had no greater administrative/bureaucratic capacity than m.  
H1e: M had greater legal capacity than m. (expected) 
H0e: M had no greater legal capacity than m. (alternatively expected)   
 
Chapter conclusions 
The review of literature presented in this chapter establishes a foundation to derive a 
modified dichotomous SP typology (primarily based on the one suggested by Shuy and Le: 
majority vs. minority regimes, used as discrete explanatory variables) and choose four major 
(and more distinguishable) alternative dimensions of state capacity (a measurable DV: 
extractive/fiscal, coercive/military, administrative/bureaucratic, and legal), along with 
attention to issues of measurement, for analysis in this dissertation. The evaluation of the 
literature results in a primary hypothesis (at an aggregate level), five auxiliary hypotheses (by 
dimensions of state capacity), and their null counterparts, which test the conventional 
wisdom that governance in president-parliamentary congruence is considered more effective 
than that in president-parliamentary incongruence. 
Given that a legislative session is a more appropriate unit of analysis than a calendar (or 
fiscal) year because many data sets used in this study were collected or generated from 
legislative sessions (i.e., records of legislation, including budget enactments) or weekly time 
sheets (i.e., the frequency of Cabinet official changes) (detailed in the next chapter), (proxy) 
measurements on a yearly basis, as suggested in the literature, might not apply well to my 
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work. The following Chapter 3 will explain the mixed-method within-case comparative 
research design and rationale, methodologies (including the application of an innovative way 
of measuring administrative/bureaucratic capacity, the power-law analysis of Cabinet 
longevity), measurements, and data selection and collection. The side question raised of 
whether (and how) the people in Taiwan perceive the difference in state capacity will be 
addressed using regression analyses, as will also be methodologically detailed later with 
relevant data being reported. 
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Chapter 3. Research Design, Methods, and Data Collection 
Introduction 
This study employed a mixed-method within-case comparative analysis in a time frame 
between 1997 and early 2008, with various traditional (Western) measures of governance. 
Firstly, I performed quantitative statistical analyses aimed at identifying if the institutional 
factor, i.e., semi-presidential (denoted SP) majority/minority regimes (hereafter referred to as 
“M/m” or “M” vs. “m”), would affect Taiwan’s state capacity over the past twenty-odd years, 
while jointly considering if the (political) party factor, i.e., either the KMT or the DPP in 
power (hereafter referred to as “KMT M/m” and “DPP M/m,” respectively), would affect 
state capacity. It is also a question of interest in exploring, statistically, if the people in 
Taiwan could perceive the difference, if any, in state capacity exhibited in public opinion 
polls over time. Secondly, I conducted qualitative semi-structured interviews with a few 
leading politicians and senior political journalists in Taiwan in hopes of garnering insightful 
interpretations of my quantitative empirical results. This chapter describes my within-case 
comparative research design and the research methodologies, quantitative and qualitative, 
used in conducting this study, as well as detailing my data collection efforts.       
 
3.1 Within-case comparative research design 
My dissertation was designed as a within-case comparison over time in an attempt to 
control contextual variables (say, in this study, the usual suspects of cross-Straits relations, 
economic performance, and independence-unification ideology). It is presumed in the design 
that all other explanatory variables remain the same from one period to another, except for 
the one that causes or brings the change in the dependent variable. The within-case 
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comparison, in other words, follows the logic of a most-similar-system design (Lim, 2006). 
I divided this study into two main and four sub periods of time (or cases). The former 
refer to (ROC SP) M and/vs. (ROC SP) m. M includes the KMT/Lee (1997-2000), KMT/Ma 
(2008-early 2016, i.e., except for the last few months in the second term of Ma’s Presidency, 
the caretaker period, as a result of Tsai’s decision to reject Ma’s cohabitation request), and 
DPP/Tsai (2016-current) administrations, while the DPP/Chen (2000-2008) and KMT/Ma 
(February-May 2016) for m, with an intention of ascertaining whether a significant difference 
in state capacity exists between the two periods marking president-parliamentary congruence 
and incongruence, respectively.1 With ruling parties being accounted for, the latter refer to 
KMT M (Lee and Ma), KMT m (Ma’s caretaker period), DPP M (Tsai), and DPP m (Chen). 
By doing so, one will know if there is a significant difference in state capacity either between 
president-parliamentary congruence and incongruence under the same-party rule (i.e., KMT 
M vs. KMT m; DPP M vs. DPP m) or in the same presidential-parliamentary mode of 
interaction but under different ruling parties (i.e., KMT M vs. DPP M; KMT m vs. DPP m). 
Again, this will add a complementary thread of the party’s leverage to my focus on structural 
variations. Simply put, there are now a total of six cases meant for analysis: M, m, KMT M, 
KMT m, DPP M, DPP m (Table 3.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
1 I opted to identify the Chen-Tang duarchy as a minority/divided government and the Chen administration in 
facing the KMT-led pan-Blue Legislative majority as the minority regime in line with the general perceptions. 
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Table 3.1. Within-case Design in Time Frames 
Two main periods of time 
M: 
KMT/Lee admin. (1997-2000); 
KMT/Ma admin. (2008-early 2016); 
DPP/Tsai admin. (2016-current).  
vs. m: 
DPP/Chen admin. (2000-2008); 
KMT/Ma admin. (caretaker period in 2016). 
Four sub-periods of time 
KMT Rule 
 
DPP Rule 
KMT M:  
Lee & Ma admins. 
 
vs. KMT m: 
Ma admin.  
 DPP M:  
Tsai admin. 
 
vs. DPP m: 
Chen admin. 
KMT M:  
Lee & Ma admins. 
vs. DPP M:  
Tsai admin. 
KMT m: 
Ma admin. 
vs. DPP m: 
Chen admin. 
 
3.2 Quantitative research 
The statistical analyses included a preliminary, chi-square (statistical) hypothesis test for 
aggregate state capacity, a power-law analysis of Cabinet longevity, or the frequency of 
Cabinet official changes, for administrative/bureaucratic capacity, and other (statistical) 
hypothesis tests for legislation (including budget enactments)-related legal, extractive/fiscal, 
and coercive/military dimensions of state capacity,2 followed by linear regression models to 
explore the relationship between varying degrees of state capacity and the trend in job 
approval ratings for the President, the Premier, and his Cabinet, respectively.  
Partly inspired by ideas presented in the literature we have reviewed in Chapter 2, this 
study proposed a list of measurements of state capacity to select from when performing the 
hypothesis tests. In general, measurements of legal capacity center on legislative productivity 
of the Legislative Yuan (LY), the parliament, mainly in terms of bills of law (法律案); 
                                                     
2 Various hypothesis tests were used as separate units of analysis because in this study the data were collected 
for approximately two decades ending in early 2018, i.e., a fairly large sample size relative to the entire 
population (in Taiwan’s SP regimes) for the time being, albeit with a larger and increasing population size to 
come over time. 
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measurements of extractive/fiscal capacity take into consideration taxation, budgetary 
legislation on annual spending/revenues, and tax collection legislation; measurements of 
coercive/military capacity focus on spending while the coercive component also gives 
attention to its performance regarding the occurrence of demonstrations and violent crime; 
and measurements of administrative/bureaucratic capacity capture the notion of duration of 
Cabinet/Cabinet-level members in office, echoing and supplementing the power-law analysis 
of Cabinet longevity for the same end. The full list of the measurements (and codes or 
denotations) include as follows, and each will be further discussed in pertinent parts of this 
chapter: 
Legal capacity 
1. bills of law passed in the Legislature (%) (11c);3 
2. bills of law proposed by the Cabinet passed in the Legislature (%) (12c); 
 
Extractive/fiscal capacity 
3. the ratio of actual tax revenue to predicted tax revenue (A/P ratio, a.k.a. “relative political 
capacity,” already referred to in the preceding chapter) (13c); 
4. a cut or increase to the annual general budget in revenue (%) (141c); 
5. a cut to the annual general budget in expenditure (%) (142c);4 
6. a cut or increase to the supplementary budget in revenue (%) (18c); 
                                                     
3 The percentage of bills of law that are passed introduced by legislators or party caucuses and proposed by 
non-legislative branches of government to the Legislature. In Taiwan, not only can members of the Legislative 
Yuan (legislators) and legislative party caucuses (defined and stipulated in the Organic Law of the Legislative 
Yuan [立法院組織法]) introduce bills in the Legislative Yuan, but the other four branches of government, i.e., 
the Executive Yuan (Cabinet), the Judicial Yuan, the Examination Yuan, and the Control Yuan, can propose bills 
to the Legislative Yuan. The budget bill, however, can be proposed only by the Executive Yuan (TLY, 2005). 
See Section 3.5.1 for further discussion. 
4 The Legislative Yuan, as stipulated in Article 70 of the ROC Constitution, cannot propose an increase in 
expenditure in the budget bill (whether general or supplementary) submitted by the Executive Yuan (Cabinet). 
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7. a cut to the supplementary budget in expenditure (%) (19c); 
8. the total number of amendments to the Tax Collection Act (稅捐稽徵法) (1121_output); 
9. the number of amendments to the Tax Collection Act that contain significant changes to 
the goals of improving extractive/fiscal capacity (1122_output); 
 
Military capacity 
10. a cut to the annual defense budget in expenditure (%) (143c); 
11. a cut to the supplementary defense budget in expenditure (%) (110c); 
12. military expenditure as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) (%) (15c); 
13. the natural log of defense budget in expenditure per capita (16c); 
 
Coercive capacity 
14. a cut to the annual police budget in expenditure (%) (144c); 
15. a cut to the supplementary police budget in expenditure (%) (111c); 
16. the natural log of police force spending per capita (17c); 
17. the (annual) number of demonstrators per 100,000 population (ap_outcome); 
18. the (annual) violent crime rate per 100,000 population (vc_outcome); 
 
Administrative/bureaucratic capacity 
19. the number of Cabinet/Cabinet-level members left office (ofout1); 
20. the duration of Cabinet/Cabinet-level members in office (dur). 
 
The aforementioned list of measurements is meant to serve as a direct measure of state 
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capacity, either aggregately or by dimensions, except for six supplementa1 measurements—
1121_output, 1122_output, ap_outcome, vc_outcome, ofout1, and dur. 1121_output and 
1122_output are performance outputs while the latter may better serve as an indirect proxy 
for assessing extractive/fiscal capacity; ap_outcome, vc_outcome are performance outcomes, 
each serving as an indirect (proxy) measurement of coercive capacity. 110c of military 
capacity and 111c of coercive capacity were both removed (or skipped) from all the 
hypothesis tests performed in subsequent sections because of the former’s small samples of 
M (n = 1) (and m [n = 3] with all zero values) in them and the latter’s lack of samples of M. 
Additionally, all but two of the selected measurements (ap_outcome and vc_outcome) may 
allow one to capture, more or less, how the dynamics of executive-legislative interactions 
affected state capacity in Taiwan. 
I drew legislative data between 1997 and early 2018 from the website of the 
Parliamentary Library of the ROC Legislative Yuan 
(https://npl.ly.gov.tw/do/www/homePage) and its Legislative Statistics Service (立法統計資
訊網) (https://lis.ly.gov.tw/lgstatc/lgstat).5 Legislations, new or amended, were accessible 
from the website of the Laws and Regulations Database of the ROC (全國法規資料庫) 
(https://law.moj.gov.tw). Furthermore, budgetary data, including legislation and practice 
(such as final accounts of the general budgets as certified by the Comptroller General (決算) 
and taxation), between 1997 and early 2018 were separately sourced from the websites of the 
Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics (DGBAS) of the ROC Executive 
                                                     
5 But the data on the number of bills of law proposed by the Cabinet passed in the Legislative Yuan became 
accessible on the website of the Legislative Statistics Service of the Parliamentary Library, beginning with the 
5th Legislative Yuan sworn in 2012. 
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Yuan (https://www.dgbas.gov.tw)6 (the primary source of such data), the ROC Finance 
Ministry (https://www.mof.gov.tw), and the Parliamentary Library. For measuring 
coercive/military capacity, I collected Taiwan’s official annual and monthly GDP and 
population data between 1997 and 2017 from the websites of the DGBS’s National Statistics 
service (中華民國統計資訊網) (https://www.stat.gov.tw) and the Statistics Service of the 
ROC Interior Ministry (內政統計查詢網) 
(http://statis.moi.gov.tw/micst/stmain.jsp?sys=100), respectively; I assembled the nationwide 
data on demonstrators and violent crime between 1997 and 2017 from the Monthly Bulletin 
of Interior Statistics, ROC (內政部統計月報), the Monthly Statistics of Police 
Administration, ROC (警政統計月報), and the Yearly Statistics of Police Administration, 
ROC (警政統計年報). Data collection for Cabinet longevity will be described later, in 
Section 3.3 on the power-law analysis. 
 
3.3 A preliminary, chi-square test for aggregate state capacity 
In my study, the first step in exploring if a dichotomous regime classification of M and m 
would contribute to the difference in aggregate state capacity, i.e., testing the primary 
hypothesis, is to perform a Pearson’s chi-square test of association (or independence) to 
determine whether M/m (categorical variables) possess similar degrees of state capacity that 
is conceptualized “as a whole,” rather than as its individual, alternative dimensions. The 
values or observed frequencies (counts) in the (two-way) contingency table used for the chi-
square test were obtained from 14 itemized measurements of the notions of legal, 
                                                     
6 The DGBAS website releases and provides access to annual budgets (and budget bills) and final accounts of 
the ROC central government and its immediate subordinate agencies via hyperlinks, respectively. 
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extractive/fiscal, coercive/military, and administrative/bureaucratic dimensions of capacity. 
The structure of the contingency table will be presented detailing the results of the tests in the 
beginning of Chapter 4, the empirical chapter. I sorted the data (values) according to 
legislative sessions—regular and extraordinary—within which they were observed 
(collected) and, if necessary, generated. When a datum observed in the interim (or recess) 
between legislative sessions, regular or extraordinary (i.e., lay outside regular and 
extraordinary legislative sessions), I matched it to the session, a period of time, either of 
whose start or end date was relatively closer in time to when the datum occurred. When this 
kind of datum was coincidentally located equidistant from two successive sessions (i.e., the 
end date of an earlier session and the start date of its ensuing session), I gave the “credit” to 
the session held in the same month when the datum was observed or generated.7, 8 
The 14 measurements used for the chi-square test are 11c and 12c (of legal capacity); 
13c, 141c, 142c, 18c, 19c, and 1122_output (of extractive/fiscal capacity); 143c, 15c, 16c (of 
military capacity); 144c and 17c (of coercive capacity); and ofout1 (of 
administrative/bureaucratic capacity). Twelve of the first 13 listed here are direct (proxy) 
measurements (except for 1122_output), while the last one, ofout1, serves as an expedient 
measure to make applicable in a chi-square test a similar, albeit less sophisticated, 
conceptualization of the longevity of Cabinet/Cabinet-level members, compared with that 
developed for a power-law analysis in a subsequent section of this chapter. Table 3.2 presents 
the marginal distributions of the 14 measurements. 
                                                     
7 Just a reminder that no legislative session began on the first day of a month in Taiwan since 1997, the 
commencement of the time frame of this study.     
8 I call this framework a prototype of Framework 1 (with ES [extraordinary sessions]) (Appendix A). The 
standard operating procedure (SOP) demonstrated above for locating data will be used again to prepare another 
framework for investigating the relationship between state capacity and the public’s approval ratings of the 
President, the Premier, and the Cabinet later in this chapter. 
 
 
69 
 
For the sake of fitting a chi-square test to a variety of data at different scales, I 
standardized each type of data collected to measure a dimension of state capacity. By doing 
so, I could divide each of my data sets (each data set represents different measurements) by 
their respective ±2 standard deviations (σ = 1) from zero into six intervals, a common 
industrial method: >2σ, 1σ~2σ (included), 0 (included) ~1σ (included), -1σ (included) ~0, -
2σ (included) ~-1σ, <-2σ, making them count on an equal basis (i.e., based on equal interval 
values) to form a contingency table for the test. Secondly, since the chi-square statistic (χ2) 
and the corresponding p-value of the test of association could not be computed when two 
categorical variables as columns (M/m in my case) in the contingency table had no data 
values, i.e., 0 counts, in (two cells in) a row (state capacity in my case), I had to remove all 
rows with 0 counts in two cells while performing the chi-square test.9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
9 Simply put, a row of zeros will result in an estimated probability of 0 for either observation being in that row. 
Given expected counts of 0 for those cells, we end up trying to divide by 0 when trying to compute a χ2 value. 
The formula for chi-square is: 
 
χ 2 = Ʃ (o-e)2/e 
Where 
o = observed number of individuals. 
e = expected number of individuals. 
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Table 3.2. Selected Measurements of State Capacity for Chi-Square Test by M/m 
(Observed counts) 
State capacity M m Totals 
Legal 11c 
(bills of law passed in the Legislature) 
45 
(16.13) 
25 
(13.97) 
70 
(15.28) 
12c 
(bills of law proposed by the Cabinet passed in 
the Legislature) 
45 
(16.13) 
25 
(13.97) 
70 
(15.28) 
Extractive/fiscal 13c 
(A/P ratio: ratio of actual tax revenue to 
predicted tax revenue) 
10 (3.58) 7 (3.91) 17 (3.71) 
141c 
(cut/increase to the annual general budget in 
revenue) 
12 (4.30) 8 (4.47) 20 (4.37) 
142c 
(cut to the annual general budget in expenditure) 
12 (4.30) 8 (4.47) 20 (4.37) 
18c 
(cut/increase to the supplementary budget in 
revenue) 
3 (1.08) 5 (2.79) 8 (1.75) 
19c 
(cut to the supplementary budget in expenditure) 
3 (1.08) 6 (3.35) 9 (1.97) 
1122c_output 
(number of amendments to the Tax Collection 
Act that contain significant changes to the goals 
of improving fiscal capacity) 
45 
(16.13) 
25 
(13.97) 
70 
(15.28) 
Military 143c 
(cut to the annual defense budget in expenditure) 
12 (4.30) 8 (4.47) 20 (4.37) 
15c 
(military expenditure as a share of GDP) 
12 (4.30) 9 (5.03) 21 (4.59) 
16c 
(logged defense budget in expenditure per 
capita) 
12 (4.30) 10 (5.59) 22 (4.80) 
Coercive 144c 
(cut to the annual police budget in expenditure) 
12 (4.30) 8 (4.47) 20 (4.37) 
17c 
(logged police force spending per capita) 
11 (3.94) 10 (5.59) 21 (4.59) 
Administrative/ 
bureaucratic 
ofout1 
(number of Cabinet/Cabinet-level members left 
office) 
45 
(16.13) 
25 
(13.97) 
70 
(15.28) 
 Totals 279 
(100.00) 
179 
(100.00) 
458 
(100.00) 
Note: Entries are percentages in parentheses, rounded to two decimal places. 
 
3.4 Power-law analysis of Cabinet longevity for administrative/bureaucratic capacity 
This idea of using a power-law analysis of the frequency of Cabinet official changes 
was initiated in my master’s thesis (Ho, 2007) and found its continuation in this dissertation. 
Thirty-nine important politically nominated offices selected in the ROC Executive Yuan 
(Cabinet) constitute the data set of study: the Premier, the Vice Premier, Ministers of State, 
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Ministers of State without Portfolio, the Secretary-General of the Cabinet, Cabinet members 
heading commissions, and Cabinet-level heads in councils or commissions, while heads of 
independent agencies, Cabinet-level heads in councils or commissions with a fixed tenure, 
and Cabinet-level officials who are not senior political appointees (特任官) are excluded.10, 
11 Taiwan is in the process of extensively restructuring the Executive Yuan to reduce the 
number of Cabinet and Cabinet-level agencies from 37 to 29, commencing in 2012. The 
following Table 3.3 displays the 39 offices selected include those that existed whether they 
were newly-established, later dissolved or merged into and subordinated to another, or 
upgraded to a ministry, within the time frame of this study (1997-early 2018).
                                                     
10 In Taiwan, Cabinet-level officials without a fixed tenure who neither serve on independent agencies nor are 
senior political appointees include the Coordination Council for North American Affairs of the Executive Yuan 
(until it was downgraded and subordinate to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 9/1/2012), the Government 
Information Office (GIO) of the Executive Yuan (until it was dissolved on 5/20/2012 and a major part of its role 
was replaced by the then newly-established Cabinet Spokesperson, a senior political appointee), and deputy 
secretary-generals. I, however, retained the head of the GIO in the data set considering his or her high-profile 
role in publicizing and promoting government policies as well as its nature of being a Cabinet spokesperson, 
thus being more exposed to the dynamics of executive-legislative interactions in Taiwan. 
11 The Chairperson of the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) of Executive Yuan established in 2004 was 
appointed for a fixed tenure of years until 7/1/2012 and thereafter has no security of tenure. However, it is 
intriguing to notice that none of the five FSC heads with security of tenure ever fulfilled their four-year term of 
office, and several of them resigned or were ousted on political grounds, revealing political dynamics. I, 
therefore, chose to extend the data set by adding the FSC heads with a fixed tenure, along with their successors 
without it. 
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Table 3.3. Offices in Cabinet Qualified by Criteria, Jul. 1997 – Feb. 2018 
Office Preceding Organic change of Cabinet official-led government agency (date) 
  Upgraded to 
Ministry 
Downgraded to the 
sub-ministerial 
level  
Dissolved Newly-
established 
1. Premier (行政院長)  N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2. Vice Premier (行政院副院
長) 
 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
3. Ministers of State without 
Portfolio (政務委員) 
 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
4. Secretary-General of the 
Cabinet (行政院秘書長) 
 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
5. Minister of the Interior (內政
部長) 
     
6. Minister of Foreign Affairs 
(外交部長) 
     
7. Minister of National Defense 
(國防部長) 
     
8. Minister of Finance (財政部
長) 
     
9. Minister of Education (教育
部長) 
     
10. Minister of Justice (法務部
長) 
     
11. Minister of Economic Affairs 
(經濟部長) 
     
12. Minister of Transportation 
and Communications (交通
部長) 
     
13. Chairperson of the 
Mongolian and Tibetan 
Affairs Commission (蒙藏委
員會主委) 
 
 
    
(9/15/2017, when 
merged into and 
subordinated to the 
Culture Ministry) 
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14. Chairperson of the Overseas 
Community Affairs Council 
(僑委會主委) 
Chairperson of the Overseas Chinese 
Affairs Commission; Chairperson of 
the Overseas Compatriot Affairs 
Commission 
(In neither case a change in the 
official title of the Council in 
Chinese was made.) 
    
15. Director General of the 
(Cabinet-level) Directorate-
General of Budget, 
Accounting and Statistics, 
Executive Yuan (行政院主計
長) 
     
16. Director General of the 
(Cabinet-level) Directorate-
General of Personnel 
Administration, Executive 
Yuan (行政院人事長) 
Director-General of the (Cabinet-
level) Central Personnel 
Administration, Executive Yuan (行
政院人事行政局長) 
    
17. Director-General of the 
(Cabinet-level) Government 
Information Office, 
Executive Yuan (行政院新聞
局長) 
    
(5/20/2012) 
 
18. Minister of Health and 
Welfare (衛福部長) 
Administrator of the (Cabinet-level) 
Department of Health, Executive 
Yuan (行政院衛生署長) 
 
(7/23/2013) 
   
19. Administrator of (Cabinet-
level) the Environmental 
Protection Administration, 
Executive Yuan (行政院環保
署長) 
     
20. Director-General of the 
(Cabinet-level) Coast Guard 
Administration, Executive 
Yuan (行政院海巡署長)a 
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Table 3.3. (cont.) 
Office Preceding Organic change of Cabinet official-led government agency (date) 
  Upgraded to 
Ministry 
Downgraded to the 
sub-ministerial 
level  
Dissolved Newly-
established 
21. Director (or Curator) of the 
(Cabinet-level) National 
Palace Museum (故宮博物
院長) 
     
22. Chairperson of the (Cabinet-
level) Mainland Affairs 
Council, Executive Yuan (行
政院陸委會主委)b 
     
23. Chairperson of the (Cabinet-
level) Council for Economic 
Planning And Development, 
Executive Yuan (行政院經建
會主委) 
   
 
 
(1/22/2014, when merged 
with the Research, 
Development and 
Evaluation Commission of 
the Executive Yuan to form 
the National Development 
Council) 
 
24. Chairperson of the Financial 
Supervisory Commission (金
管會主委) 
Chairperson of the (Cabinet-level) 
Financial Supervisory Commission, 
Executive Yuan (行政院金管會主
委) 
 
(8/1/2013) 
   
25. Chairperson of the Veterans 
Affairs Council (退輔會主
委) 
Chairperson of the (Cabinet-level) 
Veterans Affairs Commission, 
Executive Yuan (行政院退輔會主
委) 
 
(11/1/2013) 
   
26. Chairperson of the (Cabinet-
level) National Youth 
Commission, Executive Yuan 
(行政院青輔會主委) 
   
(1/1/2013, when 
merged into and 
subordinated to the 
Education 
Ministry) 
  
27. Chairperson of the (Cabinet-
level) Atomic Energy 
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Council, Executive Yuan (行
政院原能會主委) 
 
 
 
28. Minister of Science and 
Technology (科技部長) 
Chairperson of the (Cabinet-level) 
National Science Council, Executive 
Yuan (行政院國科會主委) 
 
(3/3/2014) 
   
29. Chairperson of the (Cabinet-
level) Research, 
Development and Evaluation 
Commission, Executive Yuan 
(行政院研考會主委) 
    
(1/21/2014, when merged 
with the Council for 
Economic Planning And 
Development of the 
Executive Yuan to form the 
National Development 
Council) 
 
30. Chairperson of the (Cabinet-
level) Council of Agriculture, 
Executive Yuan (行政院農委
會主委) 
     
31. Minister of Culture (文化部
長) 
Chairperson of the (Cabinet-level) 
Council for Cultural Affairs, 
Executive Yuan (行政院文建會主
委) 
 
(2/15/2012) 
   
32. Minister of Labor (勞動部
長) 
Council of (Cabinet-level) Labor 
Affairs, Executive Yuan (行政院勞
委會主委) 
 
(2/17/2014) 
   
33. Chairperson of the (Cabinet-
level) Consumer Protection 
Commission, Executive Yuan 
(行政消保會主委) 
     
(1/1/2012, when becoming a 
task force of the Executive 
Yuan) 
 
34. Chairperson of the (Cabinet-
level) Public Construction 
Commission, Executive Yuan 
(行政院工程會主委) 
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Table 3.3. (cont.) 
Office Preceding Organic change of Cabinet official-led government agency (date) 
  Upgraded to 
Ministry 
Downgraded to the 
sub-ministerial 
level  
Dissolved Newly-
established 
35. Chairperson of the Council 
of Indigenous Peoples (原住
民族委員會主委) 
Chairperson of the (Cabinet-level) 
Council of Indigenous Peoples, 
Executive Yuan (行政院原住民族委
員會主委); Chairperson of the 
Council of Aboriginal Affairs, 
Executive Yuan (行政院原住民委員
會主委) 
 
(3/26/2014) 
   
36. Chairperson of the (Cabinet-
level) National Sports 
Council, Executive Yuan (行
政院體委會主委) 
   
(1/1/2013, when 
merged into and 
subordinated to the 
Education 
Ministry) 
  
37. Chairperson of the Hakka 
Affairs Council (客委會主
委) 
Chairperson of the (Cabinet-level) 
Hakka Affairs Council, Executive 
Yuan (行政院客委會主委) 
 
(1/1/2012) 
   
38. Spokesperson (發言人)c      
(5/20/2012) 
39. Chairperson of the National 
Development Council (國發
會主委) 
     
(1/22/2014) 
a. The Coast Guard Administration of the Executive Yuan later became merged into and subordinated to the newly-established Ocean Affairs Council (海洋委
員會), a Cabinet agency, on 4/28/2018, beyond the time frame of this study.  
b. The Mainland Affairs Council of the Executive Yuan was later upgraded to full ministerial status and renamed the Mainland Affairs Council on 7/2/2018, 
beyond the time frame of this study. 
c. In accordance with the Organic Act of the Executive Yuan (行政院組織法), as amended in 2010, the Cabinet shall have a spokesperson, albeit without 
heading a Cabinet agency. 
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The data were last updated on March 9, 2018, two weeks after the Executive Yuan 
announced on February 23 by its spokesman Premier William Lai’s first, albeit partial, 
Cabinet reshuffle involving three ministers (Foreign, Defense, and Labor) and two Cabinet-
level heads (Mainland China Affairs and Veterans) (Strong, 2018), providing 553 samples in 
the last two decades: 322 samples in ROC SP majority regimes (256 samples in KMT M12; 66 
samples in DPP M) and 231 samples in its SP minority regimes (191 samples in DPP m; 40 
samples in KMT m).13  
I computed and compared the values of the power-law exponent α of the interval (i.e., 
frequency) of Cabinet official changes in chronological order on a weekly basis (according to 
the interval of dates to either assume or leave office) between M and m and, for the sake of 
exploring the influence, if any, of political parties on administrative/bureaucratic capacity, 
four possible permutations of M/m and KMT/DPP rule. If α is larger than 1, the frequency of 
Cabinet official changes is in a power-law distribution where short intervals are observed 
among most official changes and long intervals among a very few official changes. In other 
words, in this scenario, audiences via broadcast, online, or print media in Taiwan would 
perceive rapid changes in the Cabinet line-up, hence a sign of an absence of policy coherence 
and continuity from government officials. In this sense, the frequency is more informative 
than an average or median. If α is equal to 2.5, the frequency is in a pure power-law 
                                                     
12 Thirty-nine members of Lien Chan’s (連戰) Cabinet had already been in office before the 4th Constitutional 
Amendments promulgated on July 21, 1997 (and left office sometime after the promulgation). Their original 
dates of assuming office were used, which can be traced back to no earlier than February 24, 1996, if at all, 
when Lien embarked his second premiership. 
13 A Cabinet official who is either appointed to a new term of office in the same position which is continuous 
with his or her previous term or promoted to from acting to full head of a government agency is considered as a 
single sample with an original date of assuming office (as acting head, if any) and a date of leaving that 
position. Likewise, the length of service of political appointees in office is considered continued when they 
either become heads of their successor agencies after a merger or upgrade or stay in their same positions after 
Cabinet reshuffles. 
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distribution.  
Just a note here that there were many reasons why Cabinet and Cabinet-level members 
left office and the facts involved are often speculative. However, the dynamics of executive-
legislative interactions seemed to weigh more in many cases of Cabinet official changes, 
such as resignations or removal from office triggered by Legislative moves against Cabinet-
proposed bills instituting new or revised policies or programs led by individual ministers or 
other officials of comparable or higher rank,14 or Legislative accountability of executive 
leadership, sometimes fraught with an unbearable barrage of ego-crushing insults hurled by 
legislators to officials (via interpellations or various mass and social media outlets),15 to 
name but a few. Prominent cases of Cabinet official changes may illustrate the facts 
underlying the analysis, but a power-law analysis itself is looking at patterns.  
There are two major approaches available to computing the α value of the interval of 
Cabinet official changes, “interval of dates to ASSUME office” and “interval of dates to 
LEAVE office.” By taking into consideration both institutional and party factors, either 
(major) approach can be further differentiated into six sub-ones (with the numbers enclosed 
                                                     
14 As a conspicuous example of this situation, Christina Y. Liu (劉憶如) resigned as Finance Minister in Ma’s 
administration in late May 2012 in protest against ruling KMT legislators’ proposal to water down her capital 
gains tax plan on stock transactions (Hsu, Liu, & Luk, 2012). 
15 This second situation was exemplified by Hsueh Hsiang-chuan (薛香川), a former and first Cabinet 
Secretary-General in the Ma administration, who stepped down under relentless pressure from the opposition 
DPP on his slow disaster response to Typhoon Morakot in August 2009 (Lin, 2018), and Christine Tsung (宗才
怡), the country’s first female Economics Minister, who quit the position after serving only 48 days in the Chen 
administration, citing frustrations with being a “rabbit in the jungle” of Taiwan’s charged political climate 
(Dobson, 2002; “Embattled Taiwan minister quits,” 2002). The recent resignation of the scandal-ridden 
Education Minister, Wu Maw-kuen (吳茂昆), in late May 2018, was applicable to the situation. His alleged 
transgressions involved conflicts of interest, misappropriation of patent rights, and illegally attending a 
technology conference in Mainland China while he chaired the Cabinet-level National Science Council in 2005, 
making himself not only subjected to an insult campaign from KMT legislators but the shortest-lived (41 days) 
Education Minister in Taiwan (Maxon, 2018a, 2018b). Since the endpoint of the data collection was March 9, 
2018, Wu’s tenure as Education Minister was, unfortunately, not included in my data set. 
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in brackets referring to the sample sizes of officials and intervals in order):16, 17 
 
1-1) Interval of dates to ASSUME office in majority regimes (M-A) [239: 236] 
1-2) Interval of dates to ASSUME office in minority regimes (m-A) [159: 157] 
1-3) Interval of dates to ASSUME office in KMT majority regimes (KMT M-A) [213: 211] 
1-4) Interval of dates to ASSUME office in KMT minority regime (KMT m-A) [8: 7] 
1-5) Interval of dates to ASSUME office in DPP majority regimes (DPP M-A) [26: 25] 
1-6) Interval of dates to ASSUME office in DPP minority regimes (DPP m-A) [151: 150] 
2-1) Interval of dates to LEAVE office in majority regimes (M-L) [210: 207] 
2-2) Interval of dates to LEAVE office in minority regimes (m-L) [150: 149] 
2-3) Interval of dates to LEAVE office in KMT majority regimes (KMT M-L) [184: 182] 
2-4) Interval of dates to LEAVE office in KMT minority regime (KMT m-L) [0: 0] 
2-5) Interval of dates to LEAVE office in DPP majority regime (DPP M-L) [26: 25] 
2-6) Interval of dates to LEAVE office in DPP minority regimes (DPP m-L) [150: 149] 
                                                     
16 Since Taiwan has experienced three turnovers of ruling parties in 2000, 2008, and 2016, the samples of 
officials who assumed or left office on the date of the Presidential inauguration, the twentieth of May, in these 
three years were removed from the computation to avoid biases. Likewise, I applied a similar rationale to trim 
the number of officials who assume or left office on February 1, 2016 when a new Legislature was inaugurated 
with an overwhelming DPP majority vis-à-vis the Chang caretaker Cabinet, the sole, short-lived KMT (SP) 
minority regime, appointed by outgoing President Ma. However, in order to optimize my approaches to 
accommodates more samples for a power-law analysis, particularly for sub-approaches interval of dates to 
ASSUME office in m and KMT m (i.e., m-A and KMT m-A), I retain (the eight) officials whose original date of 
assuming office was February 1, 2016, given the continuity between KMT M and KMT m in the Ma 
administration.  
17 When calculating all intervals of Cabinet official changes in chronological order, I removed the intervals 
between “spatially adjacent” officials who, however, belonged to different and temporally non-adjacent SP 
regimes listed in a Microsoft Excel worksheet of mine, to avoid generating “artificial outliers,” and thus to 
ensure accurate α values. For instance, when calculating intervals using sub-approach 1-1) or “M-A,” I needed 
to remove the interval of up to 443 weeks between the last listed official in the (KMT) Lee administration 
(which ended in 5/19/2000), #84 George Chen Shi-yi (陳世圯), who assumed office as acting Minister of 
Transportation and Communications on 3/27/2000, and the first listed official in the (KMT) Ma administration 
(which began on 5/20/2008 after eight years of DPP minority rule), #319 Song Yan-rui (宋晏仁), who assumed 
office as acting Administrator of the Department of Health, Executive Yuan on 9/25/2000. 
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Since a larger (interval) sample size was observed using the major approach “interval of 
dates to ASSUME office,” which was also consistently true across all sub-approaches,18 I 
opted to perform a power-law analysis on data derived from this major approach.19 
Unfortunately, KMT m had to be excluded from a power-law analysis because the seven 
intervals computed from its eight officials were all zeros (as they all assumed office on 
February 1, 2016) for which an α was incomputable. As a result, I used five cases (M, m, 
KMT M, DPP M, and DPP m) to constitute three sets of counterparts for comparison, namely, 
“M vs. m,” “KMT M vs. DPP M,” and “DPP M vs. DPP m.” The results of this power-law 
analysis, specifically of “M vs. m,” were complemented by supplemental hypothesis tests I 
performed on the duration in office of those individual high-ranking officials (dur).  
Considering a lengthy, detailed tabulation of the large samples (553 Cabinet/Cabinet-
level officials), each of which contains a name, executive position under a specified SP 
regime, dates of assuming and, if applicable, leaving office, duration, and the interval to the 
next Cabinet official change, I preferred not to incorporate it into the text or an appendix of 
this study. A request for the tabulated data is welcome. 
The sources of data collection for Cabinet official changes between 199620 and 2018 
                                                     
18 A larger (interval) sample size in majority regimes was observed using sub-approach 1-1) (236 intervals from 
239 officials). A larger (interval) sample size in minority regimes was observed using the sub-approach 1-2) 
(157 intervals from 159 officials). A larger (interval) sample size in KMT majority regimes was observed using 
the sub-approach 1-3) (211 intervals from 213 officials). A larger (interval) sample size in the KMT minority 
regime was observed using sub-approach 1-4) (7 intervals from 8 officials). The (interval) sample sizes in DPP 
majority regimes were equal using either sub-approach 1-5) or 2-5) (25 intervals from 26 officials). A larger 
(interval) sample size in DPP minority regimes was observed using sub-approach 1-6) (150 intervals from 151 
officials).  
19 A power-law analysis on data derived from the other major approach “interval of dates to LEAVE office” 
drew the same conclusions as the approach “interval of dates to LEAVE office.” 
20 See details in footnote 12. 
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included websites of the ROC Executive Yuan (https://www.ey.gov.tw) and its immediate 
subordinate agencies, the (ROC) Presidential Office Gazette (總統府公報),21 and other 
ROC Government publications. The date of a Cabinet or Cabinet-level member’s assumption 
to office (and the date when s/he left office) depended on information, if available, obtained 
from the websites of the ROC Executive Yuan and its immediate subordinate agencies, the 
Presidential Office Gazette (and other ROC Government publications), Wikipedia, and news 
articles, in that order of priority given for information availability. Organic laws and 
regulations (executive orders), new or amended, that provided a basis to develop the list of 
qualified offices in the Cabinet for the power-law analysis are available on the websites of 
the Laws and Regulations Database of the ROC and the Parliamentary Library. 
 
3.5 Two-sample t-tests or Mann-Whitney tests for legislation (including budget enactments)-
related legal, extractive/fiscal and coercive/military dimensions of state capacity 
In this study, I conducted dozens of hypothesis tests on the difference in selected 
measurements of capacity per se and, if appropriate, of its performance (through outputs or 
outcomes), both serving as proxies (direct and indirect, respectively) for the other three 
legislation (including budget enactments)-related dimensions of state capacity between M 
and m, namely, legal, extractive/fiscal, and coercive/military. Data (sets) obtained from 
Framework 1 (with ES [extraordinary sessions]) that I created in Section 3.2 of this chapter 
(see footnote 8 on p. 68) were used for hypothesis tests (except those on the indirect 
measurements of coercive capacity) in this section. Speaking more specifically of the 
                                                     
21 The Presidential Office Gazette is available in print and electronic format, the latter of which can be accessed 
via the webpage of the Office of the ROC President at https://www.president.gov.tw/Page/129. 
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hypothesis tests, the two-sample t-test was employed for statistical analysis of my data sets 
that follow a normal distribution (an assumption of the t-test) or consist of 30, at least, or 
more samples in each group for comparison in my case, for example KMT M (assumed with 
an asymptotic normal distribution of the sample average by applying the central limit 
theorem), when the variances between two groups were equal (see the assumptions 
underlying the t-test in Pagano, 1998). The Welch’s two sample t-test was used instead when 
the variances were unequal. Without normality distribution, or when a relatively small 
sample size (of less than 30) and uneven sample sizes for two groups were collected, the 
Mann-Whitney or (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney) test, a nonparametric test, was chosen instead 
(Sharp, 1979; Mann & Whitney, 1947). 
Moreover, the Shapiro-Wilk normality test was employed to determine if a data set was 
normally distributed. The F-test and the Ansari-Bradley test were performed to examine the 
equality of variances of a data set with normal and non-normal distributions, respectively, 
and to determine if equal variance can be assumed while performing the t-tests. 
Just like what was done with my power-law analysis of administrative/bureaucratic 
capacity, KMT m was also excluded from the hypothesis tests for legal, extractive/fiscal, 
and coercive/military dimensions of state capacity, because of a lack of or insufficient 
pertinent data observed in its short-lived, three-month rule (say, at most, only one sample 
available for each measurement of capacity itself). Consequently, I used the same five cases 
and the same three resultant sets of counterparts for comparison, i.e., “M vs. m,” “KMT M vs. 
DPP M,” and “DPP M vs. DPP m,” for the hypothesis tests here as used for the power-law 
analysis. Moreover, any of two compared data sets obtained from a proposed direct or 
supplemental/indirect (proxy) measurement of state capacity with fewer than two samples (n 
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< 2) should be skipped from the hypothesis tests.22 
I selected 12 direct and three performance-based measurements for conducting 
hypothesis tests on legal, extractive/fiscal, and coercive/military dimensions of state capacity. 
The former include 11c and 12c (of legal capacity); 13c, 141c, 142c, 18c, and 19c (of 
extractive/fiscal capacity); 143c, 15c, 16c (of military capacity); and 144c and 17c (of 
coercive capacity). The latter are 1122_output (of extractive/fiscal capacity), ap_outcome, 
and vc_outcome (both of coercive capacity). They are detailed in following sections.  
 
3.5.1 Legal capacity (11c and 12c) 
I computed the legal dimension of state capacity, adopting Yang’s (2003) concept of the 
“relative number of laws supplied and demanded” (already referred in Chapter 2), through 
two informative threads on the scope of bill providers, i.e., all eligible ones vs. the Cabinet 
alone, to ensure an adequate understanding of evaluating the impact of president-
parliamentary congruence/incongruence on legislative productivity.23 Specifically, 11c 
measures overall legislative productivity in the LY by legislative sessions (regular and 
extraordinary) between 1997 and early 2018, considering all bills of law introduced by 
legislators or party caucuses and proposed by non-legislative branches of government to the 
LY, while 12c for legislative productivity during the same legislative sessions in terms of 
only those proposed by the Cabinet, intending to more accurately capture the dynamics of 
executive-legislative interactions. Each of them is formulated as follows: 
11c:  
                                                     
22 As described in the last paragraph of Section 3.1, 110c and 111c were skipped accordingly. 
23 See footnote 3 above for details. 
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Legislative productivity-cum-percentage of passed bills of law = 
number of passed bills of law 
number of introduced & proposed bills of law 
    
 
12c:  
Legislative productivity-cum-percentage of passed Cabinet-proposed bills of law = 
number of passed Cabinet−proposed bills of law
number of Cabinet−proposed bills of law  
 
 
Considering the continuity of legislation in individual Legislative terms,24 the legislative 
statistics collected for this part of the section were extended to include the first three regular 
sessions of the 3rd LY. In other words, it was because not only the numbers of bills 
introduced or proposed to the LY in the first three regular sessions but also the results of 
legislative deliberations on the bills by the end of the third session (passed or not, or 
ongoing) constituted the basis for computing legislative productivity rates in the second half 
of the 3rd LY. Otherwise, the way of computing legislative productivity rates in the 3rd LY 
by sessions would have been grounded differently from that for subsequent Legislative 
terms. The statistics focused on the bill of law (法律案) (and its derivatives, repeal [廢止案] 
and bill to cease application of law [停止適用]), which was reflective of the 
conceptualization of “rule of law” for the core idea of legal capacity (domestically).25 
                                                     
24 In Taiwan, all bills that do not pass during a Legislative term die, and do not carry over to the next 
Legislature (屆期不連續原則), except the budget bill (預算案), (the bill of) the final account of the general 
budget as certified by the Comptroller General (決算案), and the citizen petition bill (人民請願案) (TLY, 
2005). 
25 The statistics excluded the budget bill (預算案), (the bill of) the final account of the general budget as 
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3.5.2 Extractive/fiscal capacity (13c, 141c, 142c, 18c, 19c, and performance: 1122_output) 
As shown in Chapter 2, taxation is a primary concern of interest in much of the literature 
on extractive/fiscal capacity. But budgetary legislation on annual spending/revenues (general 
and supplementary) and tax collection legislation26 can also serve as complementary 
components of a broader appraisal perspective. When measuring this dimension of capacity, I 
took three different perspectives into account, including the capacity of the ROC government 
to: (1) collect taxes (13c or A/P ratio); (2) minimize budget cuts by the Legislature (141c, 
142c, 18c, 19c)27; and amend the legislation to meet its revenue targets or reduce costs and/or 
enhance efficiency for tax collection (1122_output).28 I computed the A/P ratio from fiscal 
years (FYs)29 1998 to 2017, based on the predicted and actual amounts of tax revenues in 
given fiscal years collected from annual general (and supplementary, if any) budgets (中央政
                                                     
certified by the Comptroller General (決算[案]), the treaty (條約案) (which involves Taiwan’s unique 
international personality, thus going beyond the scope of this study), the vote to override a veto (覆議案), the 
exercise of the power of consent to confirm (personnel) nominations (人事同意權), internal regulations of the 
Legislative Yuan (立法院內規), the vote of no-confidence (against the Premier) (不信任案), and resolutions. 
26 In Taiwan, legislation strengthening tax collection plays a key role in efforts to bolster government revenues 
(or fiscal capacity), as taxation accounted for over 60%, up to 80%, of the country’s annual revenue over the 
past twenty-odd years. The Tax Collection Act of Taiwan (as last amended in 2017) governs the collection of all 
taxes (and surcharges), whether levied at the national or local level (except tariffs and the mining tax) (Article 
2). 
27 Unlike the US Congress, which may propose its own budget independently of the White House, the annual 
general/supplementary budget bill in Taiwan is drafted and submitted by the Executive Yuan to the LY for 
approval, and the LY cannot propose an increase in expenditure in the budget bill submitted by the Executive 
Yuan (the latter of which was already mentioned in footnote 4 of this chapter). 
28 Most of amendments adopted to the Tax Collection Act over the past twenty-odd years in Taiwan were 
intended to further three general goals of the ROC government in respect of taxation: (1) meeting revenue 
targets; (2) streamlining revenue collection through reductions in costs and/or increases in efficiency; and (3) 
ensuring taxpayers’ right. The numbers of amendments adopted to the Act pertaining to the first two goals 
obtained from different legislative sessions constitute 1122_output while the numbers of all its adopted 
amendments constitute 1121_output, on which the results of hypothesis tests carried out will also be shown in 
the next empirical chapter. 
29 In Taiwan, for the ROC government, a fiscal year began on July 1 of the preceding year and ran through the 
end of June of the indicated year. Starting from 2001, the fiscal year has been the same as the calendar year. In 
the interim before the implementation of the newly adopted fiscal year, the ROC government followed a fiscal 
year, i.e., FY 2H 1999 & 2000, that run from July 1 of 1999 through the end of 2000. 
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府年度總預算及追加[減]預算) and final accounts of the general budgets as certified by the 
Comptroller General, respectively.30 My budget cut calculations were based on FYs 1998 
through 2018 data, and the numbers of designated amendments to the Tax Collection Act 
were each collected from legislative sessions (regular and extraordinary) within the time 
period of this study (i.e., from the second half of July 1997 through late January 2018). 
 
3.5.3 Coercive/military capacity (144c, 17c, and performance: ap_outcome and 
vc_outcome; 143c, 15c, and 16c) 
This study distinguishes between two different purposes (or sub-concepts) of 
coercive/military capacity: “maintaining internal order” and “repelling foreign invasions.” 
Two separate sets of direct measurements, albeit with similar designs from a budgetary 
perspective, were in place to each serve its own purpose, police or military. Specifically, 16c 
and 17c are, respectively, the (logged) results of annual defense budgets in expenditure and 
annual police spending31 (both subsumed in the central government general budget), divided 
by the mid-(fiscal) year population of given fiscal years (1997 to 2017).32 16c was adapted 
from Henderson and Singer’s (2000) measurement of military capacity (introduced in 
                                                     
30 The annual general budget for FY 1998 was passed by the Legislature less than two months prior to the 4th 
Constitutional Amendments promulgated by the President on July 21, 1997. Since basically there is no 
difference in Taiwan’s political power structure in 1997, the general budget (bill) for FY 1998 was included for 
analysis of the A/P ratio as well as other budget-related measurements in this study. 
31 In this study, annual police spending includes budgets in expenditure for the National Police Administration 
and its immediate subordinate agencies, and the Central Police University, both under the Interior Ministry. 
32 As noted in footnote 29 above, the ROC government’s fiscal year did not coincide with the calendar year 
until 2001. Since 16c and 17c were computed based on their respective annual budgets by fiscal years, whether 
old or new, and to address the discrepancy, the mid-year population estimates for 1997 through 2000 were 
accordingly defined as the average population in the given fiscal years (not calendar years), i.e., the arithmetic 
mean of the population between the ends of a given fiscal year and one fiscal year prior. See also the definition 
of Taiwan’s mid-year (resident) population on the website of the Statistics Service of the (ROC) Interior 
Ministry. 
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Chapter 2) and 17c was inspired by and derived from the same logic. 
Additionally, 143c and 144c are budget cut calculations per se (for the national defense 
and police force, respectively), spanning FYs 1998-2018. The military expenditure share of 
GDP or 15c, which has served as a pronounced indicator of Taiwan’s military capacity over 
time domestically and internationally,33 also echoes that budgetary perspective. According to 
the cabinet-level DGBAS, the military expenditure as a share of GDP for the ROC 
government was calculated based on the finalized defense budget and nonprofit special fund 
budget (of the central government) under the purview of the Defense Ministry for a given 
fiscal year (Chung, 2015).34 The ratio of the nonprofit special fund to defense budget ranged 
annually from approximately 10-27% over the past twenty years. In this study, the finalized 
defense budget was specified as a precise amount adjusted by supplementary budgets, if any, 
for that fiscal year.  
Alternatively, two consequences (or performance outcomes) of coercive capacity, namely, 
ap_outcome and vc_outcome (respectively, involving general demonstrations and violent 
crime35), vis-à-vis direct measurements of capacity itself were adopted in this study to serve 
                                                     
33 The three most recent ROC Presidents, Chen Shui-bian, Ma Ying-jeou, and Tsai Ing-wen, all stated during 
their terms of office a bipartisan goal of reversing the declining military spending trends and increasing the 
defense budget, or at least military expenditure (see an explanation of the term in the main text on this same 
page), to 3% of GDP. But they have failed to reach this goal for most years since 2000 (Kan, 2014; see also 
Chung, 2015; Huang, 2005; Shih, 2018). As Taiwan’s sole defense supplier, the US has urged Taiwan to 
maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, often citing or alluding to the latter’s non-fulfillment of the 3 
percent pledge as a reason for continuing arms sales to Taiwan (see a recent example in Yu, 2017).     
34 However, it is worth noting here that the US government does not count the said nonprofit special fund 
budget when calculating Taiwan’s military expenditure as a share of GDP (Kan, 2014), so there was clearly 
difference between what the US expected and what Taiwan’s leaders pledged to do. 
35 Violent crime, conventionally perceived as a more immediate threat to internal order than other types of 
crime, is defined by the ROC National Police Administration (NPA) as offenses of murder and nonnegligent 
manslaughter, robbery, forceful taking, kidnapping for ransom, forcible rape, aggravated intimidation and 
extortion, and aggravated assault and mayhem (see the website of the NPA: 
https://www.npa.gov.tw/NPAGip/wSite/lp?ctNode=12599&nowPage=5&pagesize=15). For further information 
about changes in the official definition of violent crime in Taiwan, see the latest (ROC) Crime Statistics (for 
2017) released annually by ROC Criminal Investigation Bureau, National Police Administration, Ministry of the 
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as (indirect) proxies for assessing coercive capacity and provide supplemental evidence on 
the question of interest. The notion of such indirect measurements was manifestly inspired by 
Lijphart et al.’s (1993) work on cleavage management, briefly discussed in Chapter 2.36, 37 
Both of the indirect measurements were calculated using monthly data for the period of 
August 1997 to December 2017/12.38  
 
3.6 Linear regression models for exploring the relationship between state capacity and public 
approval of job performance by the ROC dual executives and Cabinet 
I gathered nationwide public opinion polls on job approval ratings of the President, the 
Premier, and his Cabinet (as a whole) conducted and released over the past 21 years by 
TVBS39 to contrast Taiwanese people’s feelings of governance with real, measured state 
                                                     
Interior (2018). 
36 Given the fact that Taiwan has barely suffered political violence since its democratization in the late 1980s 
(albeit a huge number of social movements, largely peaceful, since then), neither indirect (proxy) measurements 
of coercive capacity employed in Lijphart’s co-authored work, i.e., the numbers of “riots” and “deaths” from 
political violence, seems applicable to the island, let alone the inaccessibility to such official data for the public 
in Taiwan. Instead, I counted on the annual violent crime rate, a common feature when analyzing crime 
statistics in Taiwan (as well as other countries), and designed likewise and employed the (annual) number of 
demonstrators (both measured per 100,000 population) as my own indirect measurements of coercive capacity.  
37 Both ap_outcome and vc_outcome can be conceptualized otherwise as “precursors” of coercive capacity 
rather than consequences, as I mentioned in Chapter 2 when discussing the Besley and Persson (2015) approach 
to assessing state capacity for domestic control. In other words, they might serve as indicators of the “demand” 
for capacity (but to get from there to coercive capacity would take at least one more premise—to respond to the 
“demand” by increasing policing, rather than not respond to the “demand” or respond in some other way). But 
since I applied Lijphart et al.’s notion of measuring coercive capacity with indirect proxies (which was also 
reflective of the desire to distinguish between the concepts of capacity and performance in this study) to the 
context of Taiwan, allow me to shelve the potential alternative of conceptualizing both of my selected 
measurements in this study. 
38 Although ap_outcome and vc_outcome were designed as annual indicators, they were calculated as the sum 
of monthly statistics in order to distinguish between SP regime types under different ruling parties in years 
when transfer of power occurred. The statistics obtained in the month of transfer of power in either indirect 
measurement (i.e., May 20 of 2000, 2008, and 2016, respectively) fell into the predecessor SP regime.        
39 TVBS is a rare, renowned television broadcaster in Taiwan with its own poll center that has conducted 
surveys, particularly on political issues, professionally and regularly since the 1990s. Even though there are 
indeed some other media outlets with a poll center and many private survey research firms in Taiwan, TVBS is 
the sole source to provide publicly-accessible opinion polls related to governance systematically not only for 
free but rich enough to present a dynamic trend over the past twenty-odd years. 
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capacity. Given the period covered by this research, July 1997 to February 2018, 178, 112, 
and 46 polls were collected from the webpage of TVBS Poll Center 
(http://www.tvbs.com.tw/poll-center) on approval ratings of the President, the Premier, and 
the Cabinet, respectively.40, 41 
Unlike the data format Framework 1 (with ES) for the chi-square and most hypothesis 
tests performed in preceding sections, data sets prepared for the regression analyses of state 
capacity against job approval ratings for the President, the Premier, and his Cabinet was 
presented in a similar format but with extraordinary sessions, if any, being merged into 
regular sessions (RS) that the former were affiliated with,42 so as to create a more condensed 
data table, facilitating regression. In this alternate format for regression, (the period of) each 
legislative session, whether mergeable or not, represents a case (or serves as the unit of 
analysis) with its corresponding values obtained from 12 of the 14 measurements (or 
independent variables for regression models) employed for the chi-square tests, with 18c and 
19c being dropped (due to either insufficient data set),43 forming Framework 2 (with RS/ES 
                                                     
40 According to TVBS polls, presidential approval (滿意度) and prestige (聲望) are interchangeable, so the 
results of polls on prestige of the President, the Premier, or the Cabinet are absorbed into each of their entire 
series of approval ratings, albeit debatable in Taiwan. Yu Ying-lung (游盈隆), a Taiwanese pollster and former 
DPP official, asserts that polls will yield different outcomes based on either form of the phrasing, presidential 
approval or prestige (Tsai, 2018). In 2009, the dissolved Research, Development and Evaluation Commission 
(RDEC) and the National Chengchi University jointly held a conference in Taipei discussing the choice of 
question phrasing between using presidential approval and prestige (or popularity) (in Chinese) for conducting 
public opinion polls on how the public felt about the president (Huang & Wang, 2009). After all, I followed suit 
of TVBS to ensure that more data could be collected for analysis. 
41 Older TVBS polling data (gathered prior to July 22, 2002) are archived offline but can be obtained on 
request.  
42 For example, the 5th (regular) session of the 7th LY merged with its two affiliated extraordinary sessions 
(i.e., the 1st and 2nd extraordinary sessions of the 5th session of the 7th term), which thus technically extended 
the 5th session by giving a new, extended date for its adjournment. As a result, the extended 5th session spanned 
its regular session and two extraordinary sessions, with two recesses in between. By contrast, regular sessions 
without extraordinary sessions in Framework 2 each have the same length of period as they do in Framework 1. 
43 The two measurements, 18c (a cut or increase to the supplementary budget in revenue [%]) and 19c (a cut to 
the supplementary budget in expenditure [%]), have respectively less than and equal to 20% of the data cells 
with values in Framework 2. 
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being merged).44 
With merged (if applicable) sessions (including regular sessions without being followed 
by their extraordinary sessions) serving as the unit of analysis, numbers of observations and 
their values from 9 measurements in Framework 2 changed compared with those from their 
counterparts shown in Framework 1 (say, different results between computing legislative 
productivity from the 3rd [regular] session of the 9th LY alone and a merger of the same 
session with its extraordinary session). These “affected” measurements were therefore re-
coded for regression to distinguish between those that were collected or generated from 
different units of analysis as follows, while codes for those “unaffected” remained the same: 
 
Legal capacity (Framework 2) 
1. bills of law passed in the Legislature (%) (re-coded 21c); 
2. bills of law proposed by the Cabinet passed in the Legislature (%) (re-coded 22c); 
 
Extractive/fiscal capacity (Framework 2) 
3. the ratio of actual tax revenue to predicted tax revenue (A/P ratio) (13c); 
4. a cut or increase to the annual general budget in revenue (%) (re-coded 241c); 
5. a cut to the annual general budget in expenditure (%) (re-coded 242c); 
6. the number of amendments to the Tax Collection Act that contain significant changes to 
the goals of improving extractive/fiscal capacity (re-coded 2122_output); 
 
Military capacity (Framework 2) 
                                                     
44 As previously mentioned in footnote 8 on p. 68, the same SOP demonstrated in Section 3.3 on p. 68 was 
employed to locate data in the framework in preparation for regression. 
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7. a cut to the annual defense budget in expenditure (%) (re-coded 243c); 
8. military expenditure as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) (%) (re-coded 25c);45 
9. the natural log of defense budget in expenditure per capita (16c); 
 
Coercive capacity (Framework 2) 
10. a cut to the annual police budget in expenditure (%) (re-coded 244c); 
11. the natural log of police force spending per capita (17c); 
 
Administrative/bureaucratic capacity (Framework 2) 
12. the number of Cabinet/Cabinet-level members left office (re-coded ofout2).  
 
There were “missing data (cells)” observed in Framework 2 (albeit rather fewer than in 
Framework 1 if I had chosen it for regression instead) that needed to be “filled in” (or 
imputed) to facilitate regression.46 Given the limited number of cases, i.e., 44 sessions, 
including those merged and excluding the sole, albeit partial, session under KMT minority 
rule (see reasons in footnote 47 below), I figured that it would be better not to drop cases 
with any missing values. Then I imputed “missing data” with the arithmetic mean of 
observed values in each selected measurement for a specified SP regime type, namely, KMT 
                                                     
45 The supplementary defense budget for FY 2002 and the annual defense budget for FY 2003 were both passed 
in the second legislative session of the 5th LY (2002/9/24 to 2003/1/14), resulting in two different, but close, 
values (2.86% and 2.98%, respectively) for that legislative session. To fit two values into one data cell in 
Framework 2 for regression, I took the arithmetic mean of both values as an expedient. (The mean is 2.92%.) 
46 I must emphasize that almost all “missing data” (including those for job approval ratings, discussed below in 
the text) observed in this alternate data format are actually not missing at all (except 22c). They simply did not 
occur or was not generated within a given period of time. Given legislative sessions (whether mergeable or not) 
as the unit of analysis, no missing data was observed for all but one of the selected measurements of legislative 
productivity—including 21c (for legal capacity) and 2122_output (for fiscal capacity). See footnote 5 for why 
22c (for legal capacity) was inapplicable. 
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M, DPP M, or DPP m,47 i.e., the category mean,48 to make the imputed values plausible, not 
with the grand mean of all observed values in each measurement regardless of SP regime 
types. The rationale for using the category mean was intuitive: Given an assumption that the 
political power structure in Taiwan should not differ much within a ROC SP regime, say, 
DPP m, it was reasonable to assign the category mean values generated from the given SP 
regime to “missing data” occurring in the same one.49  
Despite criticism for its flawed theory, many researchers still view mean substitution as a 
viable method of dealing with missing data (Osborne, 2013). (See Framework 2 with 
imputed data in Appendix A). 
In order to fit within (cells in) Framework 2, the polling data from TVBS needed 
modification when more than one survey was conducted within (or technically located in, 
according to the SOP indicated in Section 3.3) a (merged, if applicable) legislative session. In 
this situation, I took a weighted mean of approval ratings of each subject (i.e., the President, 
the Premier, and the Cabinet) from different surveys, taking into account the sample sizes of 
                                                     
47 KMT m and its sole case delimited within its rule during the first session, albeit partially, of the 9th 
Legislative term were removed from this framework because of insufficient data, say, at most, only one sample 
(or value) available for each measurement of capacity in this period of time. In other words, “missing data” in 
the case of KMT m could not be imputed when there was a lack of data for a measurement wherein its mean was 
never available. There is no survey conducted by TVBS on the Chang Cabinet either, the sole KMT minority 
regime.  
48 For example, I imputed “missing data” in the A/P ratio for KMT M in table cells with the mean of observed 
A/P ratios right from KMT M, rather than from all ROC SP regimes, M, or KMT M.    
49 But the imputation of the category mean was not meant to assume that my hypothesis (majority/party control 
make a difference) is true, and adjust the data with which I will be testing the hypothesis. It could be possible 
that different SP regimes exhibit similar results of each or some indicators of state capacity (and similar 
approval ratings of any subject of interest) through the years of their respective rule. In other words, the 
imputation using the category mean was not meant to suppose that different SP regimes must differ from one 
another as to the results of each indicators (and respective approval ratings) of their own. However, in order to 
allay the kind of concern expressed above regarding any potential bias entailed by using the category mean, I 
created another set of regression models with “missing data” being imputed using the grand mean. Following 
the same criteria as used for selecting IVs (or measurements of the four alternative dimensions of state 
capacity), described later in the text on p. 40, ten IVs were included in the new regression models—the same 
nine IVs from the models using a category mean imputation strategy plus 243c. The analysis showed that there 
was no empirical difference between the imputation using the category mean and the one using the grand mean. 
 
 
 
93 
 
surveys or the numbers of valid respondents. Then, I employed the same mean substitution 
procedure as was used for “missing” measurement values in Framework 2 to complete the 
data sets consisting of approval ratings of each subject by respective SP regime types in 
Framework 2 for regression. 
As classic linear regression assumes the error terms of the response variable Y, or 
dependent variable, are normally distributed,50 before conducting linear regression, I 
performed a logit transformation (natural log ln 𝑝𝑝
1−𝑝𝑝
) of approval ratings (%) or weighted 
means of approval ratings (%),51 if applicable (where p is the proportion between 0-1). By 
doing so, the resulting values were no longer constrained between 0 and 1, but instead varied 
from negative infinity and positive infinity. 
Next, since one should avoid multicollinearity between independent (or explanatory) 
variables (IVs) when building a regression model, I used Spearman’s rank correlation and 
variance inflation factors (VIF) tests in model building to detect potential multicollinearity 
problems between independent variables using criteria of rho > 0.5 and of VIF > 5, 
respectively.52 Together with two control variables, namely, “ruling party” (i.e., the party 
factor, coded parCO) and “SP regime type” (i.e., the institutional factor, coded regCO), nine 
IVs/measurements of notions of administrative/bureaucratic (ofout2), legal (21c), 
extractive/fiscal (13c, 242c, and 2122_output), and coercive/military (244c and 17c; 25c and 
16c) dimensions of capacity were selected to be included in my parsimonious regression 
                                                     
50 There are five assumptions underlying the (classic) linear regression model (CLRM Assumptions): (1) 
linearity; (2) strict exogeneity (error terms are not systematic and do not depend on X); (3) no multicollinearity 
(or perfect collinearity); (4) spherical error variance (error terms have constant variance [homoscedasticity] and 
are not autocorrelated [hetroskedasticity]); and (5) normally distributed error terms (Long, 1997).  
51 See the logit transformation in Witten, Frank, Hall, & Pal, 2017). 
52 See Spearman’s rank correlation and VIF tests in Gujarati & Porter (2010). 
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models.53  
 
3.7 Qualitative interviews 
This empirical study employed semi-structured interviews consisting of four key open-
ended questions, allowing participants who were familiar with the ROC semi-presidentialism 
at work over the past twenty-odd years to help interpret my empirical quantitative findings, 
so that the study may contribute to a better theoretical and practical understanding of 
relationships between SP regime types and governance in Taiwan.54 I recruited seven 
interviewees from Taiwan: four politicians and three senior political journalists from different 
Taiwan’s mainstream media outlets, based on the balance of partisan affiliation/inclination as 
well as their expertise and accessibility. They were former President Ma Ying-jeou; KMT 
Chairman Wu Den-yih (吳敦義), also a former Vice President and Premier; former KMT 
Legislator Lin Yu-fang (林郁方), who served in the LY for 17 years, almost overlapping with 
the time frame of this study, and currently convene the Foreign and National Defense 
Division of the Taipei-based National Policy Foundation, a.k.a. the KMT think tank;55 
former DPP Chairman Hsu Hsin-liang (許信良), a key advocate and driver of Taiwan’s 
                                                     
53 Moderate to high correlation coefficients were found between 21c and 22c (rho = 0.59), 241c and 242c (rho 
= 0.74), 241c and 243c (rho = 0.54), and 242c and 243c (rho = 0.62). I opted to drop 22c because it had missing 
data. As 241c (general budget cuts/increases in revenue) and 242c (general budget cuts in expenditure) are 
highly correlated (partly due to the aim of the KMT/Lee administration to achieve a balanced budget in FYs 
1998 and 1999), either measurement must be dropped. There were two reasons to drop 241c: First, the public 
generally pays more attention to government expenditure than revenue. Second, 23c or the A/P ratio also 
accounts for revenue. 
54 The choice of a semi-structured approach for this study was determined by the potential sensitive nature of 
interview questions which I (the interviewer) required considerable discretion in gathering information in 
response to. The key questions were developed in advance of the interviews and presented to all participants. 
See more details about unstructured vs. structured vs. semi-structured interviews in Singleton & Straits (2010). 
55 Lin was elected to five terms in the LY, the first from 1996 to 1999 and later for four consecutive terms from 
2002 to 2016. He was also a co-convener of the LY’s Foreign and National Defense Committee. 
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adoption of French-style semi-presidentialism and currently Chairman of the Foundation on 
Asia-Pacific Peace Studies, a front organization of Taiwan’s National Security Bureau; Hsu 
Ya-jing (許雅靜), a senior political journalist at Taiwan’s government-run Central News 
Agency (CNA) and currently Director of the CNA’s Business News Center; Huang Kuo-
liang (黃國樑), Convener of Political Division of the pro-KMT United Daily News (UDN); 
and Huang Wei-chu. (黃維助), Director of Political Division of the pro-DPP Liberty Times 
(See Appendix B: List of interviews).56 See Appendix C for a sample recruitment letter (in 
both English and Chinese) that provided an explanation of the study purpose, interview 
procedures (also involving a consent process), assurance of confidentiality, how to ensure 
correct citations and quotations from the interview, and my contact information. 
The four key questions of the interview were formulated broad and open to obtain as 
much information as possible (see Appendix D for English and Chinese). They were 
submitted to all the interviewees prior to the interviews, together with the recruitment letter 
and a summary of the empirical findings of this study. The Office of Research, Human 
Subjects Committee at the University of California, Santa Barbara deemed the interviews 
pertaining to this study, protocol number 11-18-0743, exempt from the Federal Regulations 
at 45 CFR 46.101(b) category #2. 
 
Chapter conclusions 
The primary objective of this chapter is to elucidate the quantitative research methods 
employed to test an array of hypotheses based on within-case comparisons that attempt to 
                                                     
56 I also made efforts to invite Yu Shyi-kun (游錫堃), a former Premier under Chen Shui-bian and DPP 
chairman, to interview, but to no avail. Yu is Taiwan’s longest-serving Premier since Taiwan became SP in 
1997, being three years in office. 
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explain whether majority/party control make a difference in state capacity, including 
hypothesis tests for aggregate capacity (albeit with only majority or M/m being considered) 
and for the legal, extractive/fiscal, and coercive/military components via 15 main 
measurements (excluding 1121_output, 110c, 111c, and dur), and a power-law analysis of 
administrative/bureaucratic capacity. If the results of the chi-square test on aggregate state 
capacity suggest that I cannot reject the null hypothesis, then M/m is not associated with state 
capacity. Subsequent examinations of the relationships between majority/party control and 
the four alternative dimensions of state capacity would be warranted. 
Second, I extracted 9 measurements of state capacity by dimensions from Framework 2 
to construct linear regression models that explore if people in Taiwan could perceive any 
changes in state capacity. Last but not least, I designed and conducted semi-structured 
interviews with 7 informants to obtain meaningful interpretations of my findings. The next 
chapter will describe the findings and provide discussions. 
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Chapter 4. Results and Discussions 
Introduction 
This empirical chapter presents and interprets the results of the statistical analyses of the 
relationship between the ROC’s president-parliamentary congruence and state capacity, 
measured aggregately or by the four salient dimensions of state capacity as well as by public 
perceptions of the differences it makes, if any, in governance. The results are presented in the 
following order, starting with those of preliminary, chi-square tests for aggregate state 
capacity, followed by a power-law analysis of the frequency of Cabinet official changes for 
administrative/bureaucratic capacity, hypothesis tests results for legal, extractive/fiscal, and 
coercive/military dimensions of state capacity, and ending with linear regression analyses of 
the relationship between changes in state capacity and the trend in job approval ratings for 
the President, the Premier, and his Cabinet (in the Executive Yuan), respectively. These 
results are then synthetically interpreted with two different perspectives, namely of 
leadership and political culture, based on inputs from my semi-structured interviews with the 
seven informants.   
 
4.1 Chi-square tests results for aggregate state capacity: no significant difference between 
M/m, failing to reject H0 
Performing a preliminary chi-square test allows me to address the primary hypothesis of 
this research on whether the majority/minority government (M/m) division makes a 
difference in governance at an aggregate level. The structure of the (two-way) contingency 
table used for the chi-square test between SP regime types, M/m, and itemized direct 
measurements of the notion of a variety of dimensions of state capacity is presented in Table 
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E.1 in Appendix E. The test result from the 62 (rows) x 2 (columns) contingency table is not 
significant and I fail to reject the null hypothesis that the institutional factor is not associated 
with overall state capacity (χ2 = 54.562, df = 61, p = 0.7067).  
In general, the result of a chi-square test on a contingency table larger than 2 x 2 (i.e., 
with more than one degree of freedom) may not be reliable if more than 20% of the cells 
have expected values (counts) less than 5 or any cell an expected value of less than 1 (Yates, 
Moore, & McCabe, 1999). Apparently, these conditions are not satisfied in Table E.1. I 
therefore combine the data of six intervals/rows from Table E.1 into two, using a 
dichotomous measure, i.e., transforming the data into the most condensed categories for the 
observed frequency count—greater than (or equal to), or less than a threshold of 0 on the 
standardized scale—to create a 28 (rows) x 2 (columns) contingency table (Table 4.1) for the 
same test. Unfortunately, the test result from this new table remains non-significant (χ2 = 
21.747, df = 27, p = 0.7501), and I still have 46% of expected cell frequencies less than 5, 
within which an expected count of 0.78 (under 19c) is below 1. Such “noises” (cells with 
small expected counts), however, should not be excluded from either contingency table 
created in this section just because they cause problems, particularly with an attempt to 
conceptualize state capacity “as a whole.”  
From these tests, we may draw a conclusion that the M/m division does not seem to be 
associated with aggregate state capacity, leaving the primary null hypothesis standing (H0: M 
had no greater aggregate state capacity than m). This indeed reflects the prevailing political 
awareness of Taiwanese people that whoever (Blue or Green) is in charge makes no 
difference at all.1 Consequently, subsequent empirical examinations of the relationships 
                                                     
1 In Taiwan, this sentiment is reflected in the pattern of decreases in popular satisfaction or trust with any 
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between M/m (and party control) and the four salient dimensions of state capacity are 
warranted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
political parties, once in power, and their reaction to public needs. The broadcaster TVBS’ Poll Center provides 
rich data regarding shifts in public opinion on those topics (http://www.tvbs.com.tw/poll-center). 
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Table 4.1. Contingency Table on M/m and State Capacity (Dichotomy) 
(Observed counts) (Expected 
counts)b 
State capacity σa M m Totals M m 
Legal 11c 
(bills of law passed in the Legislature) 
0~ 17 12 29 17.67  11.33  
~0 28 13 41 24.98  16.02  
12c 
(bills of law proposed by the Cabinet passed 
in the Legislature) 
0~ 24 14 38 23.15  14.85  
~0 21 11 32 19.49  12.51  
Extractive/fiscal 13c 
(A/P ratio: ratio of actual tax revenue to 
predicted tax revenue)  
0~ 5 4 9 5.48  3.52  
~0 5 3 8 4.87  3.13  
141c 
(cut/increase to the annual general budget in 
revenue) 
0~ 5 8 13 7.92  5.08  
~0 7 0 7 4.26  2.74  
142c 
(cut to the annual general budget in 
expenditure) 
0~ 7 3 10 6.09  3.91  
~0 5 5 10 6.09  3.91  
18c 
(cut/increase to the supplementary budget in 
revenue) 
0~ 1 4 5 3.05  1.95  
~0 2 1 3 1.83  1.17  
19c 
(cut to the supplementary budget in 
expenditure) 
0~ 1 1 2 1.22  0.78  
~0 2 5 7 4.26  2.74  
1122c_output 
(number of amendments to the Tax Collection 
Act that contain significant changes to the 
goals of improving fiscal capacity) 
0~ 9 3 12 7.31  4.69  
~0 36 22 58 35.33  22.67  
Military 143c 
(cut to the annual defense budget in 
expenditure) 
0~ 4 2 6 3.66  2.34  
~0 8 6 14 8.53  5.47  
15c 
(military expenditure as a share of GDP) 
0~ 6 4 10 6.09  3.91  
~0 6 5 11 6.70  4.30  
16c 
(logged defense budget in expenditure per 
capita) 
0~ 7 3 10 6.09  3.91  
~0 5 7 12 7.31  4.69  
Coercive 144c 
(cut to the annual police budget in 
expenditure) 
0~ 4 2 6 3.66  2.34  
~0 8 6 14 8.53  5.47  
17c 
(logged police force spending per capita) 
0~ 3 3 6 3.66  2.34  
~0 8 7 15 9.14  5.86  
Administrative/
bureaucratic 
ofout1 
(number of Cabinet/Cabinet-level members 
left office) 
0~ 17 7 24 14.62  9.38  
~0 28 18 46 28.02  17.98  
 Totals  279 179 458 279 179 
H0: M/m is not associated with state capacity, and 
H1: M/m is associated with state capacity. 
a. 0~ = greater than or equal to 0.  
~0 = less than 0. 
(Remove gray-shaded rows, i.e., no observations, before computation.) 
b. The expected count (or value) for each cell = (row total*column total)/n. 
Where  
n = the total number of observations (“Totals”). 
(Round off to the second decimal place.) 
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4.2 Results of power-law analysis of Cabinet longevity for administrative/bureaucratic 
capacity: no significant difference between M/m, all power-law distributed 
The result of approach interval of dates to ASSUME office demonstrates that both 
Taiwan’s SP majority and minority regimes were in power-law patterns and have similar α 
slightly over 1. The α of M is 1.003886926 and for m it is 1.004939742. Likewise, the results 
of the same approach describe no difference between either “KMT M vs. DPP M” or “DPP M 
vs. DPP m.” The α of KMT M is 1.003881651, and for DPP M and DPP m, they are 
1.003932026 and 1.004719499, respectively (Table 4.2; see also each power-law relationship 
linearized on a [natural] log-log scale in Figure 4.1).2, 3 
Summing up at this point, the α values computed above suggest that both M and m, 
regardless of which party in power, are in power-law patterns with similar α slightly over 1—
a high frequency of intervals between Cabinet/Cabinet-level members changes, hence 
affecting policy coherence and continuity that are crucial to policy implementation—
                                                     
2 Recall the formula employed to extract the power-law exponent α presented in Chapter 2:  
 
α = 1 + n � ln 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
𝑥𝑥min
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
�
−1 
Where 
xi = observed values. 
xmin = minimum observed value. 
 
Since the value of a denominator of a fraction cannot be zero, I needed to add a value x to each 
interval/observed value computed from my official longevity data set where its minimum observed value (xmin) 
was zero with its many occurrences. Therefore, 1e-306 (1 multiplied by 10 to the negative 306 power), 
numerically a very tiny value, was added to facilitate the computation of α. Likewise, given that the logarithm 
of zero is undefined, I needed to add a value x to each interval/observed value computed from my official 
longevity data set when plotting (natural) log-log graphs. Since it would make the graphs more observable and 
accessible to analysis when a relatively larger value was added, say, 1 (compared with 1e-306). The (natural) 
log-log graphs in Figure 4.1 were thus plotted using the logarithm of “interval/observed value +1.” 
3 I should point out here that “zero” observations in the log-log plots do not signify nothing, but a much shorter 
interval of within a week, given the computation on a weekly basis. This should not be seen as undermining the 
base of inference. 
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although M in all forms was slightly further away from a pure power-law distribution (with α 
= 2.5) than m. The results would very likely be consistent with the impressions that most 
people in Taiwan have received from news coverage (Ho, 2018; Wang, 2017), given that 
Chen (m) and Ma (M) each had six premiers over their eight years of running the country.4 
In other words, M does not have higher administrative/bureaucratic capacity than m. 
 
Table 4.2. Power-Law Analysis on Administrative/Bureaucratic Capacity (Longevity of 
Cabinet/Cabinet-level Members)   
Period Alpha Power-law distribution a 
M-A b 1.003886926  
m-A 1.004939742  
KMT M-A 1.003881651  
KMT m-A N/A (all intervals = 0)  
DPP M-A 1.003932026  
DPP m-A 1.004719499  
a. If α > 1, the data set is in a power-law distribution. 
If α = 2.5, the data set is in a pure power-law distribution. 
b. A = according to the interval of dates to assume office. 
 
 
 
                                                     
4 As of my writing of this footnote, Tsai has announced a new and, therefore, her third Premier Su Tseng-chang 
(蘇貞昌), a 71-year-old former DPP chairman, a former Premier under the Chen administration, and the 
defeated DPP New Taipei Mayoral candidate in the 2018 November midterm elections, replacing William Lai 
(on 1/14/2019) in the wake of her party’s bruising defeat in the midterm elections (T. Wu, 2019). Lai’s 
Premiership lasted less than 17 months. Compared with Ma’s first term of Presidency, the Tsai administration 
shows a higher frequency of appointing a new Premier, even though both are of majority status. 
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Alpha = 1.0039 
 
 
Alpha = 1.0047 
 
Figure 4.1. Intervals of dates to assume office in log-log space. For the input data, see Section 3.4 in Chapter 3. 
a. (A) = approach interval of dates to assume office.  
 
Alongside these power-law findings, it is also worth noting that m showed longer range 
of minimum/maximum official duration (between 1 and 417 weeks) than M (between 0 and 
402 weeks). In M, many politically nominated officials stayed in office for more than 50 
weeks. m, by contrast, has greater frequency of officials leaving office before 20 weeks 
(Figure 4.2). Second, the average of the duration of M Cabinet/Cabinet-level members is 
93.46 weeks (incumbents omitted) and 77.08 weeks for those of m. Two supplemental 
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were conducted to further confirm the significant difference in the official longevity between 
the two groups (t = 2.5348, 2-tailed p-value = 0.01157; equal variances assumed) in which M 
had statistically significant official duration longer than m (t = 2.5348, 1-tailed p-value = 
0.005784; equal variances assumed).5
                                                     
5 I opted not to account for the party factor while analyzing the duration of Cabinet/Cabinet-level members 
because the current Tsai administration (DPP M) had remained in power for less than two years (as of the most 
recent update to my official longevity data set on March 9, 2018) and the Chang Cabinet (KMT m) survived for 
less than four months. The two situations impose potential, lower maximum durations of 94 and 16 weeks, 
respectively. 
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Figure 4.2. Official longevity. For the input data, see Section 3.4 in Chapter 3. 
 107 
  
 
Likewise, Figure 4.3 describes a higher frequency of official changes in m than that in M. 
The largest numbers of Cabinet/Cabinet-level members who left in M occurred in May 2000 
when Taiwan completed its historic, first-ever turnover of ruling parties6 and in early 2016 
when President Ma named a new Premier to lead a caretaker Cabinet (the sole KMT SP 
minority regime since 1997) in the aftermath of the KMT’s fiasco in the 2016 general 
elections. But for the latter, only eight officials (out of 407) actually left their original 
positions after the Cabinet reshuffle. The other 32 Cabinet officials stayed on in office until 
the Presidential inauguration in May 2016, marking the third transfer of power in Taiwan. 
From this figure, we can also observe seven prominent spikes of official changes (high 
number of officials leaving, say, 10) in m: (1) January 31/February 1, 2002 (in DPP m); (2) 
May 19/20, 2004 (in DPP m); (3) February 1, 2005 (in DPP m); (4) January 24/25, 2006 (in 
DPP m); (5) May 20/21, 2007 (in DPP m); (6) May 19/20, 2008 (in DPP m); and (7) May 
19/20, 2016 (in KMT m). Except the second and sixth (both denoting transfers of power), the 
remaining five spikes correspond to Cabinet reshuffles. By comparison, M has fewer or five 
spikes: (1) September 1, 1997 (in KMT M); (2) May 20, 2000 (in KMT M); (3) September 
9/10, 2009 (in KMT M); (4) February 5/6, 2012 (in KMT M); and (5) January 31/February 1, 
2016 (in KMT M). And all but the second, again, Taiwan’s first transfer of power, hence four 
spikes, derive from Cabinet reshuffles (see Table 1.1 in Chapter 1). Each of these spikes 
exhibits self-organized criticality (SOC) behavior, a scenario that plays out repeatedly when 
data are in a power-law distribution. However, this behavior appears much more evident in 
m, thereby implying its periodic large-scale Cabinet reshuffles that lead to policy 
inconsistency. 
                                                     
6 Seven officials left office on 5/19/2000 and 33 on 5/20/2000, totaling 40. 
7 Five officials left office on 1/31/2016 and three on 2/1/2016, totaling 8. 
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Overall, the evidence for H1d that M had greater administrative/bureaucratic capacity than 
m is mixed. At first glance, the M/m division made no difference given a power-law pattern 
that ended in either status of governance, even after the party factor was accounted for. 
However, the results of the supplemental statistical analyses of official duration and a typical 
SOC behavior observed in m might suggest reservation regarding the conclusions drawn 
from the power-law analysis. 
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Figure 4.3. Number of official changes in time series. For the input data, see Section 3.4 in Chapter 3. 
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4.3 Hypothesis tests results for legal, extractive/fiscal, and coercive/military capacities: 
partial evidence of differences  
This section presents the results of the different hypothesis tests applied in determining 
whether the M/m division matters for legal, extractive/fiscal, and coercive/military capacities. 
The short answer is yes, in part. Majority status contributed to greater fiscal and military 
capacities per se and coercive capacity as proxied by its performance. Legal capacity 
likewise responded to majority/minority status, perhaps more, but not in the way expected. 
The KMT/DPP rule division would not necessarily affect state capacity, or had effects limited 
to only legal capacity and performance of coercive capacity. 
 
4.3.1 Results for Legal capacity (11c and 12c): m contributing to greater legislative 
productivity, as alternatively expected  
Figure 4.4 (and Table E.2 in Appendix E) give the basic picture from my data on 
legislative productivity. The observed range of percentage values in bills of law passed, 
excluding extraordinary sessions (ES), for M was from 1.08% to 27.41% while the range for 
m was between 2.11% and 18.24%.8 Table 4.3 shows the percentage of bills of law passed 
by terms where the highest percentage was observed in the 4th Legislative Yuan (LY), or at 
least its first half under KMT majority rule when the 4th LY was divided into two periods, 
before and after the transfer of power in May 2000. Legislative productivity in the full term 
of 3rd LY which consisted six regular and one extraordinary sessions was considered 
inappropriate for analysis of legal capacity under Taiwan’s SP because the 4th Constitutional 
                                                     
8 After considering the party factor, the range for KMT M was between 1.08% and 27.41% (the same as that for 
M), between 1.32% and 4.40% for DPP M, and between 2.11% and 18.24% for DPP m. Only a sample of the 
percentage of bills of law passed (4.04%) was observed in KMT m. 
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Amendments did not become effective until July 21, 1997 or in the recess between the 3rd 
and its extraordinary sessions (of the 3rd term).9 The same Table also shows that the highest 
number of bills of law passed took place in the 7th LY, either in its full term or during the 
KMT/Ma administration. A total of 5,459 bills were introduced or proposed to the 8th LY, the 
most in the last two decades, which was around four and half times the number of that in the 
3rd term. With SP regime types being accounted for, the overall percentage of bills of law 
passed in M was 5.40 % while m was 5.80%; the mean percentage for KMT M was 5.89%, 
2.36% for DPP M, and 5.90% for DPP m. The percentage of bills of law passed in KMT m 
was 4.04%. Overall, these descriptive statistics on the legislative productivity data, albeit 
inconclusive, might imply the negation of my H1e that M had greater legal capacity than m. 
Several hypothesis tests were also performed to verify the relationship. 
                                                     
9 In accordance with the 7th Constitutional Amendments promulgated in June 2005, the number of seats in the 
LY was halved from 225 to 113 while the legislators’ term of office was extended from three to four years in an 
attempt to synchronize with the Presidential election beginning in 2008. Accordingly, the number of (regular) 
biannual legislative sessions was increased from 6 to 8 for each Legislative term. More important, the 
amendments adopted a single-member district, two-vote system for Legislative elections beginning in 2008. 
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Figure 4.4. Percentage of passed bills of law by session. Data from the website of the Legislative Statistics, (ROC) Parliamentary Library: 
https://lis.ly.gov.tw/lgstatc/lgstat. 
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Table 4.3. Bills of Law Passed & Number of Extraordinary Sessions by Term 
Session Regime Number of bills of 
law introduced & 
proposed 
Number of 
bills of 
law passed 
Percentage 
of bills of 
law passed 
Number of 
extraordinary 
sessions 
3rd-3-ES 1 ~ 6 KMT M 1103 144 13.06% 1a 
3rd KMT M 1228 269 21.91% 1 
4th-1 ~ 3 KMT M 1003 219 21.83% 0 
4th-3 ~ 6 DPP m 2052 338 16.47% 2 
4th KMT M & 
DPP m 
2271 557 24.53% 2 
5th DPP m 2626 537 20.45% 3 
6th DPP m 2239 408 18.22% 2 
7th-1 DPP m 461 32 6.94% 0 
7th 1 ~ 8 KMT M 3621 664 18.34% 6 
7th DPP m & 
KMT M 
3653 696 19.05% 6 
8th KMT M 5459 660 12.09% 6 
9th 1 KMT m 1065 43 4.04% 0 
9th 1~ 4 DPP M 3656 235 6.43% 5 
9th 1~ 4 KMT m & 
DPP M 
3699 278 7.52% 5 
Note: Data from the website of the Legislative Statistics, (ROC) Parliamentary Library: 
https://lis.ly.gov.tw/lgstatc/lgstat 
a. The 3th LY eventually failed to reach a quorum of no less than one-third of its entire membership required 
to hold a scheduled extraordinary session at that time. (The quorum is the same as for regular sessions in 
accordance with Law Governing the Legislative Yuan’s Power [立法院職權行使法].) 
 
The statistical analyses (of 11c) revealed that there was a significant difference in the 
percentage of bills of law passed by sessions (including extraordinary sessions; see Figure 
4.4 & Table E.2) between M and m (W = 725, 2-tailed p-value = 0.04705) and that m had a 
statistically significant percentage that was greater than M (W = 400, 1-tailed p-value = 
0.02353), though not as expected, except for the alternative hypothesis (i.e., H0e). After 
accounting for the party factor, a significant difference was likewise found, respectively, 
between KMT M and DPP M (W = 15, 2-tailed p-value = 4.404e-12) wherein the former had 
a significantly greater value than the latter (W = 400, 1-tailed p-value = 0.02353), and 
between DPP M and DPP m (W = 137.5, 2-tailed p-value = 0.003912) wherein the latter had 
a significantly greater value than the former (W = 24.5, 1-tailed p-value = 0.001956). In 
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short, a significant but reverse institutional effect on overall legislative productivity in the LY 
was each found in the three sets of counterparts for comparison. That is, minority status 
contributed to greater legal capacity instead, and that different ruling parties in majority 
status behaved differently. All the hypothesis tests results from this Section 4.3 are tabulated 
at the end of this section (Table 4.4).  
When focusing on Cabinet-proposed bills of law in regular sessions to further capture the 
political dynamics between executive and legislative branches, a higher mean number of 
Cabinet-proposed bills was observed in m (107.44) than M (71.17), though as not expected, 
either, even after the party factor was taken into account: 73.92 for KMT M, 54 for DPP M, 
and 102.82 for DPP m. (And only one sample, 186, was observed in KMT m.) Likewise, the 
Cabinet of m displayed a higher mean percentage of bills of law proposed by the Cabinet 
passed in the Legislature (18.97%), compared with that of M (13.92%). This pattern of 
results or mean values virtually persisted even after the party factor was taken into account: 
14.46% for KMT M, 11.77% for DPP M, and 19.43% for DPP m, with KMT m being 
excluded due to its sample size of one, 12.90%. The computations (mean values) were taken 
from Table E.2, and Figure 4.4 compares the mean values of each legislative session.10 
The statistical analyses of legislative productivity confined to the passage of the Cabinet-
                                                     
10 Alongside looking at the passage rates of bills of law, Table E.3 tabulates numbers of bills of law proposed 
by the Cabinet and, by comparison, those introduced by legislators and party caucuses in the LY by sessions. 
The range of percentage values of bills of law proposed by the Cabinet, excluding extraordinary sessions, in M 
was from 3.22% to 52.8% and the range was between 10.10% and 49.30% in m. After adding the party factor, 
the percentage ranged from 5.25% to 52.80% in KMT M, whereas it ranged from 3.22% to 12.76% for DPP M. 
The range in DPP m was from 10.10% to 49.30%. Only a sample (17.46%) was observed in KMT m. By 
contrast, the range of percentage values of bills of law introduced by legislators and party caucuses, excluding 
extraordinary sessions, in M was from 47.20% to 96.78% and the range was between 50.70% and 89.90% in m. 
In KMT M, that percentage ranged from 47.20% to 94.75%, whereas it ranged from 87.24% to 96.78% for DPP 
M. The range in DPP m was from 50.70% to 89.90%. Only a sample (82.54%) was observed in KMT m. Figure 
4.5 converts the data table into a graph for a visual representation of the distribution between the proposers and 
introducers. 
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proposed bills of law (12c) revealed a similar, albeit less pronounced, pattern of results. Like 
11c, there was a significant difference in the percentage of passed bills of law proposed by 
the Cabinet (12c) by sessions (including extraordinary sessions) between M and m (W = 775, 
2-tailed p-value = 0.009295) and that m had a statistically significant percentage greater than 
M (W = 350, 1-tailed p-value = 0.004647). After accounting for the party factor, there was no 
significant difference between KMT M and DPP M (W = 119, 2-tailed p-value = 0.129), 
though different from 11c, but hypothetically anticipated, whereas a significant difference 
was found between DPP M and DPP m (W = 185, 2-tailed p-value = 0.01443) wherein the 
latter had a significantly greater value than the former (W = 55, 1-tailed p-value = 0.007217). 
In addition, 18 extraordinary sessions were held in M while 7 in m.11 The incumbent 
ruling DPP held an unprecedented three extraordinary sessions following the adjournment of 
a single, regular session, the 3rd, of the 9th Legislative Yuan (Table 4.3; see also Table E.2 
for a detailed breakdown of individual sessions). The implication of this, i.e., trying to be 
more productive, was well consistent with the tests results from legislative productivity.  
Overall, the M/m division did make difference in legal capacity, as proxied by legislative 
productivity, in which, however, minority status outstood regardless of which scope option I 
specified. And the ruling party was most likely suspected of confounding this relationship. 
The results therefore failed to reject H0e which, however, was not set to be ruled out and 
could be accommodated in the context of domestic partisan politics, as I will elaborate on in 
the discussion section. 
 
 
                                                     
11 An extraordinary session may be held either on the request of the ROC President or of no less than one-
fourth of the membership of the Legislative Yuan (TLY, 2005). 
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Figure 4.5. Percentage of bills of law proposed by institution & session. Data from the website of the 
Legislative Statistics, (ROC) Parliamentary Library: https://lis.ly.gov.tw/lgstatc/lgstat 
Note: The data of 17 (regular and extraordinary) legislative sessions were removed from Figure 4.5 since no bill 
was introduced or proposed in these sessions, including 3rd-3-ES 1, 4th-4-ES 1, 4th-5-ES 1, 5th-1-ES 1, 5th-3-
ES 1, 7th-2-ES 1, 7th-4-ES 1, 7th-8-ES 1, 8th-1-ES 1, 8th-3-ES 1, 8th-4-ES 1, 8th-5-ES 1, 9th-1-ES 1, 9th-2-ES 
1, 9th-3-ES 1, 9th-3-ES 3, and 9th-4-ES 1. 
 
4.3.2 Results for Extractive/fiscal capacity (13c, 141c, 142c, 18c, 19c, and performance: 
1122_output): differences in part; m suffering larger budget cuts, either in revenue 
(141c) or expenditure (142c) 
I measured extractive/fiscal capacity from three different perspectives. That is, how the 
ROC government is able to collect taxes, minimize budget cuts by the LY, and amend the 
legislation to meet its revenue targets and streamline revenue collection. To begin with the 
second perspective, I created Table E.4 in Appendix E that summarizes the ROC central 
government’s general budget bills and budgets between FYs 1998 and 2018. The lowest 
budget cut, either in revenue (approximately 0%) or expenditure (0.02%), under Taiwan’s SP 
systems was herein observed for FY 2012, or in KMT M. By contrast, significant budget cuts, 
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say, of over 2%, either in revenue or expenditure, occurred for FYs 2001, 2002, and 2005, all 
under DPP m rule. There were only two budget increases in revenue in FYs 2H 1999 & 2000 
(2.22%), or in KMT M, and 2018 (1.15%), or in DPP M. It was also intriguing to find that in 
late 2007 when the corruption and scandal-ridden DPP/Chen administration remained in 
power, only slight budget cuts in revenue (0.45%) and expenditure (0.80%, the second 
lowest) were made for FY 2008 in the LY with a KMT-led majority, the pan-Blue coalition, 
perhaps because of its extreme optimism about the prospects of KMT candidate Ma in the 
then-upcoming Presidential election in March 2008. 
In that twenty-year span, the LY also passed a total of nine supplementary budgets in FYs 
1999, 2H 1999 & 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 (twice), 2004, 2008, and 2011 (Table E.5 in 
Appendix E). The greatest supplementary budget cut in revenue (5.00%) was observed for 
FY 1999, or in KMT M, together with a 5% cut in expenditure, the second largest, behind that 
(in expenditure) of FY 2001 (23.03%) under DPP m rule. By contrast, the only 
supplementary budget increase, a seeming exception, either in revenue (43.37%) or 
expenditure (11.13%), was made for FY 2003, or in DPP m.12 Figure 4.6 shows trends in the 
percentage of general and supplementary budget cuts (and increases in revenue).  
The statistical analyses (of 141c/142c) revealed an expected, and statistically significant, 
relationship between majority/minority status and general budgetary legislation on spending 
(W = 76, 2-tailed p-value = 0.03142) and revenue (W = 78, 2-tailed p-value = 0.02013), in 
which m suffered larger budget cuts than M in either revenue (W = 18, 1-tailed p-value = 
                                                     
12 In May 2003, the Legislative Yuan passed the Cabinet-proposed Special Act for Expanding Investment in 
Public Works to Revitalize the Economy (擴大公共建設振興經濟暫行條例) in which KMT legislators and 
their allies in PFP and NP raised the statutory expenditure ceiling from NT$50 billion to NT$58.4 billion, along 
with a binding resolution attached to the Act, requesting that the Cabinet propose an amended supplementary 
budget bill for FY 2003 to meet extra expenditure (Huang, 2003). The LY is Constitutionally not allowed to 
increase budget spending. 
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0.01007) or expenditure (W = 20, 1-tailed p-value = 0.01571). After accounting for the party 
factor, all but one of the results appeared consistent with expectations: There was no 
significant difference between KMT M and DPP M in revenue (W = 5, 2-tailed p-value = 
0.3636) and nor in expenditure (W = 12, 2-tailed p-value = 0.7576), whereas a significant 
difference was found between DPP M and DPP m (W = 16, 2-tailed p-value = 0.04444) in 
revenue wherein the latter had a significantly greater value than the former (W = 0, 1-tailed 
p-value = 0.02222). The exception was the comparison of cuts in expenditure between DPP 
M and DPP m, in which no significant difference was found (W = 13, 2-tailed p-value = 
0.2667). 
Supplementary budgetary legislation (18c/19c), as opposed to its general counterpart, did 
not respond to the M/m division in either revenue (W = 2, 2-tailed p-value = 0.08767) or 
expenditure (W = 6.5, 2-tailed p-value = 0.5896). Due to a lack of samples for DPP M, 
hypothesis tests concerning 18c/19c could not be performed on comparisons involving the 
party factor.   
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Figure 4.6. Percentage of general and supplementary budget cuts by fiscal year. Data primarily from the website of the DGBAS, Executive Yuan, ROC: 
https://www.dgbas.gov.tw 
Note: A budget increase is entered as a negative percentage value.
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Next, we move on to tax collection or the A/P ratio that denotes the ratio of actual to 
predicted tax revenues. As shown in Figure 4.7, A/P ratios over 1 were found in nine fiscal 
years, including FYs 1998, 2004, 2005 (with an all-time high of 1.13), 2006, 2007, 2011, 
2014, 2015, and 2016.13 The four consecutive FYs with A/P ratios over 1 starting from 2004 
to 2007 were in DPP m (the Chen administration). The lowest A/P ratio (0.83) was found in 
FY 2009, or under KMT M rule (the Ma administration), in the aftermath of the 2008 global 
financial tsunami. The statistical analysis (of 13c) revealed no significant difference in the 
A/P ratio between M and m (W = 36, 2-tailed p-value = 0.9623). Given only a single sample 
of A/P ratios from DPP M, hypothesis tests concerning 13c on comparisons involving the 
party factor were skipped. 
 
 
Figure 4.7. Ratios of actual to predicted tax revenues by fiscal year. Data primarily from the website of the 
DGBAS, Executive Yuan, ROC: https://www.dgbas.gov.tw   
 
From the third perspective, Figure 4.8 illustrates the ROC government’s legislative 
                                                     
13 The ratios generated in FYs 2H 1999 & 2000 and 2008 have less explanatory power than those of other fiscal 
years because there was each a turnover of ruling parties in the two fiscal years while actual tax revenue (from 
different sources), in practice, was being collected throughout the entire fiscal year. Likewise, it was hard to 
break down fiscal capacity for collecting tax revenue that was measured across two administrations of different 
ruling parties in a single fiscal year, particularly with predicted tax revenue on a yearly, not monthly, basis as the 
denominator. These two ratios were therefore skipped from the hypothesis test. 
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productivity over the past twenty-odd years in terms of the number of amendments to the Tax 
Collection Act, including those that contain significant changes to the goals of improving 
fiscal capacity. Although more amendments containing these changes were observed in M, 
particularly during the KMT/Ma administration, the statistical analyses (of 1122_output) 
revealed no significant difference in this measurement between M and m (W = 511.5, 2-tailed 
p-value = 0.345). Nor, after accounting for the party factor, was there a significant difference 
between KMT M and DPP M (W = 39.5, 2-tailed p-value = 0.6237), nor between DPP M and 
DPP m (W = 123, 2-tailed p-value = 0.8656).14  
Overall, the test results of different perspectives showed some differences, in part 
dictated by general budgetary legislation on spending and revenue. Majority/minority status 
made no difference in either tax collection capacity or amending legislation to hit revenue 
targets and streamline revenue collection. In other words, partial support was found for H1a 
(expected) that M had greater extractive/fiscal capacity than m. 
 
                                                     
14 Instead, when performing hypothesis tests on the total number of amendments to the Tax Collection Act 
(coded 1121_output), there was a significant difference between M and m (W = 441.5, 2-tailed p-value = 
0.04931) wherein the former had a significantly greater value than the latter (W = 683.5, 1-tailed p-value = 
0.02466). After accounting for the party factor, no significant difference remained between KMT M and DPP M 
(W = 40, 2-tailed p-value = 0.6891), nor between DPP M and DPP m (W = 109.5, 2-tailed p-value = 0.5388). 
These test results are also reported in Table 4.4.  
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Figure 4.8. Number of amendments to Tax Collection Act by session. Data for the total sample from the website 
of the Laws and Regulations Database of the ROC: https://law.moj.gov.tw 
 
4.3.3 Results for Military capacity (143c, 15c, and 16c): differences in part; M contributing 
to higher defense spending budgets per capita (16c), albeit contextually unexpected 
To begin with, I constructed Figure 4.9 to show the budget cuts to defense spending 
(subsumed in the central government general budget) since 1998. The first three greatest 
defense budget cuts were observed in the Chen administration, or DPP m, i.e., 5.74%, 4.98%, 
and 2.31% for FYs 2007, 2006, and 2008, respectively. The unprecedented 5.74% slash in 
the defense budget resulted from a compromise between the Chen administration and the 
then KMT-led legislative majority over a long-stalled US arms procurement deal of 
NT$610.8 billion (or US$18.5 billion at the then exchange rate) (Shih, 2007). Most of the 
other defense budget cuts remained below 2%, except those at slightly over 2% in FYs 2009 
(2.15%) and 2015 (2.04%), both in KMT M. In that same period, the LY passed all 
supplementary defense budget bills without making any cuts in expenditure. The statistical 
analyses (of 143c), however, revealed no significant difference in the percentage of defense 
budget cuts between M and m (W = 73, 2-tailed p-value = 0.05738), and nor, after accounting 
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for the party factor, between KMT M and DPP M (W = 14, 2-tailed p-value = 0.4848), nor 
between DPP M and DPP m (W = 12, 2-tailed p-value = 0.4). This result resembles 
Wildavsky’s (1966) “two presidencies” thesis in the US, according to which presidents 
dominates Congress in the nation’s foreign and defense policies, but not its domestic 
policies. 
 
 
Figure 4.9. Defense budget cuts in expenditure by fiscal year. Data from the website of the DGBAS, Executive 
Yuan, ROC: https://www.dgbas.gov.tw 
 
The substantial budget slashes in defense expenditure may indicate changes in Taiwan’s 
military expenditure share of GDP (15c) over the past two decades. As Figure 4.10 shows, 
the share is in a quite stable manner over time, slightly fluctuating around 3%, until Ma 
started his second term as President in mid-2012. Since then, the share kept falling, to reach 
2.04% in FY 2017.15 As referenced in Chapter 3, the military expenditure is defined to 
include the nonprofit special fund budget. Likewise, the test result showed that the M/m 
                                                     
15 When a transfer of power occurred in a fiscal year with a or more supplementary budgets passed in the LY 
after a new administration was inaugurated, two values (of military expenditure as a share of GDP) were 
presented for this measurement, one corresponding to the old administration, and the second (after adjustment) 
for the new one. They were both included in the data set used for a hypothesis test. This (operationalized) 
framework was also applied to the computation of (logged) defense budget in expenditure per capita and police 
spending per capita presented later in this section. 
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division made no difference in military expenditure as a share of GDP (W = 75, 2-tailed p-
value = 0.1479). Given only a single sample of military expenditure as a share of GDP from 
DPP M, hypothesis tests concerning 15c on comparisons involving the party factor were thus 
skipped. 
    
 
Figure 4.10. Military expenditure as share of GDP by fiscal year. Data for the defense budget and nonprofit 
special fund budget (of the central government) under the purview of the Defense Ministry from websites of the 
DGBAS, Executive Yuan, ROC: https://www.dgbas.gov.tw and the Ministry of National Defense, ROC: 
https://www.mnd.gov.tw, and for GDP from the website of National Statistics, ROC (Taiwan): www.stat.gov.tw 
 
When focusing on the finalized defense budget in expenditure, i.e., leaving the nonprofit 
special fund budget aside, it turned out to be a different manifestation of the same underlying 
issue from 15c. Figure 4.11 shows a sharp upturn in the defense budget in expenditure per 
capita in FY 2007 and then the trendline fluctuates around 2.6 throughout the next decade, 
when majority governance prevailed. In FY 2007, Taiwan’s defense budget on a yearly basis 
stood over NT$300 billion (US$9.9 billion as of writing) for the first time, and since then the 
level was maintained, almost annually, except for FYs 2010 and 2011 when the Ma 
administration performed at a slightly lower level in an initial attempt to pursue 
rapprochement with the Mainland. 
In consistency with this trend, the statistical analysis (of 16c) revealed that the M/m 
division made difference in the (logged) defense budget in expenditure per capita (t = 2.3033, 
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2-tailed p-value = 0.03895; equal variances not assumed) and that M had a statistically 
significant value greater than m (t = 2.3033, 1-tailed p-value = 0.0194; equal variances not 
assumed). The results achieved with this measurement rejected the desired null-auxiliary 
hypothesis H0c that M had no greater military capacity than m, bolstering the conventional 
wisdom being tested in general but defying my prior hypothesis of a plausible bipartisan 
defense policy in Taiwan, drawn from the volatility inherent in cross-Strait relations. Given 
only a single sample of the (logged) defense budget in expenditure per capita from DPP M, 
hypothesis tests concerning 16c on comparisons involving the party factor were skipped. 
 
 
Figure 4.11. Logged defense budget in expenditure per capita by fiscal year. Data for the defense budget (in 
expenditure) from websites of the DGBAS, Executive Yuan, ROC: https://www.dgbas.gov.tw and the Ministry 
of National Defense, ROC: https://www.mnd.gov.tw, and for the mid-(fiscal) year population from the website 
of the Interior Statistics, Department of Statistics, (ROC) Ministry of the Interior: 
http://statis.moi.gov.tw/micst/stmain.jsp?sys=100 
 
4.3.4 Results for coercive capacity (144c, 17c, and performance): M/m related to 
performance only, changes in violent crime rates (vc_outcome); M contributing to a 
lower violent crime rate 
Unlike its bipartite, military complement, no discernible pattern seems to emerge of cuts 
to annual police budgets in expenditure since 1998 (Figure 4.12). The greatest police budget 
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cut (2.22%) was made for FY 1999, or in the Lee administration, a KMT M, while cuts 
ranging between 1% and 2% were observed in both the administrations of Chen (1.02% and 
1.69% in FYs 2002 and 2005, respectively), the DPP m, and his successor Ma (1.29% in FY 
2013), a KMT M. In line with my observations, the statistical analyses (of 144c) revealed no 
significant difference in the percentage of police budget cuts between M and m (W = 36.5, 2-
tailed p-value = 0.3959), and nor, after accounting for the party factor, between KMT M and 
DPP M (W = 13, 2-tailed p-value = 0.6061), nor between DPP M and DPP m (W = 5, 2-
tailed p-value = 0.5333). 
When the population factor was included in the analysis, a downward trend in the annual 
(logged) police spending, i.e., budget, per capita (17c) appeared to be evident from FYs 1999 
to 2004, and starts with a slow decline from 2006 onward (Figure 4.13). However, the 
converted values still showed no significant difference between M and m (W = 70, 2-tailed p-
value = 0.3144). Given only a single sample of the (logged) police spending per capita from 
DPP M, hypothesis tests concerning 17c on comparisons involving the party factor were 
skipped.  
 
 
Figure 4.12. Police budget cuts in expenditure by fiscal year. Data from the website of the DGBAS, Executive 
Yuan, ROC: https://www.dgbas.gov.tw  
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Figure 4.13. Logged police spending per capita by fiscal year. Data for police spending (i.e., the annual police 
budget in expenditure) from the website of the DGBAS, Executive Yuan, ROC: https://www.dgbas.gov.tw and 
for the mid-(fiscal) year population from the website of the Interior Statistics, Department of Statistics, (ROC) 
Ministry of the Interior: http://statis.moi.gov.tw/micst/stmain.jsp?sys=100 
 
On the other hand, the performance outcomes of coercive capacity responded to the M/m 
division, in part dictated by violent crime, rather than general demonstrations. Figure 4.14 
shows how the ROC government performed its coercive capacity in contexts of domestic 
demonstrations (including rallies and protest marches) and violent crimes. In speaking of the 
former, the first two highest spikes were observed in 2004 (52,849) and 2014 (25,042) under 
DPP m and KMT M rule, respectively. Large-scale protests challenging the legitimacy of then 
President Chen ensuing the suspicious 3/19 Shooting Incident contribute to the spike in 2004, 
while the student-led Sunflower Movement that galvanized public opinion against Ma’s 
signature trade pact with the Mainland for another one in 2014. The next two highest spikes 
were observed in 2008 (20,147) and 2000 (18,112), both Presidential election years. The test 
results (of ap_outcome) showed that the M/m division made no difference in the number of 
demonstrators (per 100,000 population) (t = -0.92373, 2-tailed p-value = 0.3571; equal 
variances not assumed), and nor, after accounting for the party factor, between KMT M and 
DPP M (W = 917, 2-tailed p-value = 0.1015), nor between DPP M and DPP m (W = 5, 2-
tailed p-value = 0.5333). They satisfy my expectations. 
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As for violent crime, a clear downward trend was observed, despite small fluctuations in 
the Chen administration. As the decline becomes sharper starting 2005, the trendline 
constantly slopes down, albeit becoming less so, throughout Ma’s second term and onward. 
The test results (of vc_outcome) showed that M/m division made difference in the violent 
crime rate (per 100,000 population) (t = -13.345, 2-tailed p-value < 2.2e-16; equal variances 
not assumed) and that majority status contributed to a lower rate of violent crime (t = -
13.345, 1-tailed p-value < 2.2e-16; equal variances not assumed), albeit not as hypothetically 
desired. After accounting for the party factor, a difference was likewise found, respectively, 
between KMT M and DPP M (W = 15, 2-tailed p-value = 4.404e-12) wherein the former had 
a higher rate than the latter (W = 2379, 1-tailed p-value = 2.202e-12), and between DPP M 
and DPP m (W = 1824, 2-tailed p-value = 6.665e-12) wherein the latter, with a lower rate, 
outperformed the former (W = 0, 1-tailed p-value = 3.333e-12). However, one would tend to 
suspect a spurious relationship between M/m and violent crime due to a time series having 
the sharper downward shift that coincides with a decade of majority rule regardless of the 
ruling party, albeit briefly interrupted by Ma’s caretaker period. By contrast, the violent 
crime rates in the prior decade appear much higher, starting with Lee’s majority rule of 
nearly three years and mostly covered by Chen’s minority rule.16 Insights from the interview 
with Ma lend further understanding to this puzzle, to which I will return later in the 
discussion section. 
In short, from a performance outcomes standpoint, we might reject the desired null-
auxiliary hypothesis H0b that M had no greater coercive capacity than m. Otherwise, the test 
                                                     
16 The stacked bar charts in Figure 4.14 show the yearly comparison of results for visible manifestations. 
However, just a reminder that the hypothesis tests of violent crime and demonstrators were each conducted on a 
monthly basis to ensure that data not within scope of the ROC SP were excluded from the computation. 
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results of measuring coercive capacity directly by comparing changes in police force budgets 
(cuts or per capita) supported my prior expectations. 
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Figure 4.14. Performance of coercive capacity by year. Data for demonstrators and violent crime, both from the Monthly Bulletin of Interior Statistics, ROC, the 
Monthly Statistics of Police Administration, ROC, and the Yearly Statistics of Police Administration, ROC. 
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4.3.5 The summary of the hypothesis test results for legal, extractive/fiscal, and 
coercive/military capacities  
The results of the hypothesis tests carried out so far in this section are summarized and 
reported in Table 4.4, a snapshot table, below. To simplify the tabulation and access to 
desired information, I presented the results obtained from the “more appropriate” analysis, 
the two-sample t or Mann-Whitney tests, for a set of counterparts for comparison, as 
determined based on several assumptions described in Chapter 3 (or summarized in Table 4.4 
below). The ruling party was suspected of affecting state capacity, or confounding the 
relationship between the M/m division and state capacity, when the test result showed either a 
significant difference in a measurement between KMT M and DPP M (i.e., with majority 
status being controlled), or no between DPP M and DPP m (i.e., with the ruling party being 
controlled) on condition that a significant difference was found instead between M and m for 
the same measurement. Likewise, when there was a significant difference in a measurement 
between DPP M and DPP m and the latter outperformed the former, the ruling party was 
likely to be a confounder.17 The cells in each said set of counterparts for comparison marked 
with a “○pE A” symbol in Table 4.4 denote such results. 
In a nutshell, by focusing on non-administrative/bureaucratic dimensions of state 
capacity, M outperformed m as hypothetically expected and unexpected, respectively, in 
fiscal capacity (when it was measured with changes made by the LY to annual general 
budgets, either in revenue or expenditure) and military capacity (when measured with the 
defense budgets in expenditure per capita), albeit in the face of long-standing Communist 
                                                     
17 The inference of the ruling party as a potential confounding variable for each cell in the tabulated results was 
performed under the conventional wisdom that governance in president-parliamentary congruence is considered 
more effective than that in president-parliamentary incongruence, whether the results supported or not the given 
auxiliary hypothesis in the Taiwanese context. 
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Chinese threat to Taiwan. The M/m division affected legal capacity in all its given sets of 
counterparts for comparison between M and m, i.e., all the four cells in “M vs. m” and “DPP 
M vs. DPP m,” but not in the way I expected hypothetically. Legal capacity appeared to be 
most reactive to the M/m division. The M/m division affected coercive capacity only when it 
was measured by its performance in reducing the violent crime rate, rather than its capacity 
per se. The KMT/DPP rule division would not necessarily affect state capacity, or had effects 
limited to only legal capacity and performance of coercive capacity. 
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Table 4.4. Summary of the Hypothesis Tests Results for Multi-dimensions of State Capacitiesa  
Dimension Caseb 
 
 
(code)  
Direct measurement 
M vs. m  KMT M vs. DPP M  DPP M vs. DPP m  
Legal capacity 
11c 
(bills of law passed in the Legislature [%]) 
Y 
(m > M: ) ** 
Y 
(KMT M > DPP M: ) **    
A○p E  
Y 
(DPP m > DPP M: ) **    
A○p E  
12c 
(bills of law proposed by the Cabinet passed in the 
Legislature [%]) 
Y 
(m > M: ) ** 
N 
(H) 
Y 
(DPP m > DPP M: ) **    
 
A○p E  
Extractive/fiscal 
capacity 
13c 
(A/P ratio: ratio of actual tax revenue to predicted tax 
revenue [%]) 
N N/A  
(n = 1 in DPP M) 
N/A  
(n = 1 in DPP M) 
141c 
(cut/increase to the annual general budget in revenue 
[%]) 
Y 
(m > M:  H) * 
N Y 
(DPP m > DPP M:  H) * 
142c 
(cut to the annual general budget in expenditure [%]) 
Y 
(m > M:  H) * 
N N 
 
A○p E  
18c 
(cut/increase to the supplementary budget in revenue 
[%]) 
N N/A  
(n = 0 in DPP M) 
N/A  
(n = 0 in DPP M) 
19c 
(cut to the supplementary budget in expenditure [%]) 
N N/A  
(n = 0 in DPP M) 
N/A  
(n = 0 in DPP M) 
Military 
capacity 
143c 
(cut to the annual defense budget in expenditure [%]) 
N 
(H) 
N 
(H) 
N 
(H) 
15c 
(military expenditure as a share of GDP [%]) 
N 
(H) 
N/A  
(n = 1 in DPP M) 
N/A  
(n = 1 in DPP M) 
16c 
(natural log of defense budget in expenditure per 
capita) 
Y 
(M > m: ) * 
N/A  
(n = 1 in DPP M) 
N/A  
(n = 1 in DPP M) 
110c 
(cut to the supplementary defense budget in 
expenditure [%]) 
N/A  
(n = 1 in KMT M; all 
data values = 0) 
N/A  
(n = 1 in KMT M; all data 
values = 0) 
N/A  
(n = 0 in DPP M; all data 
values = 0) 
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Table 4.9. (cont.) 
Dimension Caseb 
 
 
(code)  
Direct measurement 
M vs. m  KMT M vs. DPP M  DPP M vs. DPP m  
Coercive 
capacity 
144c 
(cut to the annual police budget in expenditure [%]) 
N 
(H) 
N 
(H) 
N 
(H) 
17c 
(natural log of police force spending per capita) 
N 
(H) 
N/A  
(n = 1 in DPP M) 
N/A  
(n = 1 in DPP M) 
111c 
(cut to the supplementary police budget in 
expenditure [%]) 
N/A  
(n = 0 in M) 
N/A  
(n = 0 in M) 
N/A  
(n = 0 in M) 
Dimension Case 
 
(code) 
Supplemental measurement  
M vs. m  
 
 
KMT M vs. DPP M  DPP M vs. DPP m  
Extractive/fiscal 
capacity 
(performance: 
1121_output 
not required to 
form 
conclusions; 
1122_output 
serving as an 
indirect proxy) 
1121_output 
(total number of amendments to the Tax Collection 
Act) 
Y 
(M > m:  H) * 
N N 
 
A○p E  
1122_output 
(number of amendments to the Tax Collection Act 
that contain significant changes to the goals of 
improving fiscal capacity) 
N N N 
Coercive 
capacity 
(performance: 
each serving as 
an indirect 
proxy) 
ap_outcome 
(number of demonstrators per 100,000 population) 
N 
(H) 
N 
(H) 
N 
(H) 
vc_outcome 
(violent crime rate per 100,000 population) 
Y 
(m > M: ) *** 
Y 
(KMT M > DPP M: ) ***   
A○p E  
Y 
(DPP m > DPP M: ) *** 
Administrative/ 
bureaucratic 
capacity 
(supplemental) 
dur 
(duration of Cabinet/Cabinet-level members in 
office) (weeks)c 
Y 
(M > m:  H) ** 
Not performed Not performed 
* P < .05 (1-tailed test), ** P < .01 (1-tailed test), *** P < .001 (1-tailed test). 
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Note:  
Where 
Y = there is a statistically significant difference between two groups (the symbol “>” denotes the former group has a statistically significant value greater than the 
latter). 
N = there is no statistically significant difference between two groups. 
N/A = a lack of or insufficient data observed (i.e., no or only one sample available). 
 = support the conventional wisdom that governance in president-parliamentary congruence is considered more effective than that in president-parliamentary 
incongruence (cells with yellow background). 
 = not support the conventional wisdom that governance in president-parliamentary congruence is considered more effective than that in president-
parliamentary incongruence. 
H = support the auxiliary hypothesis. 
A○pE A = potential effect of ruling parties on state capacity. 
 
a. The two-sample t-test was employed for statistical analysis of my data sets that follow a normal distribution (an assumption of the t-test) or consist of 30, at 
least, or more samples in each group for comparison in my case, for example KMT M (assumed with an asymptotic normal distribution of the sample average 
by applying the central limit theorem), when the variances between two groups were equal. The Welch’s two sample t-test was used instead when the 
variances were unequal. Without normality distribution, or when a relatively small sample size (of less than 30) and uneven sample sizes for two groups 
were collected, the Mann-Whitney or (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney) test, a nonparametric test, was chosen instead. 
b. KMT m was excluded from the hypothesis tests for legal, extractive/fiscal, and coercive/military dimensions of state capacity, because of a lack of or 
insufficient pertinent data observed in its short-lived, three-month rule (say, at most, only one sample available for each measurement of capacity itself). The 
three sets of counterparts for comparison were therefore chosen: “M vs. m,” “KMT M vs. DPP M,” and “DPP M vs. DPP m.”  
c. I opted not to account for the party factor while analyzing the duration of Cabinet/Cabinet-level members because the current Tsai administration (DPP M) 
had remained in power for less than two years (as of the most recent update to my official longevity data set on March 9, 2018) and the Chang Cabinet (KMT 
m) survived for less than four months. The two situations impose potential, lower maximum durations of 94 and 16 weeks, respectively. 
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4.4 Results for state capacity vs. approval ratings for Presidents, Premiers, and Cabinets: 
People did not perceive the difference 
Now that the M/m division was found to make some differences in certain, but not all, 
dimensions of state capacity, I sought to unravel the question of if the people in Taiwan could 
perceive and appreciate differences in state capacity, first by looking at the trend over the 
past two decades in (the weighted mean of) job approval ratings for ROC Presidents, 
Premiers, and Cabinets (Figure 4.15). Generally speaking, all the three trendlines appear to 
fluctuate in a similar manner, but the Premier’s approval ratings were ahead of the other 
two’s for most observations. The Cabinet consistently scored lower approval ratings than 
both the President and Premier in the same periods of time, except for the second half of 
2008 and early 2009 when Premier Liu Chao-shiuan’s Cabinet enjoyed an approval ratings 
lead over then-President Ma and Liu himself. Liu was Ma’s first Premier and distributed the 
country’s first-ever consumption vouchers in early 2009 to combat the economic downturn 
sparked by the global financial tsunami. It is also interesting to notice that Simon Chang, the 
independent caretaker Premier of KMT m, who was appointed following his predecessor’s 
resignation over the then-ruling KMT’s defeat in 2016 general elections, scored a 54.99% 
approval rating (in the first half of the first legislative session of the 9th LY), the fourth 
highest for the Premier since 1998.  
Table 4.5 presents the results of the three linear regression models of the nine selected 
measurements of five components of state capacity against job approval ratings for the 
President, the Premier, and his Cabinet. They suggest that variations in state capacity in ROC 
SP regimes were barely reflected, if at all, in job approval ratings of the President and 
Premier and not reflected for the Cabinet in Taiwan. That is, the people in Taiwan could not 
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perceive, or at least could not appreciate, differences in state capacity. 
In detail, overall F-tests were statistically significant for the approval ratings of the 
President (Model 1) and the Premier (Model 2) at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively, 
while the F-test was not significant for the approval ratings of the Cabinet (Model 3) given 
no significant p-values for the individual coefficients in the model. All my models displayed 
low adjusted R-squared values, indicating that these models did not do a very good job of 
explaining job approval ratings of the President, the Premier, and his Cabinet on state 
capacity. In Model 1, only 17c (logged police force spending per capita) of coercive capacity 
was significant (at the 0.05 level and in a positive direction) while the party and institutional 
factors, both control variables, were found statistically significant, respectively, at the 0.01 
and 0.05 levels and had negative and positive relationship with the Presidential approval 
rating: either DPP rule or majority status led to a higher Presidential approval rating. By 
contrast, the party and institutional factors became no longer significant with the Premier 
approval rating being the response variable in Model 2. In this model, only 13c (A/P ratio) of 
extractive/fiscal capacity was found significant (at the 0.01 level and in a positive direction). 
All these three models satisfied the underlying assumptions of (classic) linear regression, 
previously described in Chapter 3, footnote 50, on p. 93 (see regression diagnostics in 
Appendix F).  
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Figure 4.15. Weighted mean of job approval ratings by (merged) session. Original longitudinal public opinion data from the webpage of TVBS Poll Center: 
http://www.tvbs.com.tw/poll-center 
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Table 4.5. State Capacity Influencing Job Approval Ratings for Presidents, Premiers, and Cabinets, Feb. 1997 – Jan. 2018 
 
Variable 
(selected measurement of state capacity) 
Model 
(1) 
Job approval 
rating of the 
President 
(2) 
Job approval 
rating of the 
Premier 
(3) 
Job approval 
rating of the 
Cabinet 
parCO 
(ruling party: 1 = KMT, 0 = DPP) 
-1.37 ** 
(0.47) 
-0.57 
(0.37)  
-0.15 
(0.24) 
regCO 
(SP regime type: 1 = M, 0 = m)           
1.38 * 
(0.53) 
-0.08 
(0.41)  
-0.15 
(0.27) 
Administrative/bureaucratic 
capacity 
Ofout2 
(number of Cabinet/Cabinet-level members left office) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.01)  
-0.01 
(0.01) 
Legal capacity 21c 
(bills of law passed in the Legislature) 
4.26 
(2.21) 
1.45 
(1.71)  
0.06 
(1.12) 
Extractive/fiscal capacity 
13c 
(A/P ratio: ratio of actual tax revenue to predicted tax 
revenue) 
-1.79 
(1.89) 
-4.33 ** 
(1.46) 
-0.10 
(0.96) 
242c 
(cut to the annual general budget in expenditure) 
-0.77 
(19.05) 
-12.25 
(14.71) 
1.26 
(9.67) 
2122_output 
(number of amendments to the Tax Collection Act that 
contain significant changes to the goals of improving 
extractive/fiscal capacity) 
-0.05 
(0.15) 
-0.05 
(0.12) 
0.02 
(0.08) 
Military capacity 
25c 
(military expenditure as a share of GDP) 
82.45 
(43.49) 
16.82 
(33.59)  
24.59 
(22.07) 
16c 
(logged defense budget in expenditure per capita)  
-1.00 
(1.06) 
0.14 
(0.82)   
0.24 
(0.54) 
Coercive capacity 
244c 
(cut to the annual police budget in expenditure)   
48.80 
(25.30) 
24.70 
(19.54) 
-8.08 
(12.84) 
17c 
(logged police force spending per capita) 
1.99 * 
(0.96) 
-0.01 
(0.74) 
0.025 
(0.49) 
Adjusted R-squared of model 0.32 0.26 0.15 
F-statistic of model 2.88 ** 2.36 * 1.66 
* P < .05, ** P < .01, *** P < .001. 
Number of observations (after imputation) = 484; number of merged (if applicable) legislative sessions = 44; number of SP regime types = 3 (KMT M, DPP M, 
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and DPP m) 
Note: Data for the approval ratings of the President, the Premier, and his Cabinet from the website of TVBS Poll Center: http://www.tvbs.com.tw/poll-center/1. 
Entries are estimated regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses (round off to the second decimal place). All models use variations in the ruling 
parties and SP regime types as controls.   
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4.5 Discussions 
This section, dealing with the interview results with the seven selected key-informants 
involved with interpreting my quantitative findings and discussing prospects for the ROC SP, 
induces and synthesizes two major perspectives, namely, leadership and political culture, 
across them to make an insightful and practical contribution to uncovering the causal 
mechanisms for outcomes of theoretical interest with a primary focus of why M/m could 
make a difference or not. The leadership perspective can be presidential (formal/informal) or 
intermediary in the LY; the political cultural perspective is grounded in (1) Chinese imperial 
heritage, thereby fostering the nation’s non-parliament-centered politics, (2) pan-Blue 
legislators’ political behavior tinged with nostalgia for the long history of KMT rule, and (3) 
Taiwan’s increasingly polarized partisan division. These two perspectives were bolstered and 
enriched by political stories that received extensive news coverage in Taiwan over the past 
twenty-odd years, albeit focused mostly on the Presidency of Ma and that of Chen, and a 
selection of anecdotes shared by the interviewees. 
Given my primary inquiry of the effect of SP constitutional engineering on governance, 
the interview results with former President Ma Ying-jeou and KMT Chairman Wu Den-yih 
contributed the most to our understanding of the difference in state capacity, particularly for 
its proxies via fighting violent crime and, perhaps, legislative productivity and general budget 
cuts, from a leadership perspective; those with former DPP Chairman Hsu Hsin-liang, former 
KMT legislator Lin Yu-fang, and United Daily News (UDN) journalist Huang Kuo-liang 
constructed important building blocks for deeper discussions over outgrowths of Taiwan’s 
own political culture of democratization, helping understand legislative and budgetary 
ramifications (the latter including those from general and defense budgets), a constantly 
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changing Cabinet line-up, and Taiwan’s being the scene of frequent demonstrations. And 
those with Liberty Times journalist Huang Wei-chu and Central News Agency (CNA) 
journalist Hsu Ya-jing provided rich sources of underpinning evidence for those views. 
The discussions begin with the findings of this study as to the differences in state capacity 
given the M/m (or, if any, KMT/DPP rule) division, followed by an elaboration of the 
implications of Taiwanese’ scarce perception of, or appreciation for, the change in state 
capacity. I conclude the section by considering the prospects for further constitutional reform 
and the ROC SP at work. 
 
4.5.1 Interpreting the difference: the leadership perspective 
Formal/informal Presidential power 
Either formal or informal presidential power shapes presidential influence on the cabinet. 
In accordance with the ROC Constitution, as amended, the popularly-elected ROC President 
is the commander-in-chief of the three Armed Services and has power to conduct foreign 
affairs and relations with Mainland China, but nothing more than that if s/he behaves 
constitutionally. As a Presidential appointee without a popular mandate, the ROC Premier, 
however, heads the government and has power over domestic matters. This formal division 
of labor can be illustrated by KMT Chairman Wu’s example of serving Ma’s second Premier. 
In the wake of the wrath of Typhoon Morakot in 2009, then-KMT Vice Chairman-cum-
Secretary General Wu Den-yih was appointed as Premier, leading the post-disaster 
rehabilitation work. To expedite the reconstruction work for an indigenous village in the 
southern port city of Kaohsiung that was obliterated by a landslide during the typhoon, Wu 
successfully requested then-President Ma, over a phone call, to send 800-1,000 troops to aid 
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in that task, although the Premier, in practice, as he noted, could ask his Defense Minister, a 
Cabinet member, to do so without consulting the President ahead of time. Wu recalled that 
Ma had told him in that phone call that he could have instead called for troops directly to 
assist reconstruction efforts. “But I believed that I must follow the Constitution, not 
exceeding my authority as Premier,” Wu asserted (D.-y. Wu, personal communication, 
January 9, 2019). 
In fact, it is very difficult to constrain and divide power between Taiwan’s dual executive 
leadership in practice as the Constitutional provisions delineate. For example, any trade 
agreement with the Mainland must deal with both domestic economic and cross-Strait issues. 
Instead, it usually depends on the leader’s idiosyncratic ways to govern, which leaves the 
boundary between the Presidential and Premier power unclear. Unlike the French president 
who presides over the Council of Ministers, in Taiwan it is the Premier that chairs the 
Executive Yuan Council, or Cabinet, and is held accountable for implementing policies, not 
the popularly-elected President. The ROC President, according to former President Ma, 
might express “concern” about (domestic) policies to his Premier but shall not be the one 
who gives directives to ministers, said Ma, “This inevitably leads to a gap in the President’s 
pledges yet to be fulfilled” (Y.-j. Ma, personal communication, January 18, 2019).18 
Although Ma met his Premier regularly three times a week to discuss state affairs in order to 
fill this gap, he still could not be well informed about policy details. For example, Ma was 
not aware of any subsidies from his administration which inaugurated the first light-rail line 
in Kaohsiung until he was told on his first ride there several months after he left the 
                                                     
18 Upholding the Constitutional formality of a dual leadership, Ma criticized President Tsai for her recent, high-
profile public intervention in a new scooter safety rule on a mandatory and costly braking systems upgrade and 
postponing its implementation from its original 2021 target date. See also Strong (2018) for details of the news 
story. 
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Presidency in 2016. To Ma, Taiwan’s dual leadership is cumbersome, redundant, and 
apparently inefficient because of mismatches between the Presidential and Premier power 
and accountability. Sometimes he relied on the informal Presidential power to govern. 
After beginning his Presidency, Ma met the head of Taiwan’s police force regularly once 
a month, but in an expedient, low-key manner, to discuss how to promote changes in the 
social order, while lending his successful crime-fighting expertise and experience as a former 
Taipei City Mayor to his subordinates (Ma, 2019). Ma told me that he felt proud, in 
particular, of his contribution to a significant decline in violent crime and driving under the 
influence of alcohol during his Presidency, and even onward to the administration of his 
successor, Tsai, who he thought paid scant attention to crime, where “his men” continued to 
be charged with the administration of police. This helps explain the violent-crime puzzle in 
statistical reasoning in the Taiwanese context, as posed in Section 4.4.3. 
When mediated by the informal power, according to Wu (2019), governance may become 
likely to hinge on leader’s idiosyncratic morals and have no bearing on constitution 
engineering. Wu contended that the institution itself, or specifically “total governance” which 
can be efficient, is like a keen blade that can lead to tragedy, if ruled by a bad person and his 
arbitrary government. “But if ‘total governance’ is ruled by a good person, then the results 
must be good,” the chairman added. Wu denounced President Chen’s rule as being “morally 
bad” and thus affecting opposition legislators’ behavior, despite his minority status to govern. 
Throughout Chen’s Presidency, he explained, the then-ruling DPP released a series of 
infamous political ads, “no matter how barbaric one might be” (再怎麼野蠻), first initiated 
in late 2001, against KMT and its pan-Blue allies which held a Legislative majority. In these 
brutal attack ads that catered to Chen’s leadership, many specific, individual pan-Blue 
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legislators were labeled and accused of, say, slashing budgets, spending money on pork 
barrel legislation, and stymieing legislation.19 The ads deterred opposition pan-Blue 
legislators from boldly continuing to block legislative proceedings, particularly on bills 
dealing with bread and butter issues and international ones. This helped to partly explain why 
greater legislative productivity was found in minority regimes. Wu, however, did not appear 
to worry about legislative productivity, as he believed that legislative quality was more 
important than quantity. 
Likewise, this advertisement series also “successfully” mitigated the confrontational 
behavior in budgetary deliberation henceforth throughout most of Chen’s Presidency. That is, 
except 2001, the year of legislative elections for the 5th LY, Chen’s government did not 
suffer substantial annual general spending cuts made by the pan-Blue camp in the LY (W.-c. 
Huang, personal communication, September 20, 2018).20  
What is more and worth mentioning is that the idiosyncrasies of individual Premiers, and 
probably Cabinet members, of the KMT government are clearly distinguishable from those of 
their DPP counterparts, which is considered a causative factor in Taiwan’s frequent changes 
in Cabinet composition, regardless of majority/minority status. For example, as previously 
mentioned (in footnote 15 of Chapter 3, p. 78), Hsueh Hsiang-chuan (薛香川) resigned from 
the Liu Cabinet’s Secretary-General post amid intense criticism induced by the then-
opposition DPP with only a slim minority (23.89%) in the LY, over his slow disaster response 
to Typhoon Morakot of 2009, the most devastating storm to hit the island in fifty years. 
                                                     
19 For more details, see Lee & Wang (2007). 
20 A similar pattern was also observed in general budget cuts in revenue. But an escalating budget conflict 
recurred during the first legislative session after Chen’s controversial reelection in 2004, resulting in a 4.93% 
general budget cut in revenue, the third largest behind those of FYs 2002 (5.85%) and 2001 (5.11%) (referred 
also to Table 4.7). 
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Premier Liu likewise stepped down shortly in the aftermath of the disaster. “It is KMT 
government officials’ weak willpower that is to blame,” said Lin Yu-fang, a former KMT 
legislator of higher seniority with a doctorate from the University of Virginia (Y.-f. Lin, 
personal communication, September 7, 2018). He further explained that they can barely stand 
up to sustained outside criticism, in contrast with the DPP’s William Lai Ching-te, for 
example, who has persisted in office and never succumbed to mounting popular 
dissatisfaction with his Premiership. But he also reminded me that the KMT majority 
government should have allowed a longer longevity of Cabinet officials if Wu had chosen to 
continue his Premiership of almost two years and five months (the longest of any Ma’s 
Premier) rather than become Ma’s running mate for the 2012 Presidential election. 
 
Intermediary leadership in the LY 
The Legislative leadership, including the Speaker and party whips, is crucial to either of 
the dual executives’ success with the LY. And this is largely reflected in how legislative 
leaders address legislation and budgetary deliberation. Allow me to begin with the latter first.  
The DPP became the biggest party in the LY after the December 2001 elections but was 
not able to acquire a majority. Beginning in the 5th LY of a narrow pan-Blue majority (2002-
2005), legislators tended more likely to pass a general budget, instead of slashing, with 
binding “budget freeze” resolutions (以凍代刪) that authorize the appropriation of funds 
earmarked for specific government programs and functions, contingent on government 
agencies displaying implementation efficiency or providing more detailed implementation 
project descriptions (W.-c. Huang, 2018; referred also to in Y.-j. Hsu, personal 
communication, September 18, 2018). To pan-Blue alliance legislators, the change was 
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prompted partly in response to the aforementioned negative, but influential, “no matter how 
barbaric” advertising. 
Meanwhile, “party-to-party consultations” (朝野/黨團協商) emerged as an alternative to 
traditional deliberations in committee.21 Through “party-to-party consultations,” every 
budget cut was made by a party caucus(es), not individual legislators, in the LY. By doing so, 
no single legislator was as likely to be subjected to direct pressures caused by budget cuts. A 
floor vote on budget bills, as well as other bills, was required only when “party-to-party 
consultations” fail to reach a solution (Y.-j. Hsu, 2018; W.-c. Huang, 2018). Unfortunately, 
neither “budget freeze” nor “party-to-party consultations” enabled rational deliberations in 
the pan-Blue majority LY during Chen’s minority rule as in practice they eventually failed to 
reduce inflated or unnecessary budgets. 
“Party-to-party consultations” continued to dominate LY budgetary deliberations 
throughout Ma’s Presidency in “total governance.” During most of Ma’s years in office, 
budget bills were usually first reported out of a committee without any reduction, and next 
“party-to-party consultations” would decide on and apply a fixed flat-rate percentage of 
budget cuts equally across ministries and ministerial-level agencies (統刪) in an expedient 
attempt to reduce overall and potential inflated costs (Y.-j. Hsu, 2018; W.-c. Huang, 2018). 
This is decidedly not a manifestation of how a legislative body is supposed to behave, 
regardless of smaller budget cuts to Ma’s majority government. Even in the context, 
however, we should still be mindful of the fact that in Taiwan, whoever is the opposition 
party would attempt to obstruct budget bills (Lin, 2018).  
                                                     
21 The LY has been long criticized for engaging in backroom deals through prior “party-to-party consultations,” 
on which each party caucus, regardless of how many seats it holds, has a representative and retains the right to 
tie up parliamentary deliberations for a significant length of time and thus be able to affect decisions about the 
content of legislation, whether it gets enacted at all. 
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Speaking of the influence of Legislative leadership on legislation, according to Y.-j. Hsu 
(2018), many bills proposed by the Ma administration failed to pass the LY mainly because 
long-time DPP party whip Ker Chien-ming (柯建銘) was very familiar with legislative 
procedure whereby he knew how to lead his colleague to outdo KMT legislators in the 
steering of the legislative agenda and carry out relentless obstructionism through, say, 
occupying the Speaker’s podium at the LY, particularly as KMT-affiliated Speaker Wang Jin-
pyng never invoked his police powers. Second, Wang, the nation’s longest-serving Speaker 
with 17 years in the post (1999-2016), was accused of having played between the Ma 
administration and the minority DPP; tracing further back to Chen’s minority rule, he would 
even lend his support to the ruling rival party on politically insensitive issues (W.-c. Huang 
2018).22 In order to seek harmony in the Legislature, Wang preferred trying to forge a 
consensus on important legislation through “party-to-party consultations,” albeit infamous, 
rather than resort to a roll call vote. Consequently, Ma could hardly control a KMT-majority 
LY during his Presidency, even most of which featured Ma’s doubling as KMT chairman, 
because sophistication that typifies Wang’s Speakership made some important bills proposed 
and desired by the Ma administration tabled, compromised, or sacrificed (K.-l. Huang, 
personal communication, September 6, 2018). Compared with the budgetary enactment that 
is usually open for negotiations in Taiwan’s partisan politics, its law counterpart would more 
likely stir up a controversy, even within a party itself (Y.-j. Hsu, 2018).  
The “September Strife” in 2013 between Ma and Wang (see footnote 12 of Chapter 1, p. 
6) unfortunately surfaced as a key impediment to legislative productivity of the KMT 
                                                     
22 To clarify the unexpected reversal of institutional effects on legislative productivity in the LY, W.-c. Huang 
(2018) suggested a further analysis of legislative productivity by different levels of perceived political 
sensitivity of legislation.   
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government (Wu, 2019). The conflicting interests between them reached a climax as Wang 
allowed the Sunflower occupation of the LY to protest against Ma’s service trade agreement 
with Beijing in 2014, which ended up with being shelved to date. 
In comparison with Ma’s predicament, the DPP majority government led by Tsai has 
received overwhelming and consistent support from her DPP-affiliated legislative leaders 
(which is discussed in detail in a later paragraph of a following subsection, polarized 
partisanship from the political cultural perspective). The “so-called ‘total governance’ is 
nothing more than a formality. The very nature of how it works differs from party to party,” 
said Y.-j. Hsu (2018). Furthermore, the variance in a single party’s leadership styles toward 
legislation could also affect legislative productivity, which is well manifested by the KMT. 
When Lien Chan (連戰) chaired the opposition KMT (2000-2005), he adapted flexible 
response to deal with legislation in dispute, whereas Ma, Lien’s successor as KMT chairman 
(2005-2007, 2009-2014), took a no-compromise position with respect to the passage of major 
legislation, making it harder to tackle disputes for the Legislative leadership (W.-c. Huang, 
2018). 
Given Speaker Wang’s refuse to maintain order on the floor by police, citing “the 
autonomy of the Legislative Yuan” (國會自主), infamous frequent brawls in the LY stalled 
deliberations on important bills (e.g., a years-long stretch of partisan, physical infighting over 
an organic legislation that gave the Central Election Commission the legal status of an 
independent agency), unless otherwise determined by a KMT majority to win the fight 
against its minority, but aggressive, DPP rival in a chaos. In Taiwan, extraordinary sessions 
were thus often required to “accomplish” the Legislature’s chaotic workings of important 
legislation, say, the Local Government Act (地方制度法) amended in 2010 and the free 
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trade-style agreement with the Mainland ratified later the same year, known by its initials—
ECFA (the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement).23  
It is worth noting here that a practice of “party-to-party consultations” began as an ad hoc 
initiative and was later initially institutionalized in early 1999 in an attempt to reduce 
adversarial obstructionism by opposition parties, particularly small ones. It has become 
regular and increasingly essential to legislation since Wang’s Speakership began in 1999. 
Ninety percent of bills die in “party-to-party consultations,” particularly for the pork barrel 
scam, but the quality of legislative deliberation is considered not improved thereupon or even 
worse because “party-to-party consultations” undermine the role of committee as a central 
pillar of expertise for deliberations. Starting from the 9th LY, the first DPP-controlled 
Legislature in history, the content of the consultations in practice has been video-recorded 
and made available for public viewing to dispel suspicious of backroom deals. Although the 
verdict from my interviews seems to paint “party-to-party consultations” as an ad hoc 
outcome, we should be aware of their institutionalized evolution (see more details of “party-
to-party consultations” in Chang, Lin, & Tsai, 2013; Lin, 2015; Lin, 2016; Su, 2016; Yang & 
Chen, 2004). 
 
4.5.2 Interpreting the difference: the political cultural perspective 
Taiwan of non-parliament-centered politics 
Chinese culture is deeply rooted in an imperial history of thousands of years. In this 
cultural context, the people of Taiwan would more likely to view the President nowadays as 
                                                     
23 Despite strenuous opposition from the DPP, the ECFA was ratified by the KMT-majority LY in 2010, 
marking a new milestone in the development of cross-Strait relations. However, its follow-up service trade pack 
has been shelved in the LY since it was halted by the Sunflower Movement in 2014.  
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tantamount to an emperor in the past, and the belief of presidential supremacy over other 
organs has prevailed this island (that is, people believe that the President must be the only 
one who can make decisions for the nation) (K.-l. Huang, 2018; see also Keum & Campbell, 
2018). In this sense, the culture-driven President-dominant constitutional norm results in a 
powerful Presidency in the island (Kuo, 2000) and Taiwan has never been parliament-
centered (K.-l. Huang, 2018).  
This contextual element is fundamental to a thorough, thought-provoking account by Hsu 
Hsin-liang, a British-educated, veteran DPP activist contributing to the country’s adoption of 
French-style SP, on why M/m would make a difference or not. Hsu Hsin-liang ascribed the 
inverse relationship between the M/m division and legislative productivity as well as a 
frequent change in Cabinet positions to a cultural difference in treating the parliament 
between Taiwan and France. As he elaborated in the interview, “the ROC government in 
Taiwan has been embedded in the thinking of a presidential system, and therefore the LY 
looks more like the US Congress rather than a French-style parliament, which is rooted in 
Westminster heritage of parliamentary supremacy in high party discipline, or originated in 
being power-centered (權力中心)” (H.-1. Hsu, personal communication, November 14, 
2018).24 Within the context of this heritage, he went on to say, the ruling party would seek 
cooperation or compromise with the parliamentary majority, hence, pushing through 
bipartisan bills or forming a cohabitation government. Instead, he noted, without this 
heritage, Taiwan’s minority governments seemed to behave similarly to the divided 
                                                     
24 Before it instituted a SP republic, France had long been parliamentarism. The French SP Constitution of 1958 
empowers the French president to intervene in political process to prevent the unstable situation that existed in 
the Fourth Republic which saw frequent changes in the cabinet. The popularly-elected French presidency of 
Fifth Republic has become another political powerhouse since then, in tandem with the splendid heritage of 
parliamentary supremacy, hence leaving the possibility open for cohabitation (H.-l. Hsu, 2018). 
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government in the US; the LY operated more like a US-style congress than a parliament, as 
many individual lawmakers introduced bills in behalf of interest groups, a phenomenon 
rarely observed in the parliamentarism. In this scenario, the minority cabinet (and the ruling 
party) cannot, and would not, oppose these kinds of bills introduced by majority lawmakers, 
seeking instead a quid pro quo for their support, he said. But he also reminded me that when 
Taiwan’s ruling parties enjoyed “total governance,” the LY’s internal regulations allowing 
“party-to-party consultations” still gave opposition parties opportunities to block legislative 
proceedings.25 Although the DPP elder believed that the same reasoning as that applied 
above in legislative productivity should hold for general budget cuts and the defense budget, 
this was, however, not confirmed in my study. 
Taiwan’s lack of Westminster heritage of parliamentary supremacy, hence (lack of) the 
parliament-centered politics, also sheds light on why a high frequency of Cabinet official 
changes prevails in the ROC SP trajectory since 1997. Unlike its French blueprint, according 
to H.-l. Hsu (2018), in which cabinet positions are usually held by prominent political figures 
or those harking from the parliament and arbitrary ministerial replacements are therefore 
likely to bring political risk, in Taiwan many Cabinet members typically come from two 
other sources: academia and the civil service.26 Hsu Hsin-liang argued that that was why 
Taiwan’s Cabinet members had been treated as replaceable cogs whenever someone or a 
scapegoat was needed to take political responsibility. To be clear, as former President Ma 
                                                     
25 See reasoning in footnote 21 above. 
26 Hsu Hsin-liang on this point echoes the position of Huang Wei-chu. According to W.-c. Huang (2018), 
frequent changes in Cabinet posts lead to a Gresham’s Law of Cabinet member recruitment in Taiwan, whereby 
brilliant people hesitate to join the Cabinet and therefore appointees are usually those who chase after power 
and political position. Besides, Cabinet posts in Taiwan rarely attract talents from the private sector mostly 
because of their reluctance to become obligated, as government officials, to file an assets declaration. As a 
result, a Cabinet line-up in Taiwan is dominated by only those from a civil official background, hence 
conservative, and on secondment from higher education institutions. 
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said candidly, this rule also applied to most Premiers in Taiwan, particularly those of the 
KMT government, because they never ran in an election and hardly connected with the 
grassroots (接地氣) (Ma, 2019). Usually, replacing his embattled Premier allows the 
President to shift responsibility or set a stop-loss point (W.-c. Huang, 2018; Ma, 2019), let 
alone the island’s Chinese imperial heritage in which replacing a Premier, when needed, was 
good enough to respond to people’s expectations (K.-l. Huang, 2018).27 
Admittedly, the advent of social media reinforces the said phenomenon of frequent 
Cabinet official changes in Taiwan, as it has promoted broader public access to oversight on 
government and thus created a new political culture in which politicians are held more 
accountable and, especially for political appointees, become vulnerable. Taiwan entered the 
era of social media, roughly synchronized with the KMT’s return to power in 2008. “This 
was a reason for a constantly changing Cabinet line-up through Ma’s Presidency,” said UDN 
journalist Huang Kuo-liang, “The situation for Chen Shui-bian’s Cabinet members was 
different because at that time, traditional media outlets remained a major dominant source of 
external pressure” (K.-l. Huang, 2018).  
 
Nostalgic KMT-rule politics among pan-Blue legislators 
Before its defeat in the 2000 Presidential election, the KMT had governed Taiwan for 
over half a century. According to Lin (2018), many KMT legislators thus have a nostalgia for 
the past and act as if the KMT remained in power, not to mention their long-standing ties 
with government officials and technocrats from a KMT background, particularly those in the 
                                                     
27 The Chinese monarchs were compelled to blame themselves publicly (下詔罪己) when much distress and 
discontent prevailed in the country. But they rarely abdicated the throne of China unless forced to do so. 
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Cabinet under KMT-affiliated Tang Fei, Chen’s first Premier. Lin argued that given this 
sentiment, although the pan-Blue Camp legislators constituted a Legislative majority under 
Chen’s minority rule, they were rational in their voting behavior, by his standard, and gave 
consideration to the needs of their government official friends, without engaging in partisan 
obstructionism, in comparison with their DPP colleagues who were a Legislative minority 
throughout Ma’s Presidency, resorting instead to infamous brawls and scuffles to delay or 
block undesirable bills from reaching the floor (vote or agenda). He believed that this was the 
main reason for KMT and pan-Blue camp legislators being willing to pass bills in the face of 
Chen’s minority government. 
The above reasoning also applies to Legislative deliberations on the defense budget bill, 
together with KMT/pan-Blue camp politicians’ nostalgia-tinged memories, from the KMT 
party-state era, of having treated the ROC Armed Forces as the KMT’s own (Lin, 2018). 
“We’re reluctant to cut their [defense] budgets,” said Lin Yu-fang, who has stayed abreast of 
military issues. Therefore, he went on to explain, under DPP minority rule, defense budget 
bills would likely receive bipartisan support, except the controversial special arms 
procurement package of NT$610.8 billion from the US proposed by the Chen administration, 
as previously noted in Section 4.3.3, which suffered a barrage of sustained objections from 
the pan-Blue majority for several years.28 The objections primarily related to the pan-Blue 
camp’s move to preempt then-President Chen’s independence push (K.-l. Huang, 2018), or 
were due to perhaps the Mainland China-friendly KMT’s giving a serious consideration not 
                                                     
28 The special arms procurement proposal failed to pass through the Rules Committee to the floor in a total of 
69 attempts since it was proposed in 2004. It was finally passed in 2007 with a deep budget cut (roughly 
totaling NT$578.9 billion, including most of the budget funds for diesel-electric submarines) and the package 
being included in the annual defense budget rather than a special budget. After the KMT returned to power in 
2008, the Ma administration had each year requested for submarines instead, but to no avail (W.-c. Huang, 
2018; Lee, 2010; Mo, 2011; Shih, 2007). 
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to provoking Beijing’s hostility (W.-c. Huang, 2018).  
When the KMT was in power, by contrast, DPP legislators resorted to highly partisan 
deliberations on defense budget bills, paying “fastidious” attention to every single detail, 
according to Lin (2018). But Lin found a solution to this, albeit very personal. Lin revealed 
that under his co-convenership of the LY’s (Foreign and) National Defense Committee, he 
used his friendship with two other then-Committee co-conveners of DPP affiliation, Lee 
Wen-chung (李文忠) and Mark Chen Tan-sun (陳唐山), alongside a pan-Blue or KMT 
Legislative majority, to facilitate the passage of these bills.29, 30  
In addition to considering the influence of nostalgic KMT-rule politics on Taiwan’s 
defense budget deliberations, the interview with Lin offered a different strand of thought 
exploring how workable a proxy the annual defense spending is for military capacity given 
Taiwan’s extensive reliance on foreign arms exports. Because of its unique political status, 
the ROC government on Taiwan has depended largely on US support, politically and 
militarily, since it relocated to the island in 1949. Taiwan has procured cutting-edge military 
equipment and technology requirement through imports, and the US is a dominant source of 
Taiwan’s arms import.31 Since Taiwan’s US arms procurement projects usually span many 
fiscal years of the procedure, i.e., roughly from the US administration’s approval of the arms 
                                                     
29 The National Defense Committee was renamed Foreign and National Defense Committee after its merger 
with the Foreign and Overseas Compatriot Affairs Committee in early 2008, or starting from the 8th LY. 
30 As Lin clarified in the interview, empirically, the defense and foreign affairs budgets have passed with fewer 
cuts than those of other functions, say, transportation, economics, finance, social welfare, and environmental 
hygiene, which more likely involve legislators’ competing interests or local politicking due to enormous amount 
of money spent, and would thus motivate legislator, particularly from opposition parties, to exercise greater 
oversight. Although KMT legislators still made cuts to military-related funds for cost efficiency improvement 
under DPP rule, “that’s not a big deal, and government officials always proposed a larger budget than needed in 
preparation for budget cuts,” Lin said. 
31 On the other hand, the US arms sales to Taiwan have also been significant as Taiwan has consistently ranked 
among the top importers of US arms, ranking fourth in 2004-07, fifth in 2008-11, and fourth in 2013-17 (Cheng, 
2018; Kan, 2014). 
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sale to Taiwan, to payments made to the contractor, to the acquisition of arms, and to 
sustainment, the annual defense budget will increase in a given fiscal year when a payment(s) 
is due (Lin, 2018).  
As Lin illustrated this point with examples in a news article by United Daily News 
reporter Cheng Jia-wen (2016), we see many US arms deals with Taiwan materialized during 
Ma’s Presidency should have been traced back to the junior former President Bush’s 
authorization, and only by clarifying this complexity could one better understand why larger 
military spending budgets on US arms were allowed in the Ma administration than his 
predecessors, Lee and Chen. In comparison with G. W. Bush, according to the same source, 
the administration of former President Barack Obama approved fewer arms sales to Taiwan, 
so there would be no significant increase in Taiwan’s defense spending on US arms 
purchases during the first term of Tsai’s Presidency.  
Therefore, the implication here is that given Taiwan’s reliance on US arms supplies, 
measuring military capacity via the amount of annual defense budgets in expenditure seems 
less preferred, compared with defense budget cuts which are more reflective of a complicated 
variety of executive-legislative dynamics. And together with this implication, Lin’s 
elaboration of his understanding of how pan-Blue legislators’ nostalgia for the long history of 
KMT rule and well-established ties with government officials/technocrats allowed 
themselves to behave differently from their DPP colleagues in considering the defense 
appropriations bill affords a clue for explaining why my desired null hypothesis for military 
capacity was only partially supported by the findings. 
 
Political polarization 
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Over the course of its democratization and localization movement beginning at the turn 
of the 1990s, politics in Taiwan has become increasingly polarized over the closely 
interlinked issues of national identity and cross-Strait relations. To make a long story short, 
Taiwan faces an evolving dichotomy between an increasingly mono Taiwanese identity and a 
steady dual Chinese/Taiwanese identity, while a mono Chinese identity has fallen far behind 
the other two since the early 1990s. In Taiwan, voters with a dual Chinese/Taiwanese identity 
or a mono Chinese identity are generally in favor of the pro-reunification KMT, while the 
pro-independence DPP attracts a much larger portion of voters with a mono Taiwanese 
identity. The majority of people in Taiwan want to maintain the status quo.32 
While Ma and his KMT were seeking closer ties with Beijing during his eight-year 
Presidency, there was a growing trend of people in Taiwan embracing the pro-independence 
narrative advocated by the DPP.33 This change not only made the KMT’s pro-China 
reunification stance tainted but also pushed KMT legislators away from supporting to pass 
controversial bills proposed by the Ma administration (K.-l. Huang, 2018). Indeed, in the 
aftermath of 2014 Sunflower Movement, Taiwanese identity (vis-à-vis Chinese or dual 
identity) and support for Taiwan independence (vis-à-vis reunification or maintaining status 
quo) each reached a record high of 60.4% and 23.8%, respectively, in the island (Tseng & 
Chung, 2014), although this trend has been slightly reversed over the past two years (see also 
footnote 32 below). 
                                                     
32 For further details of changes in national identity and the reunification-independence stances of Taiwanese 
from the early 1990s to the present, see the website of the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University: 
https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/main.php 
33 In dealing with the growth of pro-independence sentiment in Taiwan, Ma pledged and went by a “three noes” 
policy during his time in office, i.e., “no unification, no independence, and no use of force” (不統、不獨、不
武). Given the top priority of “no unification” in the policy, it might imply a preference of most people in 
Taiwan to refuse reunification (K.-l. Huang, 2018). In 2018, Ma proposed an updated version, vowing that “no 
ruling out the possibility of unification with the Mainland, no support for independence, and no use of force” 
(Lee & Wang, 2018). 
  
158 
 
 
In addition, the increasingly polarized politics has also sharply accelerated 
confrontational partisanship in the LY in recent years. So far, however, it seems to me that the 
biggest victim of this trend is Ma’s KMT government. Unlike the KMT, the DPP 
demonstrated a stronger sense of partisanship and solidarity. Therefore, many of the priority 
bills, albeit highly controversial, that the Tsai administration identified already passed the 
DPP-majority LY during the first half of her current term of Presidency, including “ill-gotten 
party assets” legislation (不當黨產處理條例) targeting the KMT and its affiliated 
organizations since 1945, “transitional justice” legislation (促進轉型正義條例) targeting 
abuses from the KMT’s authoritarian era, and unpopular labor and pension reforms (一例一
休、年金改革). By contrast, the prior KMT majority in LY was criticized for not constantly 
voting according to party line during Ma’s Presidency, resulting in the failure of important 
legislation to pass (e.g., the bill governing political parties and their assets, a draft special 
statute for free economic pilot zones, and the shelved service trade pack with Beijing) or its 
watering-down (e.g., a capital gains tax bill on stock transactions of 2012; see also footnote 
14 of Chapter 3, p. 78).34, 35  
The rise of ideological conflict within the island, as K.-l. Huang (2018) indicates, might 
help bolster a suspicion that in Taiwan, a government’s majority status could hardly curb 
demonstrations. Taiwan’s vibrant civil society (reference) resulted in many protests coming 
primarily from various social groups and organizations over the years, regardless of who’s in 
                                                     
34 As another illustrative example, in 2014 the KMT-controlled LY refused to confirm 11 of 27 ombudsman 
nominees of President Ma for the Control Yuan because of KMT defections (Ta, Tseng, & Kao, 2014). 
However, this research did not incorporate analysis of how the LY exercised its consent power over the 
President’s nominees. 
35 I should note here that neither the shelved cross-Strait service trade pack nor its parent ECFA was classified 
into bills of law by the LY. Instead, they were conceived as “quasi-treaties” in nature. Therefore, they were not 
included in my statistical analysis of legislative productivity focusing on bills of law. But their significance in 
illustrating the partisan dynamics of the LY during Ma’s Presidency would be helpful. 
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power, he said (referred also to in Y.-j Hsu, 2018). K.-l. Huang explained that in Taiwan, 
social protests highlighted different aspects of inequality, including income, gender, age, 
well-being, welfare, between-occupation, religion, etc., among which labor protests were 
traditionally fierce and contributed a major share of social protests in Taiwan. For example, 
labor unions demand for higher minimum wages, say, almost every year. “However,” the 
UDN journalist reminded me, “we saw a type of massive political protest that blamed the 
KMT for being ‘pro-China and selling out Taiwan’ (親中賣台) emerge only when the KMT 
was in power.” According to the DPP’s official party chronicle 
(https://www.dpp.org.tw/about/history_3), the DPP staged nine massive political protests 
throughout Ma’s eight-year Presidency, seven of which were against Ma’s “China”-leaning 
policies. This was a serious, and perhaps unexpected, challenge that faced Ma’s majority 
government. 
In this subsection, a synthesis of the interview results with the seven informants provides 
answers to the institutional puzzles raised by my empirical research on changes in multi-
dimensional state capacity from “non-institutional” perspectives of idiosyncratic leadership 
and several aspects of political culture. Such a variety of interpretations reflects the nuanced 
complexity of the dynamics of executive-legislative interactions by separate dimensions of 
state capacity, which sometimes produced results contradictory to my initial expectations. 
This complexity might also be able to facilitate an access to further understanding the 
implications of the null, or near null, findings on the association between the M/m division 
and aggregate state capacity. That is, when people are unable or unwilling to take apart 
elements of governance for assessing the government’s capability to govern, they probably 
would perceive no change in the government’s overall capability to govern no matter who is 
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in power, and whether his or her party is in “total governance.” This implication might be 
further strengthened by the findings to be discussed next that people in Taiwan cared less 
about governance. 
 
4.5.3 Exploring sources of popular nonresponse to varying assessments of state capacity 
The null or slim relationship between the change in state capacity and people’s 
perception of, or appreciation for, governance implies that in Taiwan, perceived good 
governance may not necessarily guarantee that the ruling party remains ruling. The gap or 
inconsistency can be attributed to either asymmetry in information on the part of people—
say, they could not understand what the legislation or policy program was about—or on the 
part of the ruling elite whose policy-making process fails to reflect public preferences (e.g., 
the controversial amendment to the labor law in late 2016 that instituted a 40-hour work 
week [一例一休] and its recent 2018 revision raising a lot of complaints from both 
employers and employees owing to, first, the lack of flexibility and then the draconian 
amendment).36, 37  
Perhaps, this notion of information asymmetry can be illustrated by the fact, as told by 
Ma (2019), that survey respondents are inclined to answer questions in a manner susceptible 
to negative media effects, not personal experience of life. For example, he said, a media hype 
for a single local news story about, say, on crime, would negatively frame and shape 
                                                     
36 See Shih (2018) for more detail on Taiwan’s recent labor reform.  
37 Another example of explaining a slim relationship, if any, between state capacity and approval ratings by 
information asymmetry on the part of ruling elite may be found in K.-l. Huang (2018), who argued that in 
Taiwan, an emerging and now prevalent pro-independence sentiment unfortunately dominated over good 
governance which seemed to be something taken for granted. “Many Taiwanese believe that only independence 
will be vital to survive regardless of the efforts by Mainland China-friendly Ma and his KMT to create a great 
deal of cross-Strait dividends of peace and promoted Taiwan’s prosperity,” he said, but at the cost of having 
Taiwan’s being within the controversial one-China framework. 
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Taiwanese public opinion about the social order. The former President, also a Harvard S.J.D., 
touted his mayoral experience in successfully preventing response bias in surveys of 
satisfaction on social order administered by his Taipei City government. His newly-designed 
questionnaire assessed three different levels of social order: national, local, and 
community/neighborhood, where considerably higher satisfaction on social order was found 
in the last (because, for most respondents, there was nothing so very bad in their 
neighborhoods), even though the survey revealed lower satisfaction with the national level. 
This method of stratification was subsequently adopted by academics in Taiwan for 
conducting similar opinion polls, said Ma. Ma also added that he felt sympathy for Su Tseng-
chang, the incumbent Premier (as of the time of interview), over a setback in his bid to 
reduce crime during his first Premiership (2006-07) with a robbery of a farmers’ association 
committed by an off-duty police officer (for more on this story, see “Caught in,” 2006). That 
case and its ensuing media coverage was, unfortunately, obtrusive enough to mar Su’s well-
intended efforts, he stressed. 
Ma’s point of view is echoed by former legislator Lin (2018), who considered the 
inconsistency is due to people’s short memories, “Their memories of new, powerful, or 
impressive incidents would replace those of old, less powerful, or less impressive ones. It is 
quite commonplace among democracies.” He further explained that respondents would most 
likely associate a given subject’s job approval with their myopic and fragmented 
understanding of how government did its work recently (e.g., a favorable response given by 
those aware of recent tax concessions), rather than refer to the government’s “ability to do 
something” in an objective way. “The notion of ability differs from that of job approval after 
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all,” he added.38 
Either Ma’s argument or Lin’s is similar to those made by Achen & Bartels (2016) for 
myopic voting behavior in the Western context, as we saw in Chapter 2. On the other hand, 
one might also wonder if this inconsistency is a potential result of Taiwan’s polarized 
political context. Following John R. Zaller’s (1992) “polarization model” of public opinion, 
the higher politically informed survey respondents become, the more likely they are attuned 
to persuasive and cueing messages from highly divided and competing elites who they 
support and choose their position on an issue accordingly. That is, in this scenario, the 
inconsistency reflects the consequences of respondents’ choices made based on partisanship 
instead of personal cognition of the reality. 
In a similar sense to that of information asymmetry on the part of people, the 
inconsistency might also result from the public’s unrealistic expectations from 
democratically elected leaders: After the honeymoon period is over, their prestige inevitably 
falls. Give recent examples such as President Tsai’s pension reforms for fiscal sustainability 
targeting civil servants, public school teachers, and military personnel (most of whom, 
however, particularly in retirement, are perceived as traditional KMT supporters) and 
“transitional justice” efforts that address the past abuses of the authoritarian KMT state, they 
were supported by the general public in the first place, but soon criticized by stalwart DPP 
supporters for not being “tough” enough. When these two of the Tsai government’s top 
agenda later became driven by partisan politics and, at the same time, growing popular anger 
                                                     
38 But Lin still tried to believe that there must be “interplay forces” of state capacity and opinion polls to ensure 
that a more intuitive logic of the relationship was followed here. Perhaps, according to him, the use of the 
phrasing “approval rating” (施政滿意度), a “serious” phrasing, encouraged respondents to think and reply 
carefully and rationally, thus rating the given subject’s job performance strictly, more than other phrasings, say, 
“support rating” (選舉支持度), which affected respondents emotionally (e.g., one’s refusal to vote for a certain 
candidate because of the latter’s ideology or moral flaw). 
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over national economic stagnation could not be soothed, Tsai’s approval and her Premiers’ 
ended up sliding down (Y.-j. Hsu, 2018). 
 
4.5.4 What is next for ROC semi-presidentialism? 
In the past two decades, there were several occasions that arose for a French-style 
cohabitation in Taiwan, but all to no avail, revealing the near impossibility of that. In May 
2000, Tang Fei, a KMT member and former Defense Minister under President Lee, took 
office as President Chen’s first Premier. Since Tang’s appointment was not endorsed by the 
KMT, he was only allowed by his party to form a Cabinet in his individual capacity while 
agreeing to withdraw from all KMT activities on becoming the Premier. On the other hand, 
the KMT-led pan-Blue majority consistently blocked Tang’s policies in the LY. In the 2004 
legislative elections, the pan-Blue camp won a three-seat majority and requested that 
President Chen appoint then-KMT Vice Chairman Chiang Pin-kung (江丙坤), a former Vice 
Legislative Speaker, as new Premier. The talks fell apart as Chen only offered the Vice 
Premiership to Chiang. Soon after Ma defeated then-Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng in 
the KMT leadership race in mid-2005, Chen allegedly offered Wang privately an opportunity 
to form a Cabinet, replacing Su’s, through party-to-party negotiations in hopes of relying on 
his Legislative leadership influence to reduce confrontations in the pan-Blue controlled LY. 
Although the Speaker replied to this proposal positively, he was mindful of the necessity of 
consulting with KMT Chairman Ma before any decision was made. Due to a lingering 
distrust between the leadership of two parties, or perhaps between Ma and Wang themselves, 
the conditions were not yet ripe for a follow-up thereof. So right after Ma said in public that 
he was barely enthusiastic about Chen’s political gesture, Chen and Wang both denied the 
  
164 
 
 
“allegations” of such an offer. “That was the closest chance for making a ‘cohabitation’ 
happen in Taiwan so far,” said Liberty Times journalist Huang Wei-chu (W.-c. Huang, 2018).  
In more recent years, either Tsai’s pledge to form a great coalition government (大聯合
政府) in a televised Presidential debate, just a week ahead of the election in mid-January 
2012, or Ma’s proposal to allow the DPP with a newly seated Legislative majority to form a 
new Cabinet after the KMT’s defeat in 2016 elections was not the way it looked.39 “They 
were both shams because Tsai Ing-wen knew her odds in the 2012 race were bad and Ma 
Ying-jeou was simply doing Tsai a rhetorical favor when he was ready to step down,” Huang 
Wei-chu said, “Every politician has a personal calculation of what s/he will gain” (W.-c. 
Huang, 2018). “Words spoken out loud are usually not true. A deal always comes under 
table,” the Liberty Times journalist noted.40 
Literally, the French-style cohabitation has never occurred in Taiwan. This is mostly 
because the pan-Blue majority Legislature never dared to put forth any no-confidence motion 
against Chen’s minority DPP government and take the risk of entering snap elections for 
eight years owing to the electoral uncertainty and high campaign costs (H.-l. Hsu, 2018; Ma, 
2019).41 According to former DPP Chairman Hsu Hsin-liang’s account of the consequences 
of Taiwan’s lack of parliament-centered politics, because the LY in Taiwan has never 
appeared to be a political forefront, compared with the powerful Presidency, it can never 
parallel with the political power-wresting tradition of its French counterpart, and nor dare the 
KMT and its pan-Blue allies initiate a vote of no-confidence when holding a Legislative 
                                                     
39 See also note e of Table 1.1 in Chapter 1 for a brief description of the latter situation: Then-DPP Chairman 
and President-elect Tsai turned down outgoing Ma’s call for cohabitation during the caretaker period in 2016. 
40 When asked about his proposition that allowed the DPP to form a new Cabinet before Tsai’s inauguration, 
former President Ma asserted that it had been made in sincerity and honesty (Ma, 2019). 
41 In accordance with the ROC Constitution, as amended in 1996, the President may dissolve the LY on the 
Premier’s request if a no-confidence vote against the Premier passes and the Premier refuses to resign.          
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majority during Chen’s rule. In other words, as he put it, “no ‘real’ parliamentary majority 
has ever existed in Taiwan, and it alters the way the ROC semi-presidentialism has operated.”  
Another possible, and related, reason for the absence of cohabitation in Taiwan might be 
that whether the President should appoint a Premier from the opposition party with a 
Legislative majority is a controversial issue that works its way into partisan politics (Paolino, 
2008). Therefore, as long as a political party in Taiwan wins the Presidency, it will take over 
the executive power in practice, regardless of how many LY seats it wins. 
After Taiwan’s 2016 election of Tsai as a new President and a DPP-majority legislature, 
the LY did not become power-centered and the presidency-centered politics remained the 
prevailing norm (H.-l. Hsu, 2018). In such political circumstances, it was not desirable at all 
for Tsai to allow her party to “cohabit” with the utterly defeated KMT and share 
responsibility for the outgoing Ma administration during the caretaker period. Because Tsai 
had yet to be sworn in as new President, one might ask, at that time, who should have taken 
responsibility for any unexpected problems until Ma stepped down if a cohabitation Cabinet 
was formed? Tsai and her DPP had only wanted, and prepared, to form a Cabinet under Tsai’s 
own leadership as new President in less than four months, not Ma (H.-l. Hsu, 2018; K.-l. 
Huang, 2018). 
Since 2008, when Taiwan began to hold its Presidential and legislative elections 
concurrently or within close enough ranges,42 the President’s party has also been the 
majority in the LY and any minority government format will therefore be least likely to 
occur, barring a persistent increase in popular taste for independent, or less partisan, 
                                                     
42 Except 2008 with a two-month interval between the Presidential and legislative elections, the elections were 
held concurrently in 2012 and 2016 and scheduled so for 2020 (Wang & Lin, 2019).  
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politicians that undermines the country’s primary dynamics of two-party/coalition 
competition.43 In this regard, the French experience is similar to that of Taiwan. A French 
constitutional amendment, approved by referendum in 2000, shortened the French 
presidential term from seven to five years, staring with the election in 2002. The amendment 
allows the French president and members of the National Assembly, the lower, more 
powerful house of the French parliament, to serve a nearly concurrent term of five years, 
given legislative elections scheduled about one month after the election of the president. 
Since then, the French president’s party/coalition has won a majority in the National 
Assembly, hence no more need for cohabitation (Hao, 2014; Le, 2005).  
Perhaps it is still too early to decide as to whether a cohabitation government still has its 
chance in the Taiwanese context in the future, making the ROC SP system function as 
designed or work effectively as initially expected. But when asked if a constitutional reform 
is a segue way to better governance, say, by reinstating the LY’s confirmation power over 
Presidential nominees for the Premier, those of my interviewees who answered the question 
in a dichotomous manner held a negative attitude toward it. For example, former Legislator 
Lin Yu-fang argued that due to the inherent selfishness of humanity, i.e., the pursuit of being 
powerful, it would not be easy to pass a further constitutional amendment to change Taiwan’s 
current SP system which favors whoever was in power (Lin, 2018). He explained that since 
the LY’s confirmation power over Presidential nominees for the Premier was removed, the 
                                                     
43 Ko Wen-je (柯文哲), a blunt, surgeon-turned-independent politician and now potential Presidential contender 
in 2020, was re-elected to a second term as Mayor of Taipei City, a staunch KMT electoral stronghold, in the 
2018 local elections by defeating both his KMT and DPP opponents. Ko was first elected mayor of Taipei in 
2014 and became Taipei’s first independent mayor since the reintroduction of directly elected mayors of Taipei 
and Kaohsiung Cities in 1994. Ko’s rise to political prominence signals a public desire to turn around Blue-
Green polarization in Taiwan’s politics.  
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Premier had been likened to an underdog, particularly compared with the all-powerful 
President in “total governance.” As such, he said, any sitting President who was not a 
figurehead in either a majority or minority status would make no concessions to allow a 
constitutional reform.44 However, Lin added with reservation, such an underdog label might 
not hold true for a Premier who counted on substantial support from within the party and thus 
could not be replaced easily, like William Lai (Ching-de), who was strongly affiliated with 
the DPP’s powerful New Tide faction (新潮流).45 
In other words, one would find that either of major political parties in Taiwan would 
criticize its SP system for creating a powerful but unaccountable Presidency whenever the 
party is not in power. When the party wins or expects to win the Presidency, it would change 
its attitude about the problem because political power is always appealing. Therefore, as long 
as this “dynamic equilibrium” between the ruling party that benefits from the institutional 
status quo and the opposition parties that call for a change continues to exist, no further 
Constitutional reform will be likely on Taiwan’s agenda. Yet, the equilibrium is not so steady 
that it cannot be disturbed. As W.-c. Huang (2018) suggests, constitutional reforms may 
happen only if either a quid pro quo between Taiwan’s two major political coalitions occurs, 
as it did in 1997 when the KMT joined the DPP to downsize, or “freeze,” the Taiwan 
provincial government in return for the latter’s support for removal of the LY’s confirmation 
power over Premier appointees. Another condition would be when public pressure 
encourages the stakeholders to amend the Constitution, such as halving LY seats from 225 to 
                                                     
44 It is intriguing to know that under the Fifth Republic, the French president appoints the prime minister 
without parliamentary confirmation (Chen, 1999). 
45 William Lai, who was emerging as Tsai’s potential rival in the 2020 Presidential race, resigned in early 2019 
to shoulder responsibility for the DPP’s crushing defeat in the 2018 November midterm elections, although Tsai 
wanted him to stay on. 
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113 in 2004 and dissolving the nation’s largely ceremonial National Assembly in 2005. 
However, for the time being, neither scenario is likely, said Huang Wei-chu. 
On the other hand, by adhering to his perspective that rests on the importance of the role 
of the parliament, H.-l. Hsu (2018) argues that the ROC SP, in its current form, is not an 
issue, but the lack of parliament-centered politics is. To improve the SP operation in Taiwan, 
he suggested that not only the LY but its membership, legislators, be pushed to the nation’s 
political forefront. He argued that in order for the parliament-centered politics to occur, the 
President should appoint prominent political figures, particularly those harking from the 
parliament (國會權力人物) to form a Cabinet, instead of experts or civil officials. “Politics 
should have belonged to politicians, who are sufficiently sophisticated to understand how 
politics works and cater to the mainstream vox populi,” he said. Hsu Hsin-liang exemplified 
such an ideal type of politician with William Lai, who was a four-term DPP legislator and the 
highly popular mayor of Tainan before becoming the Premier in 2017.46 “The President has 
got to treat politicians of the type in office, say, as Premier, with respect,” he noted. The 
former DPP chairman concluded by stressing the importance of establishing a Westminster-
inspired political system where the “true politicians” were powers that be, and aiming to 
achieve a more efficient, professional, and apolitical merit-based civil service, comparable to 
those in Great Britain, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Japan, where politicians offered ideas, set 
policy goals, and made important policy decisions while civil officials used their expertise in 
drafting bills in accordance with policy goals.  
Unlike Hsu Hsin-liang, former President Ma believed that a further constitutional reform 
                                                     
46 In the 2014 local elections, Lai won his second term as Tainan City Mayor with a record-high share of the 
vote, i.e., 72.9%, or 71,1557 votes, in a mayoral election of the special municipality since Taiwan lifted the 
martial law in 1987 (Yeh, 2017).  
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was necessary and warranted for better governance (Ma, 2019). “In my capacity as a former 
ROC President and having engaged in the Constitutional reform of 1994,” as Ma stressed, “I 
propose amending the current ROC semi-presidential system in the direction of adopting 
Taiwan’s existing local political system that has developed on our soil and served the country 
well since 1950, instead of trying to find a solution inspired by or from within the British, 
American, or French model of political system, or government type.”47, 48 In Taiwan’s local 
political system, city and county chiefs are popularly elected and responsible to local 
councils. While they can give directives to subordinates, they are required to regularly attend 
city/county council interpellations. 
By doing so, Ma (2019) suggests a merger of the Presidential Palace and Executive Yuan, 
making the President responsible to the LY. The merger will bring personnel numbers at the 
two organs down to a combined total of 600 from 1,200, said Ma, “It will also be a much 
more efficient and economical way to govern.” 
In Taiwan, the constitutional amendment bill requires a very high threshold for passage, 
as stipulated in the 7th Constitutional Amendment promulgated in 2005, and there have been 
no more constitutional amendments ever since.49 Given a low likelihood of passing a 
                                                     
47 The 1994 Constitutional Amendments replaced a system of indirect election of the ROC Presidency with the 
current system of direct, popular election.  
48 Ma also said that he opposed the passage of the Constitutional Amendment in 1997 that removed the 
Legislative power of consent to confirm the ROC President’s nomination of the Premier. In response to 
immediate past Premier Lai’s blunt call for allowing legislators to serve as Cabinet ministers, or at least 
concurrently, by further amending the Constitution (“Su Tseng-chang,” 2019), Ma opined that (Westminster) 
parliamentarianism was not applicable to Taiwan because very few legislators were qualified for Cabinet 
positions. 
49 In accordance with the ROC Constitution, as amended in 2004, an amendment bill to the Constitution must 
be endorsed by no less than one-fourth of the membership of the Legislative Yuan before it can be referred to a 
legislative ad hoc committee for review. The Constitutional amendment bill reported out of the committee shall 
subsequently be voted on, by the Legislative Yuan plenary session, requiring a quorum of no less than three-
fourths of the entire membership of the Legislative Yuan. Passage of the amendment bill requires no less than 
three-fourths of those members present. Six months after the bill is promulgated by the Central Election 
Commission, it will only officially become effective if it receives a majority of the vote of all eligible voters in a 
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constitutional bill, Constitutional reforms have become nothing but issues that emerge on the 
political agenda and only when there is a Presidential election looming. More often than not, 
they just appear as a smokescreen for real problems, while acknowledged being unrealistic. 
So, the point should be how lofty aspirations of the Constitution can be realized in face of 
stark realpolitik, say, by setting a precedent for a cohabitation government or dismantling the 
entrenchment of presidential supremacy. This is indeed a challenge that politicians in Taiwan 
need to meet. 
 
4.6 Chapter conclusions 
The empirical results of in this chapter were primarily based on chi-squares tests for 
aggregate state capacity, a power-law analysis for administrative/bureaucratic capacity, 15 
main hypothesis tests and their respective measurements (excluding 1121_output, 110c, 111c, 
ofout1, and dur) for legislation (including budget enactments)-related legal, extractive/fiscal, 
and military/coercive capacities, along with three linear regression models for job approval 
ratings of the President, the Premier, and the Cabinet. They suggested the following: 
1. The M/m division, or the institutional factor, may not be significantly associated with 
aggregate state capacity, thereby not supporting the primary hypothesis derived from the 
conventional wisdom of the positive relationship between president-parliamentary 
congruence and governance;  
2. the M/m division would lead to some differences in certain, but not all, dimensions of 
state capacity, whereas the KMT/DPP rule division, or the party factor, would not 
necessarily affect state capacity, or had only a very limited effect: 
                                                     
Constitutional referendum. Before it was dissolved in 2005, the National Assembly had full power to amend the 
Constitution. 
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(1) Contrary to my prior expectations, similar high frequencies of Cabinet official 
changes reflective of administrative/bureaucratic capacity were found in both M and 
m (even after the party factor was accounted for), although the latter more evidently 
followed self-organized criticality behavior; 
(2) both the M/m and KMT/DPP rule divisions affected legal capacity which appeared to 
be more reactive to the institutional factor among others, but in a reverse direction to 
the expected; 
(3) the M/m division made a difference as I expected in extractive/fiscal capacity, but 
only when this dimension of capacity was measured with changes made by the LY to 
annual general budgets, either in revenue or expenditure; 
(4) military capacity was found to be positively related to majority status only when 
measured with the defense budget in expenditures per capita; albeit unexpected, it 
gives a plausible claim of bipartisanship in sustaining Taiwan’s self-defense 
capabilities against the Chinese Mainland’s military threat; and 
(5) coercive capacity only became responsive to the M/m division when proxied instead 
by its performance—changes in violent crime rates, which is probably compatible 
with my prior expectations; and   
3. people did not seem to perceive nor appreciate the differences in regime type and 
variations in state capacity were barely reflected, if at all, in domestic approval ratings of 
the ROC President and the Premier, respectively, and not at all for the Cabinet.  
Next, analysis of the semi-structured interviews with the seven informants results in two 
major perspectives, namely of leadership and political culture. The former underlies a causal 
mechanism whereby Ma Ying-jeou’s leadership contributed to effective crime fighting not 
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only throughout his Presidency but also onward to Tsai Ing-wen’s and the Legislative 
leadership leveraged on legislation and budgetary decisions by expedient measures such as 
infamous “party-to-party consultations.” Ma’s claim, albeit idiosyncratic, moves in the same 
direction chartered by Richard E. Neustadt’ presidential power (1991). According to 
Neustadt, a president’s power is the power to persuade, and the power to persuade is the 
power to bargain. A president’s status and authority give him great advantages in dealing 
with and convincing the men who share in governing the country, although outcomes are not 
guaranteed by his advantages. The Neustadtian paradigm, however, could also nicely fit 
problems with Ma’s vulnerable leadership in the governing effectiveness of a congruent 
government to Wang’s “uncooperative” Speakership in the KMT-controlled LY, in contrast 
with either Tsai’s mastering leadership dynamics in “total governance” of the DPP or Lee 
Teng-hui’s strong leadership. Indeed, Ma’s complaint of the ineffectiveness of the dual 
leadership setup in Taiwan is derived from a competing and cumbersome command structure, 
in which he found his vantage points less comfortable as he must rule through his Premier, 
albeit whose replacement depends on the President’s needs. 
The latter, or the political culture perspective, considers Taiwan’s presidency-centered, 
nostalgia-based, and polarized ideological politics that not only helps to explain the inverse 
M/m-legislative productivity relationship but also sheds light on, respectively, the vulnerable 
Cabinet, the complexities of proxying military capacity by the defense appropriations bill 
given lengthy arms procurement procedures, and vibrant public participation in protests and 
demonstrations. In a nutshell, we need to approach those institutional puzzles from a “non-
institutional” angle, too. The interview results also suggest that the gap or inconsistency 
between any change in state capacity and people’s perception of, or appreciation for, 
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congruence in governance may result most from information asymmetry between people and 
the ruling elite. 
It seems, for the time being, Taiwan’s experience has cast doubt on, if not falsified, the 
conventional wisdom that president-parliamentary congruence is better at governing than 
incongruence. And in long run, the ROC SP system seems unfavorable to Taiwan’s 
democratic development and quality of governance because of its tilt toward a powerful (but 
not necessarily all-powerful) and unaccountable Presidency, a trend that appears to be least 
reversible. It would be nothing more than wishful thinking to make further Constitutional 
reforms in Taiwan. 
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Chapter 5. Conclusions 
The ROC government was transformed into a semi-presidential (SP) system after the 
1997 ROC Constitutional Amendments. This constitutional framework has been subject to 
criticisms for creating a powerful but unaccountable presidency in president-parliamentary 
congruence (SP majority regime/“total governance”, or M), a political stalemate between the 
executive and legislative branches in president-parliamentary incongruence (SP minority 
regime, or m, tantamount to minority governance in the Taiwanese context due to a lack of 
French-style cohabitation and coalition government), and an incapable government 
regardless which political party is in power. My research examines the validity of these 
criticisms by empirically studying the Presidential (executive)-legislative relationship of 
variations in ROC’s semi-presidentialism, i.e., the M/m (government) division, and its impact 
on the nation’s governance, specifically through the lens of multi-dimensional state capacity, 
from mid-1997 to early 2018. By doing so, I attempted to test the Western conventional 
wisdom that governance in president-parliamentary congruence is considered more effective 
than that in president-parliamentary incongruence by using twenty-odd years of practical 
experience in Taiwan, a prominent nascent democracy in the third wave of democratization 
but largely ignored in literature, as well as answer the fundamental question: Is semi-
presidentialism good for Taiwan? 
The empirical findings in this work showed more complicated implications for its 
theoretical significance: Whether “total governance” outperforms minority governance 
depends on what level of state capacity is in focus and what dimension of state capacity is 
measured. That is, the M/m division in Taiwan may not make any difference in aggregate 
state capacity. This helps to explain the prevailing sentiment in Taiwan that whoever is in 
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power does not matter. When analyzed by the four salient, alternative dimensions of state 
capacity that unpack and more precisely define the notion of governance, namely, 
extractive/fiscal, (domestic) coercive/(external) military, administrative/bureaucratic, and 
legal, I found that the M/m division made difference, but not that much, nor the direction, as I 
initially expected: The majority status could not ensure an endurable Cabinet composition, 
and greater legislative productivity was even found in the minority governance. The ruling 
party factor would not necessarily affect state capacity, or had effects limited to only legal 
capacity and performance of coercive capacity. 
Therefore, the practical significance of this study was to explore why the realpolitik 
within Taiwan failed, to a certain degree, to make its SP system of dual legitimacy work as 
designed or as the textbooks would suggest. A mixed-method triangulation approach was 
employed to further the understanding of the causal mechanisms. The seven key-informants 
recruited for semi-structured interviews in this study answered the institutional puzzles from 
“non-institutional” perspectives of idiosyncratic leadership and political culture, revealing the 
complexity of contextual and political dynamics in Taiwan where the parties and the leaders 
have taken a wide variety of actions (some of them genuinely temporary, but some having the 
scripted character that connotes “institutionalization”) to accomplish their goals. In other 
words, although the core of politics is occupied by power and the institution and the 
institution is theoretically supposed to ensure good governance, or at least prevent abuse of 
power, that complexity indeed reflects how Taiwanese politicians treat institutions while 
exercising power in the practice of governance.  
What is more, good governance in Taiwan may not necessarily guarantee that the ruling 
party remains ruling, as implied by the null or slim relationship between the change in state 
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capacity and people’s perception, or at least appreciation, of governance. In this sense, 
people are unable or unwilling to seriously and deeply consider issues of governance, and 
thus for those politicians seeking re-election, the issues might not be their top priority. I am 
afraid that they are not signs for a healthy democracy. The implication of this finding is 
consistent with and complement the existing literature on Western democracies (Achen & 
Bartels, 2016), as previously discussed in Chapter 2.  
Another theoretical significance of this study lies in reaffirmation and extension of my 
original findings of 2007, albeit not published, that given Taiwan’s SP system, the frequency 
of Cabinet official changes, or intervals of any change in Cabinet composition, exhibit a 
power-law distribution (Ho, 2007). This contributes to the diversity in applying the power 
law to a world that is “out of balance” and enriches the governance literature. Compared with 
the original findings derived from the first decade following Taiwan’s installation of semi-
presidentialism, this study collected data spanning over more than two decades with 
sufficient observations both in M and m, albeit without a cohabitation yet. 
This dissertation is subject to certain limitations. Firstly, some issues of governance in 
Taiwan may be driven by the Chinese Mainland factor or Sino-US relations. For example, 
Taiwan’s economy benefited from concessions made by the Mainland in trade deals (讓利) 
when Ma Ying-jeou promoted controllable and stable cross-Strait relations during his 
Presidency; Taiwan’s exports suffered a substantial decline over the recent US-Mainland 
China trade war, given Taiwan’s heavy reliance on the Mainland market for trade balance. 
All of these seem likely to affect Taiwan’s fiscal resources but were not accounted for in this 
study. Although exogenous conditions are presumed to be controlled in a within-case 
comparison design, this dissertation still gave certain, but quite limited, considerations on 
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their influence on governance, say, the “China factor” when hypothesizing a bipartisan 
defense policy in Taiwan, though later (partially) rejected, and the 2008 global financial 
tsunami when analyzing tax collection in Taiwan. Secondly, neither cohabitation nor 
coalition government has occurred in Taiwan. So, it seems that only the “collision” mode, or 
plus Ma’s short-lived caretaker Cabinet, of minority/divided government are observed for m 
in Taiwan, along with the limited samples obtained from the only DPP M, the incumbent Tsai 
administration. Thus, research that further considers exogenous conditions, such as the state 
of the domestic and external economy and barometers that reflect the cross-Strait or 
international political climate, or collects bigger or cross-national data with more variations 
in the SP typology are warranted to provide a more comprehensive picture of how SP 
engineering works on governance and understand whether it is a good alternative for nascent 
democracies. By contrast, when considering endogenously former Speaker Wang Jin-pyng’s 
role as a major player in influencing the governing effectiveness of a KMT-led congruent 
government, it would be benefited to have the LY Speaker as part of the model in my future 
study. 
Thirdly, or last but not least, the selection of the unit of analysis might also be considered 
to matter to the outcome. KMT Chairman Wu (2019) suggested narrowing the unit of 
analysis from the two (M/m)-by-two (KMT/DPP rule) division to separate Premierships, 
Presidencies, or terms of the Presidency regardless of the ruling party (and, perhaps, the M/m 
status), as he believed by doing so, the results of people’s perception of the difference in state 
capacity would be different.1 He shared with me some surveys conducted by the Lausanne-
                                                     
1 Wu defended his idea of working with a narrower unit of analysis by paying a left-handed compliment to 
Chen Shui-bian, who was now on medical parole from prison where he had been serving a 20-year sentence for 
corruption committed during his second term as President, saying that Chen would be a good President if he had 
only served the first term. 
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based International Institute for Management Development on his performance as Premier, 
superior in comparison to outgoing Premier William Lai’s (as of interview date), such as the 
country’s competitiveness, economic and public infrastructure growth, and government 
effectiveness. Likewise, he also used the Ma administration’s performance as the yardstick 
for judging and criticizing that of its immediate predecessor (Chen Shui-bian) and successor 
(Tsai Ing-wen) in increasing the numbers of foreign tourist arrivals in Taiwan and 
countries/territories granting visa-free or landing visa privileges to ROC passport holders, as 
well as in retaining the nation’s dwindling number of diplomatic allies. However, none of 
those measures were employed in this study, which demands focused attention, albeit not 
exclusively, on the notion of state capacity per se instead of relying on performance.2 
As of this writing, Taiwan’s embattled and unpopular President Tsai Ing-wen is facing 
daunting challenges in her bid from re-election next year from not only her KMT rival 
hopefuls, Han Kuo-yu (韓國瑜), a former KMT outcast and now the populist mayor of 
Kaohsiung, and Terry Gou (郭台銘), Foxconn’s billionaire founder and a friend of Donald 
Trump, and but within her DPP where former Premier William Lai has unexpectedly 
announced his own run for the DPP nomination.3 Since the first direct Presidential election 
in 1996, there has been no ROC President who lost either re-election or his party’s 
nomination for re-election. The consequence of the DPP’s first ever “total governance” will 
                                                     
2 Likewise, H.-l. Hsu (2018) also suggested that more indicators of state capacity be considered for a better 
understanding the relationship between published polls and governance, say, a range of indices reflecting 
people’s happiness, Taiwan’s economic development, and the wealth gap. For example, Taiwan ranked the 
happiest country in East Asia and 25th among 156 countries in the world according to the United Nations’ latest, 
as of this writing, annual World Happiness Report, released in March 2019, which assessed factors in different 
countries including average life span, social support and corruption (Everington, 2019). Again, none of them 
seems satisfactory, either with my four-dimension-centric selection of proxies or when considering the notion of 
capacity itself. 
3 Lai’s Premiership lasted less than 17 months. He was replaced by Su Tseng-chang in early 2019. See details 
in Chapter 4, footnote 4. 
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definitely be significant, theoretically or practically, to allow us to ponder the questions this 
dissertation addresses.    
Perhaps, as former President Ma suggested, and tried to conclude from my findings, in 
our interview, Taiwan’s SP constitution needs to change for better governance. But there is 
no immediate prospect of constitutional reform due to its very high threshold and a lack of 
consensus among the ruling and opposition parties on solutions to tackling the reform. So, 
once again, the point should be how lofty aspirations of the ROC Constitution can be 
realized. It needs a set of politicians, if not statesmen, of integrity, courage, and wisdom. 
A few decades ago, Communist China vowed to follow the example of Singapore to 
“reform and open-up” the country. In fact, it was Taiwan, not Singapore, since Taiwan was 
not allowed to be recognized as an exemplar by the other side of the Strait at the time of 
mutual hostilities (Chao & Ho, 2009). Today, Taiwan is still believed to be the sole trigger for 
democratization in Mainland China—but the prerequisite is that Taiwan must make 
democracy work in better ways. 
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Appendix A 
Data sheets (Framework 1/2)  
 
Framework 1 (with LY Sessions, Regular and Extraordinary, as Unit of Analysis) 
Year Party M/m LY Session Period ofout1 11c 12c 13c 141c 142c 18c 19ca 143c 15cb 16c 144c 17c 1121 _output 
1122 
_output 
1997 KMT M 3rd-3-ES 1 1997/7/28 ~ 1997/8/11 0 0.00 NA           0 0 
1997 KMT M 3rd-4 1997/9/9 ~ 1998/1/9 15 6.07 NA        2.54  0.19 1 1 
1998 KMT M 3rd-5 1998/2/20 ~ 1998/5/29 11 4.71 NA 106.41 1.42 1.42   0.42 3.27  2.22  0 0 
1998 KMT M 3rd-6 1998/9/11 ~ 1999/1/15 2 6.07 NA    5.00 5.00   2.56  0.39 0 0 
1999 KMT M 4th-1 1999/2/6 ~ 1999/6/22 9 27.41 NA 97.29 -2.22 0.93   0.49 3.14  0.28  0 0 
1999 KMT M 4th-2 1999/9/17 ~ 2000/1/16 4 14.21 NA           0 0 
2000 KMT M 4th-3 2000/2/18 ~ 2000/5/19 2 5.54 NA        2.50  0.29 1 1 
2000 DPP m 4th-3 2000/5/20 ~ 2000/7/28 2 4.28 NA           0 0 
2000 DPP m 4th-4 2000/9/15 ~ 2001/1/4 6 5.80 NA  5.11 2.03  0.00 1.91 3.13 2.50 0.49 0.29 0 0 
2001 DPP m 4th-4-ES 1 2001/1/30 ~ 2001/1/31 0 0.00 NA           0 0 
2001 DPP m 4th-5 2001/2/20 ~ 2001/6/6 5 2.42 NA    0.00 23.03  3.17    0 0 
2001 DPP m 4th-5-ES 1 2001/6/26 ~ 2001/6/27 0 0.35 NA        2.49  0.18 0 0 
2001 DPP m 4th-6 2001/9/20 ~ 2002/1/18 26 9.12 NA 92.98 5.85 5.04   1.36   1.02  0 0 
2002 DPP m 5th-1 2002/2/19 ~ 2002/6/21 3 18.24 39.37           0 0 
2002 DPP m 5th-1-ES 1 2002/7/15 ~ 2002/7/17 0 0.00 0.00           0 0 
2002 DPP m 5th-2 2002/9/24 ~ 2003/1/14 4 8.37 26.30 93.35 0.88 1.41 0.00 0.04 1.67 2.86 2.98 2.45 0.23 0.13 0 0 
2003 DPP m 5th-3 2003/2/25 ~ 2003/6/6 2 4.96 15.76    -43.37 -11.13      0 0 
2003 DPP m 5th-3-ES 1 2003/7/8 ~ 2003/7/10 2 0.27 1.36        2.43  0.03 0 0 
2003 DPP m 5th-4 2003/9/5 ~ 2004/1/13 1 3.28 13.05 89.11 0.67 1.22 0.00 0.00 0.37 2.78  0.08  0 0 
2004 DPP m 5th-5 2004/2/6 ~ 2004/6/11 25 3.17 12.10        2.46  -0.07 0 0 
2004 DPP m 5th-5-ES 1 2004/8/11 ~ 2004/8/24 0 0.30 0.61    0.00 0.00      0 0 
 193 
2004 DPP m 5th-6 2004/9/14 ~ 2005/1/24 9 2.11 8.96 101.50 4.93 1.67   0.82 2.72  1.69  0 0 
2005 DPP m 6th-1 2005/2/25 ~ 2005/5/31 6 7.23 27.27        2.43  -0.02 0 0 
2005 DPP m 6th-2 2005/9/13 ~ 2006/1/13 23 5.98 21.82 113.23 1.37 1.74   4.98 2.40  0.47  0 0 
2006 DPP m 6th-3 2006/2/21 ~ 2006/5/30 2 5.50 28.92           0 0 
2006 DPP m 6th-3-ES 1 2006/6/13 ~ 2006/6/30 3 0.17 0.00        2.40  0.02 0 0 
2006 DPP m 6th-4 2006/9/19 ~ 2007/1/19 5 2.58 9.25 109.60          1 1 
2007 DPP m 6th-5 2007/2/27 ~ 2007/6/15 17 6.03 23.47  1.52 2.13   5.74 2.66  0.38  1 1 
2007 DPP m 6th-5-ES 1 2007/7/10 ~ 2007/7/20 0 0.31 1.33        2.59  -0.04 0 0 
2007 DPP m 6th-6 2007/9/7 ~ 2007/12/21 0 4.34 16.20 108.67 0.45 0.80   2.31 3.13  0.05  1 1 
2008 DPP m 7th-1 2008/2/22 ~ 2008/5/19 9 6.94 10.17        2.70  0.00 0 0 
2008 KMT M 7th-1 2008/5/20 ~ 2008/7/18 0 3.44 6.45    0.00 0.00  3.07 2.68   2 2 
2008 KMT M 7th-2 2008/9/19 ~ 2009/1/13 3 6.43 20.11  1.88 1.11   2.15 3.00  0.00  1 0 
2009 KMT M 7th-2-ES 1 2009/1/15 ~ 2009/1/16 0 0.10 0.00           0 0 
2009 KMT M 7th-3 2009/2/20 ~ 2009/6/16 1 7.86 29.81        2.63  -0.04 5 1 
2009 KMT M 7th-3-ES 1 2009/8/25 ~ 2009/8/27 1 0.07 0.53%           0 0 
2009 KMT M 7th-4 2009/9/18 ~ 2010/1/12 17 4.84 20.39 82.99 0.26 1.15   0.89 2.63  0.69  7 3 
2010 KMT M 7th-4-ES 1 2010/1/18 ~ 2010/1/19 0 0.06 0.49           0 0 
2010 KMT M 7th-5 2010/2/23 ~ 2010/6/8 7 3.29 10.67           0 0 
2010 KMT M 7th-5-ES 1 2010/7/8 ~ 2010/7/14 0 0.25 0.87        2.55  -0.05 0 0 
2010 KMT M 7th-5-ES 2 2010/8/17 ~ 2010/8/30 0 0.66 3.93           0 0 
2010 KMT M 7th-6 2010/9/24 ~ 2011/1/12 2 3.07 11.15 96.10 0.21 1.11   0.86 2.60  0.60  1 0 
2011 KMT M 7th-7 2011/2/22 ~ 2011/6/14 6 3.21 15.12    0.02 0.02   2.54  -0.08 3 0 
2011 KMT M 7th-8 2011/9/16 ~ 2011/12/14 3 3.06 15.33 102.94 0.00 0.02   0.08 2.64  0.58  4 2 
2012 KMT M 7th-8-ES 1 2012/1/19 ~ 2012/1/20 15 0.84 6.90           0 0 
2012 KMT M 8th-1 2012/2/24 ~ 2012/6/15 7 1.08 2.21        2.61  -0.07 0 0 
2012 KMT M 8th-1-ES 1 2012/7/24 ~ 2012/7/27 2 0.90 1.69           0 0 
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Framework 1 (cont.) 
Year Party M/m LY Session Period ofout1 11c 12c 13c 141c 142c 18c 19ca 143c 15cb 16c 144c 17c 1121 _output 
1122 
_output 
2012 KMT M 8th-2 2012/9/18 ~ 2013/1/15 8 3.62 10.61 97.76 0.18 1.90   0.58 2.55  1.29  0 0 
2013 KMT M 8th-3 2013/2/26 ~ 2013/5/31 8 2.17 9.31           3 2 
2013 KMT M 8th-3-ES 1 2013/6/13 ~ 2013/6/27 0 0.41 3.42        2.59  -0.06 0 0 
2013 KMT M 8th-3-ES 2 2013/7/30 ~ 2013/8/9 10 0.41 3.15           0 0 
2013 KMT M 8th-4 2013/9/17 ~ 2014/1/14 6 3.74 20.00 95.14 1.37 1.26   0.51 2.32  0.28  0 0 
2014 KMT M 8th-4-ES 1 2014/1/27 ~ 2014/1/28 1 0.03 0.40           0 0 
2014 KMT M 8th-5 2014/2/21 ~ 2014/5/30 10 1.98 10.34           5 1 
2014 KMT M 8th-5-ES 1 2014/6/13 ~ 2014/7/4 2 0.05 0.70        2.59  -0.07 0 0 
2014 KMT M 8th-5-ES 2 2014/7/28 ~ 2014/8/8 5 0.08 0.35           0 0 
2014 KMT M 8th-6 2014/9/12 ~ 2015/1/23 18 2.08 12.46 105.67 1.25 1.28   2.04 2.14  0.30  2 0 
2015 KMT M 8th-7 2015/2/24 ~ 2015/6/16 1 2.44 19.46        2.59  -0.08 0 0 
2015 KMT M 8th-8 2015/9/15 ~ 2015/12/31 0 1.80 17.97 111.04 1.21 1.12   0.49 2.10  0.20  0 0 
2016 KMT m 9th-1 2016/2/19 ~ 2016/5/19 8 4.04 12.90        2.61  -0.10 0 0 
2016 DPP M 9th-1 2016/5/20 ~ 2016/7/15 1 1.32 5.78           0 0 
2016 DPP M 9th-1-ES 1 2016/7/20 ~ 2016/7/29 0 0.07 0.00           0 0 
2016 DPP M 9th-2 2016/9/13 ~ 2016/12/30 3 4.40 15.71 106.52          1 1 
2017 DPP M 9th-2-ES 1 2017/1/05 ~ 2017/1/19 0 0.10 0.91  0.25 1.20   0.75 2.04  0.40  0 0 
2017 DPP M 9th-3 2017/2/17 ~ 2017/5/31 6 1.95 13.36           2 0 
2017 DPP M 9th-3-ES 1 2017/6/14 ~ 2017/7/5 0 0.14 1.32        2.61  -0.11 0 0 
2017 DPP M 9th-3-ES 2 2017/7/13 ~ 2017/7/21 0 0.00 0.00           0 0 
2017 DPP M 9th-3-ES 3 2017/8/18 ~ 2017/8/31 7 0.04 0.45           0 0 
2017 DPP M 9th-4 2017/9/22 ~ 2017/12/29 4 1.75 12.24           0 0 
2018 DPP M 9th-4-ES 1 2018/1/5 ~ 2018/1/30 0 0.12 1.59  -1.15 1.25   1.43   0.73  0 0 
Note: Fractions, if any, are rounded off to the second decimal place. Data on 11c, 12c, 13c, 141c, 142c, 18c, 19c, 143c, 15c, and 144c are expressed as a 
percentage. Minus numbers in 141c, 18c, and19c mean budget increases in revenue or expenditure. 
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a. See footnote 12 of Chapter 4, p. 117, for the explanation of an exceptional negative value in 19c during 5th-3.  
b. Two different values (2.86 and 2.98) are obtained in 15c during 5th-2 because the supplementary defense budget for FY2002 and the general defense budget 
for FY2003 (without a supplementary budget being provided) were passed in that same session.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 196 
Framework 2 (with Merged LY Session as Unit of Analysis) 
Year Party M/m LY session ofout2 21c 22c 13c 241c 242c 2122 _output 243c 25c 16c 244c 17c Pres apv PM apv Cab apv 
1997 KMT M 3rd-3 + 3-ES 1 7 16.91 15.67* 99.48* 1.46 1.46 0 1.16 3.34 2.37* 0.05 0.04* -0.58 -0.51 -1.02 * 
1997 KMT M 3rd-4 15 6.07 15.67* 99.48* 0.64* 1.16* 1 0.88* 2.73* 2.54 0.59* 0.19 -0.26 0.21 -0.55 
1998 KMT M 3rd-5 11 4.71 15.67* 106.41 1.42 1.42 0 0.42 3.27 2.37* 2.22 0.04* 0.36 -0.77 * -1.02* 
1998 KMT M 3rd-6 2 6.07 15.67* 99.48* 0.64* 1.16* 0 0.88* 2.73* 2.56 0.59* 0.39 -0.76* -0.77* -1.02* 
1999 KMT M 4th-1 9 27.41 15.67* 97.29 -2.22 0.93 0 0.49 3.14 2.37* 0.28 0.04* 0.45 -0.77* -1.02* 
1999 KMT M 4th-2 4 14.21 15.67* 99.48* 0.64* 1.16* 0 0.88* 2.73* 2.37* 0.59* 0.04* -0.04 -0.77* -1.02* 
2000 KMT M 4th-3 2 5.54 15.67* 99.48* 0.64* 1.16* 1 0.88* 2.73* 2.50 0.59* 0.29 0.48 -0.77* -1.02* 
2000 DPP m 4th-3 2 4.28 19.56* 101.21* 2.60* 2.01* 0 2.39* 2.86* 2.49* 0.49* 0.06* 0.54 0.55 -0.09 
2000 DPP m 4th-4 + 4-ES 1 6 5.80 19.56* 101.21* 5.11 2.03 0 1.91 3.13 2.50 0.00 0.29 -0.44 -0.58 -0.62 
2001 DPP m 4th-5 + 5-ES 1 5 2.76 19.56* 101.21* 2.60* 2.01* 0 2.39* 3.17 2.49 0.49* 0.18 -0.14 -0.69 -1.05 
2001 DPP m 4th-6 26 9.12 19.56* 92.98 5.85 5.04 0 1.36 2.86* 2.49* 1.02 0.06* -0.20 -0.41 -0.69* 
2002 DPP m 5th-1 + 1-ES 1 3 18.24 39.37 101.21* 2.60* 2.01* 0 2.39* 2.86* 2.49* 0.49* 0.06* 0.01 0.37 -0.49 
2002 DPP m 5th-2 4 8.37 26.30 93.35 0.88 1.41 0 1.67 2.92 2.45* 0.23 0.13* -0.80 0.06 -0.58 
2003 DPP m 5th-3 + 3-ES 1 4 5.22 16.91 101.21* 2.60* 2.01* 0 2.39* 2.86* 2.43 0.49* 0.03 -0.63 0.11 -0.73 
2003 DPP m 5th-4 1 3.28 13.05 89.11 0.67 1.22 0 0.37 2.78 2.49* 0.08* 0.06* -0.79 -0.14 -0.75 
2004 DPP m 5th-5 + 5-ES 1 25 3.46 12.63 101.21* 2.60* 2.01* 0 2.39* 2.86* 2.46 0.49* -0.07 -0.43 0.00 -0.41 
2004 DPP m 5th-6 9 2.11 8.96 101.50 4.93 1.67 0 0.82 2.72 2.49* 1.69 0.06* -0.73* -0.30* -0.69* 
2005 DPP m 6th-1 6 7.23 27.27 101.21* 2.60* 2.01* 0 2.39* 2.86* 2.43 0.49* -0.02 -0.28 0.16 -0.69* 
2005 DPP m 6th-2 23 5.98 21.82 113.23 1.37 1.74 0 4.98 2.40 2.49* 0.47 0.06* -1.58 -0.94 -1.27 
2006 DPP m 6th-3 + 3-ES 1 5 5.66 28.92 101.21* 2.60* 2.01* 0 2.39* 2.86* 2.40 0.49* 0.02 -1.80 -0.47 -1.09 
2006 DPP m 6th-4 5 2.58 8.29 109.60 2.60* 2.01* 1 2.39* 2.86* 2.49* 0.49* 0.06* -1.67 -0.79 -0.69* 
2007 DPP m 6th-5 + 5-ES 1 17 6.31 24.49 101.21* 1.52 2.13 1 5.74 2.66 2.59 0.38 -0.04 -1.53 -0.84 -0.69* 
2007 DPP m 6th-6 0 4.34 16.13 108.67 0.45 0.80 1 2.31 3.13 2.49* 0.05 0.06* -1.52 -1.21 -0.69* 
2008 DPP m 7th-1 9 6.94 10.17 101.21* 2.60* 2.01* 0 2.39* 2.86* 2.70 0.49* 0.00 -1.90 -0.30* -0.69* 
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Framework 2 (cont.) 
Year Party M/m LY session ofout2 21c 22c 13c 241c 242c 2122 _output 243c 25c 16c 244c 17c Pres apv PM apv Cab apv 
2008 KMT M 7th-1 0 3.44 6.45 99.48* 0.64* 1.16* 2 0.88* 3.07 2.68 0.59* 0.04* -0.64 -0.71 -0.62 
2008 KMT M 7th-2 + 2-ES 1 3 6.52 20.11 99.48* 1.88 1.11 0 2.15 3.00 2.37* 0.00 0.04* -0.80 -0.81 -0.62 
2009 KMT M 7th-3 + 3-ES 1 2 7.92 30.08 99.48* 0.64* 1.16* 1 0.88* 2.73* 2.63 0.59* -0.04 -0.70 -1.01 -1.02* 
2009 KMT M 7th-4 + 4-ES 1 17 4.89 20.78 82.99 0.26 1.15 3 0.89 2.63 2.37* 0.69 0.04* -1.00 -0.08 -1.02* 
2010 KMT M 7th-5 + 5-ES 1-2 7 4.16 14.73 99.48* 0.64* 1.16* 0 0.88* 2.73* 2.55 0.59* -0.05 -0.91 -0.49 -0.94 
2010 KMT M 7th-6 2 3.07 11.15 96.10 0.21 1.11 0 0.86 2.60 2.37* 0.60 0.04* -0.32 -0.20 -1.02* 
2011 KMT M 7th-7 6 3.21 15.12 99.48* 0.64* 1.16* 0 0.88* 2.73* 2.54 0.59* -0.08 -0.69 -0.42 -0.71 
2011 KMT M 7th-8 + 8-ES 1 18 3.87 21.17 102.94 0.00 0.02 2 0.08 2.64 2.37* 0.58 0.04* -0.62 -0.80 -1.02* 
2012 KMT M 8th-1 + 1-ES 1 9 1.97 3.87 99.48* 0.64* 1.16* 0 0.88* 2.73* 2.61 0.59* -0.07 -1.29 -1.00 -1.41 
2012 KMT M 8th-2 8 3.62 10.61 97.76 0.18 1.90 0 0.58 2.55 2.37* 1.29 0.04* -1.61 -1.35 -1.74 
2013 KMT M 8th-3 + 3-ES 1-2 18 2.96 15.17 99.48* 0.64* 1.16* 2 0.88* 2.73* 2.59 0.59* -0.06 -1.80 -1.11 -1.53 
2013 KMT M 8th-4 + 4-ES 1 7 3.77 20.32 95.14 1.37 1.26 0 0.51 2.32 2.37* 0.28 0.04* -1.74 -1.33 -1.45 
2014 KMT M 8th-5 + 5-ES 1-2 17 2.11 11.29 99.48* 0.64* 1.16* 1 0.88* 2.73* 2.59 0.59* -0.07 -1.85 -1.27 -1.02* 
2014 KMT M 8th-6 18 2.08 12.46 105.67 1.25 1.28 0 2.04 2.14 2.37* 0.30 0.04* -1.85 -1.61 -1.02* 
2015 KMT M 8th-7 1 2.44 19.46 99.48* 0.64* 1.16* 0 0.88* 2.73* 2.59 0.59* -0.08 -1.66 -0.77* -1.02* 
2015 KMT M 8th-8 0 1.80 17.97 111.04 1.21 1.12 0 0.49 2.10 2.37* 0.20 0.04* -1.59 -1.39 -1.02* 
2016 KMT m 9th-1 8 4.04 12.90 NA NA NA 0 NA NA 2.61 NA -0.10 -1.18 0.20 N/A 
2016 DPP M 9th-1 + 1-ES 1 1 1.39 5.78 106.52* -0.45* 1.23* 0 1.09* 2.04* 2.61* 0.57* -0.11* -0.18 -0.49 -0.66 
2016 DPP M 9th-2 + 2-ES 1 3 4.50 16.48 106.52 0.25 1.20 1 0.75 2.04 2.61* 0.40 -0.11* -0.80 -1.04 -1.12 
2017 DPP M 9th-3 + 3-ES 1-3 13 2.13 14.89 106.52* -0.45* 1.23* 0 1.09* 2.04* 2.61 0.57* -0.11 -1.03 -1.20 -1.30 
2017 DPP M 9th-4 + 4-ES 1 4 1.87 13.64 106.52* -1.15 1.25 0 1.43 2.04* 2.61* 0.73 -0.11* -0.87 0.07 -1.01* 
Note: Fractions, if any, are rounded off to the second decimal place. Data on 21c, 22c, 13c, 241c, 242c, 243c, 25c, and 244c are expressed as a percentage. The 
approval ratings of each subject (Pres = President; PM = Premier; Cab = Cabinet) are computed with a weighted mean and subjected to a logit transformation. 
Minus numbers in 241c mean budget increases in revenue. Numbers with an asterisk (*) in the tabulation indicate imputed data by the category-mean substitution 
method.   
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Appendix B 
List of interviews 
 
The following is a complete list of all the interviews conducted for this study. The interviews 
are listed in the chronological order they were conducted.    
 
Name Gender Current position/occupation Party 
affiliation 
Date of 
interview 
Location of 
interview 
Hsu Ya-jing Female Director, Business News 
Center, Central News Agency 
Independent 9/18/18 Royal Host-
Songjiang 
Restaurant, Taipei 
Huang Kuo-liang Male Convener, Political Division, 
United Daily News 
Independent 9/19/18 Library134, a café 
in Taipei 
Huang Wei-chu Male Director, Political Division, 
Liberty Times 
Independent 9/19/18 Nola Kitchen-
Linsen 
Restaurant, Taipei 
Lin Yu-fang Male Convener, Foreign and 
National Defense Division, 
Taipei-based National Policy 
Foundation 
Kuomintang 9/21/18 His office, Taipei 
Hsu Hsin-liang Male Chairman, Foundation on 
Asia-Pacific Peace Studies 
Democratic 
Progressive 
Party 
11/14/18 His office, Taipei 
Wu Den-yih Male Chairman, Kuomintang Kuomintang 1/10/19 His office, Taipei 
Ma Ying-jeou Male 12th and 13th President, 
Republic of China  
Kuomintang 1/18/19 His retirement 
office, Taipei 
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Appendix C 
Sample recruitment letter (in English/Chinese) 
 
Recruitment Letter 
 
Dear (prospective participant), 
  
My name is Chih-Yung Ho, a doctoral candidate in Political Science at the University of 
California, Santa Barbara (UCSB). I am writing to invite you to participate in an interview 
for my doctoral dissertation, entitled the ROC Semi-presidentialism at Work Revisited: A 
Within-case Comparison through the Lens of State Capacity. This dissertation, under 
Professor Kathleen Bruhn, conducted an empirical study on the impact of president-
parliamentary congruence (“total governance”) and incongruence (minority government) on 
the country’s governance since Taiwan became semi-presidential in 1997. Your experience 
and knowledge of Taiwan’s political development would make an invaluable contribution to 
the interpretation of my empirical quantitative findings. I hope that you will agree to 
participate in this study.    
 
Specifically, I am asking you to participate in one interview, lasting approximately 60 to 90 
minutes, scheduled at your convenience and in a location of your choice. With your 
permission, I would audio-record our conversation with the intention of precisely quoting 
your remarks. But you do reserve the right to pause or stop the recording at any time if you 
wish. In this scenario, I will ask your permission again to keep a written record of this part of 
conversation instead. If you agree to be interviewed, I will keep your audio-recorded 
responses to my questions confidential and will not share them with anyone other than my 
dissertation committee. After my dissertation is filed and Ph.D. is granted, I will delete the 
audio-recording. Even if I will not transcribe the audio-recording of our conversation, I will 
quote some of your responses to the interview questions in my dissertation. When I have a 
full draft of my dissertation completed, you will be welcome to review and do reserve the 
right to edit or remove any of your remarks quoted herein. The summary of my empirical 
findings, four interview questions, and six statistical tables and figures (all presented in both 
Chinese and English) are submitted herewith for your information and reference.                   
 
It would be a great privilege for me to count on your participation in my empirical study on 
our country’s democratic and constitutional development over the past two decades or so. If 
you have any questions or concerns, please do not hesitate to contact me. I have also included 
the contact information of my dissertation advisor, Professor Kathleen Bruhn, as well as of 
the UCSB Human Subjects Committee (serving as the Institutional Review Board).  
 
Thank you very much for your consideration. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
Chih-Yung Ho 
Doctoral Candidate, Department of Political Science, University of California, Santa Barbara 
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Winner, Dr. Sun Yat-sen Scholarship (2010)    
chihyung_ho@ucsb.edu 
+886 (○) ○○○ ○○○ ○○○ 
  
Dr. Kathleen Bruhn, Professor and Chair of Department of Political Science, University of 
California, Santa Barbara 
bruhn@polsci.ucsb.edu 
+1 805 893 3740 
 
The Human Subjects Committee, University of California, Santa Barbara 
hsc@research.ucsb.edu 
+1 805 893 3807 or +1 805 893 4290 
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博士論文訪談邀請函 
 
敬愛的○○○鈞鑒： 
  
我是美國加州大學聖塔芭芭拉分校（University of California, Santa 
Barbara）政治學博士候選人何志勇，目前在 Kathleen Bruhn教授的指導下，
返台撰寫博士論文 The ROC Semi-presidentialism at Work Revisited: A 
Within-case Comparison through the Lens of State Capacity中譯：（重新
審視中華民國實施雙首長制的憲政經驗：從國家［治理］能力的角度來進行個
案內比較研究），旨在探究我國改行雙首長制至今逾廿年裡，行政和立法權是否
一致（即「完全執政」或少數政府）對國家（治理）能力所造成的影響。您寶
貴的經驗與意見對如何解讀本實證研究（統計分析）的結果至為重要，懇請惠
予面訪為盼。 
 本次訪談預計進行一至一個半小時，訪談日期、時間及地點以您的方便為
主。為求詳實記錄，我將會在徵求您的同意後，對訪談過程進行全程錄音，但
在過程中您也可以隨時要求某些對話暫停錄音，改以書面紀錄來取代之。至於
錄音檔案僅作為本次研究之用，不對外公開，並會在論文完成後銷毀。訪談錄
音內容不會被謄打為逐字稿，但您的部分對話或見解將被引用。待論文初稿完
成後，我會請您協助確認涉及本次訪談的引文，對此您有刪修權。本研究結果
摘要、訪談題目（四題）如附件，另也提供相關的統計圖表給您做為參考（以
上內容皆有中英文對照）。 
 如蒙應允，將會使我對於中華民國在台灣過去廿餘年裡，憲政制度如何影
響國家治理的研究順利獲得成果。對您的協助與參與，敬申謝忱。專此奉邀，
敬祝   
鈞安 
 
美國加州大學聖塔芭芭拉分校政治學博士候
選人、中國國民黨中山獎學金 99年度得主  何志勇敬上 
 
 
10○年(201○)○月○日 
 
聯絡電話：○○○○ ○○○ ○○○ 
E-mail：chihyung_ho@ucsb.edu 
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Appendix D 
Interview questions (in English/Chinese) 
 
1. My empirical study (1997-2018) shows that in Taiwan over the last two decades, the 
selected dimensions of state capacity in president-parliamentary congruence (or SP 
majority regime) were not necessarily better than those in president-parliamentary 
incongruence (or SP minority regime). Do you think this is consistent with your 
understanding? How would you interpret the results, particularly that fail to support the 
theory? 
2. As stated earlier in the summary of findings, “variations in state capacity in ROC SP 
regimes were barely reflected, if at all, in job approval ratings of the President and 
Premier and not reflected for the Cabinet in Taiwan.” What do you think if this implies 
that ruling political parties in Taiwan rely on something else rather than “governance” to 
maintain their political power? 
3. To date, Taiwan has not yet set a constitutional precedent in which the opposition 
political party (or coalition) that wins a legislative majority forms a Cabinet, i.e., the 
French-style “cohabitation.” What do you think of the rationalities underlying their 
choices? Is “cohabitation” foreseeable in Taiwan? 
Background: During the Presidency of Chen Shui-bian (2000-2008), the KMT-led pan-
Blue opposition majority in the Legislative Yuan failed in its attempt to form a Cabinet. 
Right after the DPP won a sweeping victory in Taiwan’s presidential and legislative 
elections in January 2016, then President Ma Ying-jeou proposed allowing the DPP with 
its newly-won legislative majority to form a new Cabinet before the inauguration of the 
new administration in May. However, President-elect Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP turned 
down the proposition. 
4. In Taiwan, for the last two decades and particularly ahead of and after the 2016 general 
elections, there has been much discussion regarding a possible change to the country’s SP 
system. What you think of the necessity and, if necessary, feasibility of a constitutional 
reform in Taiwan?   
 
1. 台灣過去逾廿年的經驗顯示，「完全執政」時的國家（治理）能力並非在各方面優
於少數政府。這和您的理解是一致的嗎？您又如何解讀與理論相悖的部分？ 
2. 雙首長以及內閣的施政滿意度民調和國家展現治理能力的程度脫鉤，這是否意味
著，在台灣，政黨維持政權並非取決於治理本身，而是其他的標準？您如何看待
之？ 
3. 前總統陳水扁任內朝小野大，由掌握國會過半席次的泛藍陣營來組閣卻從未成局；
前總統馬英九在二零一六年大選後曾邀請囊括國會多數席次的民進黨（提前）組
閣，但遭拒。我國也因此未能出現類似法國「左右共治」的憲政慣例。您如何解讀
其中（當事人或政黨）的邏輯？未來「左右共治」在台灣仍可期嗎？ 
4. 在過去廿年裡，改革我國雙首長制的主張時有所聞，國、民兩黨在二零一六年總統
大選前後也曾對此議題交鋒。您認為我國進行憲政體制改革的必要性和（或）可行
性為何？若要改，應該要怎麼改呢？ 
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Appendix E 
Supplemental tables 
 
Table E.1. Contingency Table on M/m and State Capacity (±2σ) 
(Observed counts) (Expected 
counts)b 
State capacity σa M m Totals M m 
Legal 11c 
(bills of law passed in the Legislature) 
2~ 2 1 3 1.83  1.17  
1~2 1 2 3 1.83  1.17  
0~1 14 9 23 14.01  8.99  
-1~0 28 10 38 23.15  14.85  
-2~-1 0 3 3 1.83  1.17  
~-2 0 0 0 0.00  0.00  
12c 
(bills of law proposed by the Cabinet 
passed in the Legislature) 
2~ 1 1 2 1.22  0.78  
1~2 6 3 9 5.48  3.52  
0~1 17 10 27 16.45  10.55  
-1~0 10 6 16 9.75  6.25  
-2~-1 11 5 16 9.75  6.25  
~-2 0 0 0 0.00  0.00  
 
Extractive/fiscal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13c 
(A/P ratio: ratio of actual tax revenue to 
predicted tax revenue) 
2~ 0 0 0 0.00  0.00  
1~2 1 1 2 1.22  0.78  
0~1 4 3 7 4.26  2.74  
-1~0 4 2 6 3.66  2.34  
-2~-1 0 1 1 0.61  0.39  
~-2 1 0 1 0.61  0.39  
141c 
(cut/increase to the annual general budget 
in revenue) 
2~ 0 0 0 0.00  0.00  
1~2 1 3 4 2.44  1.56  
0~1 4 5 9 5.48  3.52  
-1~0 5 0 5 3.05  1.95  
-2~-1 1 0 1 0.61  0.39  
~-2 1 0 1 0.61  0.39  
142c 
(cut to the annual general budget in 
expenditure) 
 
 
 
2~ 0 1 1 0.61  0.39  
1~2 1 0 1 0.61  0.39  
0~1 6 2 8 4.87  3.13  
-1~0 4 5 9 5.48  3.52  
-2~-1 0 0 0 0.00  0.00  
~-2 1 0 1 0.61  0.39  
18c 
(cut/increase to the supplementary budget 
in revenue) 
2~ 0 0 0 0.00  0.00  
1~2 1 0 1 0.61  0.39  
0~1 0 4 4 2.44  1.56  
-1~0 2 0 2 1.22  0.78  
-2~-1 0 1 1 0.61  0.39  
~-2 0 0 0 0.00  0.00  
19c 
(cut to the supplementary budget in 
expenditure) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2~ 0 0 0 0.00  0.00  
1~2 1 1 2 1.22  0.78  
0~1 0 0 0 0.00  0.00  
-1~0 2 4 6 3.66  2.34  
-2~-1 0 1 1 0.61  0.39  
~-2 0 0 0 0.00  0.00  
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Table E.1. (cont.) 
(Observed counts) (Expected 
counts)b 
State capacity σa M m Totals M m 
Extractive/fiscal 1122c_output 
(number of amendments to the Tax 
Collection Act that contain significant 
changes to the goals of improving fiscal 
capacity) 
 
2~ 4 3 7 4.26  2.74  
1~2 0 0 0 0.00  0.00  
0~1 5 0 5 3.05  1.95  
-1~0 36 22 58 35.33  22.67  
-2~-1 0 0 0 0.00  0.00  
~-2 0 0 0 0.00  0.00  
Military 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
143c 
(cut to the annual defense budget in 
expenditure) 
2~ 0 0 0 0.00  0.00  
1~2 2 2 4 2.44  1.56  
0~1 2 0 2 1.22  0.78  
-1~0 7 5 12 7.31  4.69  
-2~-1 1 1 2 1.22  0.78  
~-2 0 0 0 0.00  0.00  
15c 
(military expenditure as a share of GDP) 
 
2~ 0 0 0 0.00  0.00  
1~2 3 3 6 3.66  2.34  
0~1 3 1 4 2.44  1.56  
-1~0 3 4 7 4.26  2.74  
-2~-1 3 1 4 2.44  1.56  
~-2 0 0 0 0.00  0.00  
16c 
(logged defense budget in expenditure per 
capita) 
2~ 0 1 1 0.61  0.39  
1~2 1 1 2 1.22  0.78  
0~1 6 1 7 4.26  2.74  
-1~0 4 6 10 6.09  3.91  
-2~-1 1 1 2 1.22  0.78  
~-2 0 0 0 0.00  0.00  
Coercive 144c 
(cut to the annual police budget in 
expenditure) 
 
 
 
2~ 1 1 2 1.22  0.78  
1~2 1 0 1 0.61  0.39  
0~1 2 1 3 1.83  1.17  
-1~0 7 6 13 7.92  5.08  
-2~-1 1 0 1 0.61  0.39  
~-2 0 0 0 0.00  0.00  
17c 
(logged police force spending per capita) 
2~ 1 1 2 1.22  0.78  
1~2 1 1 2 1.22  0.78  
0~1 1 1 2 1.22  0.78  
-1~0 8 6 14 8.53  5.47  
-2~-1 0 1 1 0.61  0.39  
~-2 0 0 0 0.00  0.00  
Administrative/
bureaucratic 
ofout1 
(number of Cabinet/Cabinet-level 
members left office) 
2~ 4 3 7 4.26  2.74  
1~2 3 1 4 2.44  1.56  
0~1 10 3 13 7.92  5.08  
-1~0 28 18 46 28.02  17.98  
-2~-1 0 0 0 0.00  0.00  
~-2 0 0 0 0.00  0.00  
 Totals  279 179 458 279 179 
H0: M/m is not associated with state capacity, and 
H1: M/m is associated with state capacity. 
a. 2~ = greater than 2σ. 
1~2 = greater than 1σ and less than or equal to 2σ.  
0~1 = greater than or equal to 0 and less than or equal to 1σ. 
-1~0 = greater than or equal to -1σ and less than 0. 
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-2~-1 = greater than or equal to -2σ and less than -1σ.  
~-2 = less than -2σ. 
(Remove gray-shaded rows, i.e., no observations, before computation.) 
b. The expected count (or value) for each cell = (row total*column total)/n. 
Where  
n = the total number of observations (“Totals”). 
(Round off to the second decimal place.) 
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Table E.2. Bills of Law Passed by Session 
Session Regime Period 
(month/date/year) 
 Number 
of bills of 
law 
introduced 
& 
proposed 
Number 
of bills 
of law 
passed 
(Accumulated) 
number of bills 
of law 
introduced & 
proposeda 
Percentage 
of bills of 
law passed 
Number of 
bills of 
law 
proposed 
by 
Cabinetb 
Number of 
bills of law 
proposed by 
Cabinet 
passedc 
(Accumulated) 
number of bills 
of law 
proposed by 
Cabinet 
Percentage of 
passed bills of 
law proposed 
by Cabinet  
3rd-1 KMT M 2/1/ ~ 7/2/96 121 6 121 4.96% 39 N/A N/A N/A 
3rd-2 KMT M 9/2/ ~ 12/31/96 271 28 386 7.25% 58 N/A N/A N/A 
3rd-3 KMT M 2/18 ~ 5/31/97 180 91 538 16.91% 29 N/A N/A N/A 
3rd-3-ES 1 KMT M 7/28 ~ 8/11/97 0 0 447 0.00% 0 N/A N/A N/A 
3rd-4 KMT M 9/9/97 ~ 1/9/98 229 41 676 6.07% 75 N/A N/A N/A 
3rd-5 KMT M 2/20 ~ 5/29/98 236 41 871 4.71% 49 N/A N/A N/A 
3rd-6 KMT M 9/11/98 ~ 
1/15/99 
191 62 1021 6.07% 55 N/A N/A N/A 
4th-1 KMT M 2/1/ ~ 6/22/99 259 71 259 27.41% 62 N/A N/A N/A 
4th-2 KMT M 9/17/99 ~ 
1/16/00 
530 102 718 14.21% 164 N/A N/A N/A 
4th-3d KMT M 2/18 ~ 5/19/00 214 46 830 5.54% 113 N/A N/A N/A 
4th-3  DPP m 5/20 ~ 7/28/00 198 42 982 4.28% 20 N/A N/A N/A 
4th-4 DPP m 9/15/00 ~ 
1/4/01 
371 76 1311 5.80% 120 N/A N/A N/A 
4th-4-ES 1 DPP m 1/30 ~ 1/31/01 0 0 1235 0.00% 0 N/A N/A N/A 
4th-5 DPP m 2/20 ~ 6/6/01 501 42 1736 2.42% 247 N/A N/A N/A 
4th-5-ES 1 DPP m 6/26 ~ 6/27/01 0 6 1694 0.35% 0 N/A N/A N/A 
4th-6 DPP m 9/20/01 ~ 
1/18/02 
198 172 1886 9.12% 94 N/A N/A N/A 
5th-1 DPP m 2/1 ~ 6/21/02 965 176 965 18.24% 414 163 414 39.37% 
5th-1-ES 1 DPP m 7/15 ~ 7/17/02 0 0 789 0.00% 0 0 251 0.00% 
5th-2 DPP m 9/24/02 ~ 
1/14/03 
453 104 1242 8.37% 114 96 365 26.30% 
5th-3 DPP m 2/25 ~ 6/6/03 395 76 1533 4.96% 80 55 349 15.76% 
5th-3-ES 1 DPP m 7/8 ~ 7/10/03 0 4 1457 0.27% 0 4 294 1.36% 
5th-4 DPP m 9/5/03 ~ 
1/13/04 
407 61 1860 3.28% 93 50 383 13.05% 
5th-5 DPP m 2/6 ~ 6/11/04 249 65 2048 3.17% 39 45 372 12.10% 
5th-5-ES 1 DPP m 8/11 ~ 8/24/04 5 6 1988 0.30% 0 2 327 0.61% 
5th-6 DPP m 9/14/04 ~ 
1/24/05 
152 45 2134 2.11% 21 31 346 8.96% 
6th-1 
 
DPP m 2/25 ~ 5/31/05 567 41 567 7.23% 88 24 88 27.27% 
  
 
   
207 
6th-2 DPP m 9/13/05 ~ 
1/13/06 
545 64 1071 5.98% 101 36 165 21.82% 
6th-3 DPP m 2/21 ~ 5/30/06 247 69 1254 5.50% 37 48 166 28.92% 
6th-3-ES 1 DPP m 6/13 ~ 6/30/06 1 2 1186 0.17% 0 0 118 0.00% 
6th-4 DPP m 9/19/06 ~ 
1/19/07 
329 39 1513 2.58% 55 16 173 9.25% 
6th-5 DPP m 2/27 ~ 6/15/07 267 105 1741 6.03% 39 46 196 23.47% 
6th-5-ES 1 DPP m 7/10 ~ 7/20/07 1 5 1637 0.31% 0 2 150 1.33% 
6th-6 DPP m 9/7 ~ 12/21/07 282 83 1914 4.34% 68 35 216 16.20% 
7th-1 DPP m 2/22 ~ 5/19/08 461 32 461 6.94% 118 12 118 10.17% 
7th-1 KMT M 5/20 ~ 7/18/08 210 22 639 3.44% 18 8 124 6.45% 
7th-2 KMT M 9/19/08 ~ 1/13/09 441 68 1058 6.43% 73 38 189 20.11% 
7th-2-ES 1 KMT M 1/15 ~ 1/16/09 0 1 990 0.10% 0 0 151 0.00% 
7th-3 KMT M 2/20 ~ 6/16/09 474 115 1463 7.86% 114 79 265 29.81% 
7th-3-ES 1 KMT M 8/25 ~ 8/27/09 2 1 1350 0.07% 1 1 187 0.53% 
7th-4 KMT M 9/18/09 ~ 1/12/10 408 85 1757 4.84% 69 52 255 20.39% 
7th-4-ES 1 KMT M 1/18 ~ 1/19/10 0 1 1672 0.06% 0 1 203 0.49% 
7th-5 KMT M 2/23 ~ 6/8/10 365 67 2036 3.29% 51 27 253 10.67% 
7th-5-ES 1 KMT M 7/8 ~ 7/14/10 4 5 1973 0.25% 4 2 230 0.87% 
7th-5-ES 2 KMT M 8/17 ~ 8/30/10 1 13 1969 0.66% 1 9 229 3.93% 
7th-6 KMT M 9/24/10 ~ 1/12/11 421 73 2377 3.07% 58 31 278 11.15% 
7th-7 KMT M 2/22 ~ 6/14/11 623 94 2927 3.21% 183 65 430 15.12% 
7th-8 KMT M 9/16 ~ 12/14/11 243 94 3076 3.06% 46 63 411 15.33% 
7th-8-ES 1  KMT M 1/19 ~ 1/20/12 0 25 2982 0.84% 0 24 348 6.90% 
8th-1 KMT M 2/24 ~ 6/15/12 1014 11 1014 1.08% 181 4 181 2.21% 
8th-1-ES 1 KMT M 7/24 ~ 7/27/12 0 9 1003 0.90% 0 3 177 1.69% 
8th-2 KMT M 9/18/12 ~ 1/15/13 910 69 1904 3.62% 71 26 245 10.61% 
8th-3 KMT M 2/26 ~ 5/31/13 656 54 2491 2.17% 71 27 290 9.31% 
8th-3-ES 1 KMT M 6/13 ~ 6/27/13 0 10 2437 0.41% 0 9 263 3.42% 
8th-3-ES 2 KMT M 7/30 ~ 8/9/13 6 10 2433 0.41% 0 8 254 3.15% 
8th-4 KMT M 9/17/13 ~ 1/14/14 868 123 3291 3.74% 69 63 315 20.00% 
8th-4-ES 1 KMT M 1/27 ~ 1/28/14 0 1 3168 0.03% 0 1 252 0.40% 
8th-5 KMT M 2/21 ~ 5/30/14 625 75 3792 1.98% 68 33 319 10.34% 
8th-5-ES 1 KMT M 6/13 ~ 7/4/14 0 2 3717 0.05% 0 2 286 0.70% 
8th-5-ES 2 KMT M 7/28 ~ 8/8/14 3 3 3718 0.08% 0 1 284 0.35% 
8th-6 KMT M 9/12/14 ~ 1/23/15 619 90 4334 2.08% 70 44 353 12.46% 
8th-7 KMT M 2/24 ~ 6/16/15 476 115 4720 2.44% 25 65 334 19.46% 
8th-8 KMT M 9/15 ~ 12/31/15 282 88 4887 1.80% 37 55 306 17.97% 
9th-1 KMT m 2/19 ~ 5/19/16 1065 43 1065 4.04% 186 24 186 12.90% 
9th-1 DPP M 5/20 ~ 7/15/16 342 18 1364 1.32% 11 10 173 5.78% 
9th-1-ES 1 DPP M 7/20 ~ 7/29/16 0 1 1346 0.07% 0 0 163 0.00% 
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Table E.2. (cont.) 
Session Regime Period 
(month/date/year) 
 Number 
of bills of 
law 
introduced 
& 
proposed 
Number 
of bills 
of law 
passed 
(Accumulated) 
number of bills 
of law 
introduced & 
proposeda 
Percentage 
of bills of 
law passed 
Number of 
bills of 
law 
proposed 
by 
Cabinetb 
Number of 
bills of law 
proposed by 
Cabinet 
passedc 
(Accumulated) 
number of bills 
of law 
proposed by 
Cabinet 
Percentage of 
passed bills of 
law proposed 
by Cabinet  
9th-2 DPP M 9/13 ~ 12/30/16 768 93 2113 4.40% 98 41 261 15.71% 
9th-2-ES 1 DPP M 1/05 ~ 1/19/17 0 2 2020 0.10% 0 2 220 0.91% 
9th-3 DPP M 2/17 ~ 5/31/17 797 55 2815 1.95% 44 35 262 13.36% 
9th-3-ES 1 DPP M 6/14 ~ 7/5/17 0 4 2760 0.14% 0 3 227 1.32% 
9th-3-ES 2 DPP M 7/13 ~ 7/21/17 1 0 2757 0.00% 0 0 224 0.00% 
9th-3-ES 3  DPP M 8/18 ~ 8/31/17 0 1 2757 0.04% 0 1 224 0.45% 
9th-4 DPP M 9/22 ~ 12/29/17 726 61 3482 1.75% 63 35 286 12.24% 
9th-4-ES 1 DPP M 1/5 ~ 1/30/18 0 4 3421 0.12% 0 4 251 1.59% 
Note: Data from the website of the Legislative Statistics, (ROC) Parliamentary Library: https://lis.ly.gov.tw/lgstatc/lgstat 
a. The (accumulated) total is reduced by the number of bills passed, and goes to zero with a new LY seated. See more details in footnote 24, Chapter 3 and 
Yang’s (2003) equation of the “relative number of laws supplied and demanded” in Chapter 2, pp. 40-41. 
b. The statistics provided in this column include the number of bills of law prosed by the Cabinet and that jointly proposed by the Cabinet and one or more 
other non-Legislative branches. 
c. The data on the number of bills of law proposed by the Cabinet passed in the LY became assessible on the Legislative Statistics Service, beginning with the 
5th LY sworn in 2012. 
d. The 3rd session of the 4th LY, the 1st session of the 7th LY, and the 1st session of the 9th LY are each divided into two rows, namely, “KMT M/4th-3 and 
DPP m/4th-3,” “DPP m/7th-1 and KMT M/7th-1,” and “KMT m/9th-1 and DPP M/9th-1” to indicate three transfers of power in Taiwan. 
 
 
 
 
  
209 
   
 
Table E.3. Bills of Law Introduced/proposed by Institution & Session 
Session Regime Number of 
bills of law 
introduced 
& proposed 
Number of 
bills of law 
proposed by 
Cabinet 
Percentage of 
bills of law 
proposed by 
Cabinet 
Number of bills 
of law proposed 
by lawmakers & 
party caucuses 
Percentage of 
bills proposed by 
lawmakers & 
party caucuses 
3rd-1 KMT M 121 39 32.23% 82 67.77% 
3rd-2 KMT M 271 58 21.40% 213 78.60% 
3rd-3 KMT M 180 29 16.11% 151 83.89% 
3rd-3-ES 1 KMT M 0 0 N/A 0 N/A 
3rd-4 KMT M 229 75 32.75% 154 67.25% 
3rd-5 KMT M 236 49 20.76% 187 79.24% 
3rd-6 KMT M 191 55 28.80% 136 71.20% 
4th-1 KMT M 259 62 23.94% 197 76.06% 
4th-2 KMT M 530 164 30.94% 366 69.06% 
4th-3 c KMT M 214 113 52.80% 101 47.20% 
4th-3  DPP m 198 20 10.10% 178 89.90% 
4th-4 DPP m 371 120 32.35% 251 67.65% 
4th-4-ES 1 DPP m 0 0 N/A 0 N/A 
4th-5 DPP m 501 247 49.30% 254 50.70% 
4th-5-ES 1 DPP m 0 0 N/A 0 N/A 
4th-6 DPP m 198 94 47.47% 104 52.53% 
5th-1 DPP m 965 414 42.90% 551 57.10% 
5th-1-ES 1 DPP m 0 0 N/A 0 N/A 
5th-2 DPP m 453 114 25.17% 339 74.83% 
5th-3 DPP m 395 80 20.25% 315 79.75% 
5th-3-ES 1 DPP m 0 0 N/A 0 N/A 
5th-4 DPP m 407 93 22.85% 314 77.15% 
5th-5 DPP m 249 39 15.66% 210 84.34% 
5th-5-ES 1 DPP m 5 0 0.00% 5 100.00% 
5th-6 DPP m 152 21 13.82% 131 86.18% 
6th-1 DPP m 567 88 15.52% 479 84.48% 
6th-2 DPP m 545 101 18.53% 444 81.47% 
6th-3 DPP m 247 37 14.98% 210 85.02% 
6th-3-ES 1 DPP m 1 0 0.00% 1 100.00% 
6th-4 DPP m 329 55 16.72% 274 83.28% 
6th-5 DPP m 267 39 14.61% 228 85.39% 
6th-5-ES 1 DPP m 1 0 0.00% 1 100.00% 
6th-6 DPP m 282 68 24.11% 214 75.89% 
7th-1 DPP m 461 118 25.60% 343 74.40% 
7th-1 KMT M 210 18 8.57% 192 91.43% 
7th-2 KMT M 441 73 16.55% 368 83.45% 
7th-2-ES 1 KMT M 0 0 N/A 0 N/A 
7th-3 KMT M 474 114 24.05% 360 75.95% 
7th-3-ES 1 KMT M 2 1 50.00% 1 50.00% 
7th-4 KMT M 408 69 16.91% 339 83.09% 
7th-4-ES 1 KMT M 0 0 N/A 0 N/A 
7th-5 KMT M 365 51 13.97% 314 86.03% 
7th-5-ES 1 KMT M 4 4 100.00% 0 0.00% 
7th-5-ES 2 KMT M 1 1 100.00% 0 0.00% 
7th-6 KMT M 421 58 13.78% 363 86.22% 
7th-7 KMT M 623 183 29.37% 440 70.63% 
7th-8 KMT M 243 46 18.93% 197 81.07% 
7th-8-ES 1  KMT M 0 0 N/A 0 N/A 
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Table E.3. (cont.) 
Session Regime Number of 
bills of law 
introduced 
& proposed 
Number of 
bills of law 
proposed by 
Cabinet 
Percentage of 
bills of law 
proposed by 
Cabinet 
Number of bills 
of law proposed 
by lawmakers & 
party caucuses 
Percentage of 
bills proposed by 
lawmakers & 
party caucuses 
8th-1 KMT M 1014 181 17.85% 833 82.15% 
8th-1-ES 1 KMT M 0 0 N/A 0 N/A 
8th-2 KMT M 910 71 7.80% 839 92.20% 
8th-3 KMT M 656 71 10.82% 585 89.18% 
8th-3-ES 1 KMT M 0 0 N/A 0 N/A 
8th-3-ES 2 KMT M 6 0 0.00% 6 100.00% 
8th-4 KMT M 868 69 7.95% 799 92.05% 
8th-4-ES 1 KMT M 0 0 N/A 0 N/A 
8th-5 KMT M 625 68 10.88% 557 89.12% 
8th-5-ES 1 KMT M 0 0 N/A 0 N/A 
8th-5-ES 2 KMT M 3 0 0.00% 3 100.00% 
8th-6 KMT M 619 70 11.31% 549 88.69% 
8th-7 KMT M 476 25 5.25% 451 94.75% 
8th-8 KMT M 282 37 13.12% 245 86.88% 
9th-1 KMT m 1065 186 17.46% 879 82.54% 
9th-1 DPP M 342 11 3.22% 331 96.78% 
9th-1-ES 1 DPP M 0 0 N/A 0 N/A 
9th-2 DPP M 768 98 12.76% 670 87.24% 
9th-2-ES 1 DPP M 0 0 N/A 0 N/A 
9th-3 DPP M 797 44 5.52% 753 94.48% 
9th-3-ES 1 DPP M 0 0 N/A 0 N/A 
9th-3-ES 2 DPP M 1 0 0.00% 1 100.00% 
9th-3-ES 3  DPP M 0 0 N/A 0 N/A 
9th-4 DPP M 726 63 8.68% 663 91.32% 
9th-4-ES 1 DPP M 0 0 N/A 0 N/A 
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Table E.4. Annual Central Government General Budget Review by Fiscal Year 
Unit: New Taiwan (NT) dollar (thousands)a 
Fiscal year Regime Periodb 
(month/date/year) 
Submitted 
annual revenue 
for approval 
Passed annual 
revenue 
Percentage 
of budget 
cut/increase 
(revenue)c 
Submitted 
annual 
expenditure for 
approval 
Passed annual 
expenditure 
Percentage of 
budget cut 
(expenditure) 
1998 KMT M 3/10 ~ 5/30/97 $1,243,464,656 $1,225,264,656 1.46% $1,243,464,656 $1,225,264,656 1.46% 
1999 KMT M 3/10 ~ 5/29/98 $1,271,440,211 $1,253,440,211  1.42% $1,271,440,211 $1,253,440,211 1.42% 
2H 1999 & 2000 KMT M 2/25 ~ 5/28/99 $1,942,575,877 $1,985,645,323 (2.22%) $2,255,769,216 $2,234,769,216 0.93% 
2001 DPP m 10/21/00 ~ 1/4/01 
(8/31 ~ w/d 10/7/00)d 
$1,458,476,645 $1,384,008,953 5.11% $1,608,147,394 $1,575,479,832 2.03% 
2002 DPP m 8/28/01 ~ 1/18/02 $1,340,726,906 $1,262,283,121 5.85% $1,599,289,471 $1,518,724,533  5.04% 
2003 DPP m 8/29/02 ~ 1/10/03 $1,334,245,980 $1,322,477,817 0.88% $1,572,367,870 $1,550,254,213  1.41% 
2004 DPP m 8/28/03 ~ 1/13/04 $1,353,933,410 $1,344,853,316 0.67% $1,611,281,276  $1,591,569,910  1.22% 
2005 DPP m 8/30/04 ~ 1/21/05 $1,402,718,320 $1,333,619,362 4.93% $1,635,615,000 $1,608,326,140 1.67% 
2006 DPP m 8/30/05 ~ 1/12/06 $1,403,822,810 $1,384,582,416 1.37% $1,599,560,424 $1,571,685,071 1.74% 
2007 DPP m 8/30/06 ~ 6/15/07 $1,511,713,010 $1,488,689,851 1.52% $1,663,807,421 $1,628,351,207  2.13% 
2008  DPP m  8/30 ~ 12/20/07 $1,601,616,717 $1,594,436,316 0.45% $1,699,478,897 $1,685,856,453  0.80% 
2009 KMT M 8/28/08 ~ 1/15/09 $1,705,207,932 $1,673,231,316 1.88% $1,829,988,997 $1,809,667,004  1.11% 
2010 KMT M 9/24/09 ~ 1/12/10 
(8/31 ~ w/d 9/17/09) 
$1,552,032,459 $1,547,986,445 0.26% $1,734,950,382 $1,714,937,403 1.15% 
2011 KMT M 8/31/10 ~ 1/12/11 $1,630,611,392 $1,627,246,853 0.21% $1,789,622,210 $1,769,844,184 1.11% 
2012 KMT M 8/31 ~ 12/13/11 $1,729,474,748 $1,729,431,644 0.00% $1,938,974,923 $1,938,637,325  0.02% 
2013 KMT M 8/31/12 ~ 1/15/13 $1,730,195,815 $1,733,259,058 0.18% $1,944,608,461 $1,907,567,387  1.90% 
2014 KMT M 8/30/13 ~ 1/14/14 $1,730,800,121 $1,707,156,731 1.37% $1,940,732,242 $1,916,227,714  1.26% 
2015 KMT M 8/29/14 ~ 1/23/15 $1,799,267,683 $1,776,702,733 1.25% $1,959,658,165 $1,934,636,035  1.28% 
2016 KMT M 8/31 ~ 12/18/15 $1,844,624,363 $1,822,377,773 1.21% $1,998,192,346 $1,975,866,301 1.12% 
2017 DPP M 8/31/16 ~ 1/19/17 $1,845,655,556 $1,841,099,445 0.25% $1,997,995,520 $1,973,995,947 1.20% 
2018 DPP M 9/14/17 ~ 1/30/18 
(8/31 ~ w/d 9/8/17) 
$1,897,404,169 $1,919,175,004 (1.15%) $1,991,773,071 $1,966,862,309 1.25% 
Note: Data for the general budget (bill) from the website of the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS), Executive Yuan, ROC: 
https://www.dgbas.gov.tw and for the period from the website of the Legislative Statistics, (ROC) Parliamentary Library: https://lis.ly.gov.tw/lgstatc/lgstat 
a. NT$1,000 = US$29.635 (the foreign exchange rate [buying rate] adopted as of May 21, 2018).    
b. The period begins when the Cabinet submits a general budget bill for the next fiscal year to the LY for approval. The period ends when the LY passes the 
general budget bill and then sends the general budget to the President for promulgation. The process of the LY’s budget deliberation is normally concluded 
within a legislative session (or perhaps in one of its following extraordinary sessions), except that of nine and half months for FY 2007. 
c. Numbers in parentheses are percentages of budget increases in revenue. 
d. The budget bills for FYs 2001, 2010, and 2018 were each withdrawn owing to a Cabinet reshuffle and then re-submitted by a new Premier. The dates of first 
submission and subsequent withdrawal are given in parentheses.  
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Table E.5. Central Government Supplementary Budget Review by Fiscal Year 
Unit: New Taiwan (NT) dollar (thousands)a 
Fiscal year Regime Periodb 
(month/date/year) 
Submitted 
supplementary 
revenue for 
approval 
Passed 
supplementary 
revenue 
Percentage of 
budget 
cut/increase 
(revenue)c 
Submitted 
supplementary 
expenditure for 
approval 
Passed 
supplementary 
expenditure 
Percentage of 
budget cut 
(expenditure) 
1999 KMT M 9/22 ~ 10/22/98 $67,112,062 $63,757,062 5.00% $67,112,062  $63,757,062 5.00% 
2H 1999 & 
2000 
KMT M 8/31 ~ 12/12/00 N/A N/A N/A $80,000,000  $80,000,000  0% 
2001 DPP m 3/23 ~ 6/5/01 $10,634,538 $10,634,538 0% $80,029,176 $61,599,291  23.03% 
2002 DPP m 8/29 ~ 12/17/02 $37,880,556  $37,880,556 0% $72,045,939 $72,013,939  0.04% 
2003 (1st) DPP m 2/19 ~ 6/5/03  24,670,000 $35,370,000 (43.37%) $69,931,904 $77,715,936 (11.13%) 
2003 (2nd) DPP m 8/28 ~ 12/23/03  $3,790,000  $3,790,000  0% $28,790,000 $28,790,000  0% 
2004 DPP m 8/4 ~ 8/19/04  $4,600,000  $4,600,000  0%  $5,700,000   $5,700,000  0% 
2008  DPP m  5/30 ~ 7/17/08 $25,860,973 $25,860,973 0% $25,860,973  $25,860,973  0% 
2011 KMT M 2011/4/29-
2011/6/10 
$18,571,736 $18,567,747 0.02% $18,571,736 $18,567,747 0.02% 
Note: Data for the supplementary budget (bill) from the website of the DGBAS, Executive Yuan, ROC: https://www.dgbas.gov.tw and for the period from the 
website of the Legislative Statistics, (ROC) Parliamentary Library: https://lis.ly.gov.tw/lgstatc/lgstat 
a. NT$1,000 = US$29.635 (the foreign exchange rate [buying rate] adopted as of May 21, 2018). 
b. The period begins when the Cabinet submits a supplementary budget bill for the current fiscal year to the LY for approval. The period ends when the LY 
passes the supplementary budget bill and then sends the supplementary budget to the President for promulgation. 
c. Numbers in parentheses are percentages of budget increases in revenue or expenditure. 
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Appendix F 
Regression diagnostics  
 
The results of Spearman’s rank correlation (performed in model building in Chapter 
3, on pp. 93-94) and VIF tests (performed on my parsimonious models consisting of the 
selected 9 IVs) showed that the absolute value of the correlation coefficients (rho) 
between pairs of the selected IVs ranged from weak to moderate correlation ( 0.0065 < 
rho < 0.48923) and the VIF for each selected IV was low, ranging from 1.310981 to 
1.568640, and within the acceptable range of less than 5, regardless of the VIF of either 
control variable, i.e., KMT/DPP rule or M/m status, (which must be kept within the 
models for completeness) being high—7.446726 for the party factor and 8.744844 for the 
institutional factor. All the three models were therefore regarded as having no 
multicollinearity problem (CLRM Assumption 3). 
The diagnostic plots of the residuals (Figures A1-3) did not reveal any serious 
problems with the other four CLRM assumptions. The diagnostics are as follows: 
1. In each of the three models, both the residual plot (Residual vs. Fitted values) and the 
standardized residual plot (Scale-Location) showed that the residuals seemed not 
correlated cross observations, i.e., no autocorrelation. Likewise, the results of the 
Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity (non-constant variance of residuals) 
revealed that the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity could not be rejected at the 0.05 
level in any of the models (p-value = 0.9541 in Model 1; p-value = 0.9996 in Model 
2; p-value = 0.9599 in Model 3). The results satisfied the assumption of independence 
among residuals (CLRM Assumption 4). 
2. In the Q-Q (quantile-quantile) plot for each model, with the respective three large 
outliers being disregarded, the residuals of each of my models were generally close to 
normal distribution (although those of Model 3 appeared relatively less consistent), 
which satisfied the assumption of normally distributed error terms (CLRM 
Assumption 5).1 
 
When error terms of my models had constant variance and were normally distributed, 
the models also satisfied strict exogeneity (CLRM Assumption 2).     
 
                                                      
1 In Model 1, the three large outliers were the 3rd session of 4th LY (under DPP m), the 3rd session of 6th 
LY and its extraordinary session, and the 2nd session of 8th LY in Model 1; for Model 2, the 4th session of 
3rd LY, the 3rd session of 4th LY (under DPP m), and the 4th session of 9th LY and its extraordinary 
session; and for Model 3, the 3rd session of 4th LY (under DPP m), the 3rd session of 8th LY and its two 
extraordinary sessions, and the 4th session of 9th LY and its extraordinary session. 
 Since large outliers are not necessarily leverage points which have greatest influence on a regression 
model, I employed Cook’s distance to identify influential cases. In Model 1, the 6th session of 3rd LY, the 
5th session of 5th LY and its extraordinary session, and the 6th session of 4th LY were the leverage points; 
for Model 2, the 4th session of 3rd LY, the 1st session of 4th LY, and the 6th session of 6th LY were the 
leverage points; and for Model 3, the 6th session of 4th LY, the 2nd session of 6th LY, and the 2nd session 
of 8th LY. Accordingly, only (KMT m during) the 4th session of 3rd LY, a large outlier in Model 2, was 
identified as a leverage point in the same model, perhaps because of its good record of generating higher 
military/coercive capacity in terms of the (logged) defense budget in expenditure per capita (placed 17th of 
44 after imputation) and the (logged) police force spending per capita (placed 5th of 44 after imputation). 
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Figure A1. Diagnostic plots for Model 1. 
 
 
Figure A2. Diagnostic plots for Model 2. 
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Figure A3. Diagnostic plots for Model 3. 
 
